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ABSTRACT 
Variable Performance Linked Pay and its Impact on 
Employee Performance - A study of select MNCs 
1. Issue of Variable Performance Linked Pay 
India has demonstrated tremendous growth in recent years, making it one of the most 
competitive markets in the world. However with this growth, we have also seen the 
emergence of a highly competitive talent market and a rise in the cost of attracting, 
retaining and motivating key talent. Companies are exploring meaningful ways of 
rewarding their workforce. There is an attempt to link employee pay to their 
performance for their own sustainability. It is anticipated that linking pay to 
performance may motivate employees to perform better. Therefore variable 
performance linked pay plans continue to grow in popularity globally as well as in 
India. Variable Performance Linked Pay has therefore become a fixture in the 
organisational landscape, with purported advantages ranging from increased firm 
performance, employee motivation, pay satisfaction and job satisfaction to reduced 
absenteeism and turnover (Heneman, 1992). 
It may be noted that 78% companies in US and an increasing number of organisations 
globally have implemented variable pay plans (Hansen, 2005). Traditional 
compensation systems with grades, matrices, and annual reviews do provide a sense 
of control, order, and stability. The issue is that we operate in a business environment 
where the only constant thing is change, where flexibility is mandatory, and where 
controlling must evolve to influencing. However, organizations are moving away 
from traditional compensation schemes, and towards more flexible pay systems that 
are more strategically aligned with complex, changing business environments 
(Heneman et al., 2000; Lawler, 2000). Variable Performance Linked Pay Schemes 
such as bonuses, gain sharing, and stock plans are increasingly complementing or 
replacing more traditional Pay for Performance plans internationally (Flynn, 1999; 
Heery, 1996). As a result, organizations invest tremendous amount of time and money 
to design, administer and deliver competitive pay schemes to their employees (Lawler, 
2000). 
The degree of reliance on variable pay schemes varies considerably from one country 
to another because of cultural and regulatory differences. Even the most ardent 
supporters of variable pay recognize that it is extraordinary difficult to manage 
variable pay schemes well in difficult cultures (Hofstede, 1980). Research on cultural 
value orientations and pay differentials suggests that MNC's attempting to harmonize 
rewards systems may face resistance across different countries. These aspects of 
national culture are amenable to change, but only among highly selected groups. 
Many human resource managers in these multinational organizations and their line 
colleagues feel profoundly uncomfortable about linking pay to performance (Hewitt, 
2001). 
Adequate research evidence exists that attempts to measure employee satisfaction 
with overall pay (Carraher, 1991; Heneman et al, 1988; Heneman & Schwab, 1985; 
Judge, 1993; Judge & Welboume, 1994; Scarpello, Huber, & Vandenberg, 1988). 
However there has been little research aimed at understanding the significance of 
variable pay on employee performance and satisfaction. We understand that 
Satisfaction with pay is different than satisfaction with variable pay (Sturman and 
Short, 2000). The lack of a valid measure of variable pay significance hinders research 
into its antecedents and effects. The money associated with variable pay plans relative 
to total compensation is growing. Yet enough research does not exist that attempts to 
examine how such plans can be designed and/or implemented to maximize employees' 
performance and satisfaction with such schemes. Similarly, it is unclear how 
employees perceive such schemes and the effects of such perceptions. 
Some previous researchers examining variable pay or incentives have focused on their 
use as a portion of senior executive pay Gray and Cannella, 1997; Stroh et al, 1996), 
thus demonstrating a gap in research because the use of variable pay needs to be 
addressed at other organizational levels as well. 
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Further most organizations that have some sort of Variable Performance Linked Pay 
schemes, are still trying to perfect this element of performance management. The most 
debated question is whether an organization gains by making differentials and whether 
it is possible to be fair and objective to an individual. It is important to recognize that 
a performance management system and a Variable Performance Linked Pay plan are 
not the same. While a Variable Performance Linked Pay plan may need a performance 
management system, the drivers of the two could be different. A Variable 
Performance Linked Pay plan may not reckon with the 'competencies' of an 
individual but only the outcome (Tyson, 2002). And this is the challenge of 
management - to manage both as they are meant for different purposes. In the end, 
unless the individual has the competencies that the organization needs, they may not 
always be able to deliver. 
2. Variable Pay in Literature 
There are a variety of reasons for the introduction of variable pay schemes. Several 
writers Kessler (1992), Armstrong and Murlis (1994), Procter et al. (1993) noted that 
a pay system can be used as a vehicle for organizational change. However, VPLP may 
simply be one of a number of initiatives designed to achieve cultural change. Procter 
et al. (1993) suggested that "the necessary culture may already have to be in place for 
a system of VPLP to work effectively', as VPLP alone may be incapable of becoming 
the primary driving force of cultural change. VPLP may also serve the purpose of 
providing a statement to employees regarding what Kessler and Purcell (1992) 
described as the 'kind of company we are' and may reinforce existing organizational 
values and expectations. The strategy of culture change may also encompass broader 
objectives, which aim to change the relationship between management and 
employees. Thus, it has been suggested Ribbens (1988), Kessler and Purcell (1992) 
and Procter et al. (1993) that the individualistic nature of VPLP can be used to side-
step the collective bargaining process, thereby reducing the influence of the trade 
union in an effort to re-establish managerial control. 
VPLP acts as a motivator, through both providing incentives in the form of monetary 
rewards and by recognizing achievements (Armstrong and Murlis, 1991; Wright, 
1991). Further benefits cited include the fact that individuals can identify closely with 
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their employers' goals and that this can increase productivity and encourage quality, 
flexibility and teamwork. In addition, VPLP can contribute to the successful 
recruitment and retention of staff However, many researchers (Dwyer, 1994; Kessler, 
1992; Marsden and Richardson, 1992) have questioned the extent to which VPLP 
actually acts as a motivator, or, indeed, the extent to which money itself can motivate. 
Most managers are aware of Herzberg's view that the job itself is the source of true 
motivation, not the pay or even the conditions of work' (Dwyer, 1994). A study by 
Kovach (1987) reported a mismatch between managerial and employee views 
concerning what motivates. While managers attributed high financial needs to 
employees, staff cited pay as fifth on a list of ten factors, while the first four were 
concerned with intrinsic motivators. Anfuso (1995) noted that individual incentive 
programs were losing their popularity, in part, because they do not promote teamwork, 
quality improvement, and other important business issues. He further suggested that 
these programs can work against these objectives. Difficulty in measuring individual 
performance is offered as a significant causal effect of these results. Other research 
not only criticizes the structure of programs, but also the purpose of the programs. 
Arrowsmith and Sisson (1999) opined that the Incenfive programs utilized by 
businesses in highly regulated industries have been characterized as highly 
sophisticated, but lacking effectiveness since these organizations are not driven by 
business necessity. 
Storey and Sisson (1993) argue that PRP would appear to undermine the entire 
concept of teamwork. From research in multinationals operating in Ireland, Geary 
(1992) found evidence of the contradictory nature of management's strategy which 
attempted to develop simultaneously a collective identity focused around teamwork, 
while discriminating between individual contributions. 
The literature, however, suggests that success of variable pay programs varies in 
different cultural background. However there is lack of clarity on the kind of culture 
best suited for VPLP. In a country like India, its economy is largely dominated by 
foreign / multi national players. Most of these MNCs operate as per Global Best 
Practices, including their variable pay programs. There is negligible research evidence 
available in India that confirms that such variable pay programs motivate employee to 
perform better. Employee satisfaction and motivation with variable pay is a real issue 
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here. Even the most ardent supporters of variable pay recognize that it is 
extraordinary difficult to manage variable pay schemes well in difficult cultures 
(Hofstede, 1980). 
3. Need for Research 
There are mixed views emerging from different researchers. There is lack of clarity on 
the subject whether variable pay has any relationship with employee satisfaction and 
performance or not. How do employees perceive it before and after they are 
introduced to variable pay schemes? Most of the available research is based on studies 
done in US and European countries. There is lack of research evidence from India. All 
progressive nations have wide interest in Indian business. The Indian businesses are 
making their presence felt worldwide with large acquisitions and mergers. India is 
becoming a centre of attraction for all potential investors. The widespread and 
growing use of variable pay in India has made it an important subject of research. 
However, the literature on pay, pay satisfaction, and its measurement has not 
adequately produced a measure of variable pay impact on employee satisfaction and 
performance, especially in Indian context. Therefore the important issue here today is 
to understand the effectiveness of Variable pay and its impact on employee 
performance and satisfaction. There is a need to study the best environment for overall 
success of VPLP Schemes. There are plenty of instruments to measure employee 
satisfaction with pay. However fewer attempts have been made to design an 
instrument that measures employee satisfaction and perceived performance with 
variable pay. Literature suggests that variable pay plans perform differently in 
different cultural background. However there is inadequate research based evidence 
that confirms a particular cultural environment best suited for VPLP Programs. There 
is a need to study as to which type of cultural environment ensures success of VPLP 
Schemes. The present study attempts to address these questions. It is expected that 
the study shall provide insight to Indian corporate to help them re-design their 
compensation plan in a more meaningful manner. 
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4. Objectives of the study 
In light of the growing importance of the variable performance linked pay schemes, 
the present study focused on the following key objectives: 
• To ascertain the impact of variable pay on employee performance (as perceived by 
them). 
• To assess the employee satisfaction with variable pay. 
• To explore benefits of variable pay in an organization. 
• To explore the drawbacks of variable pay in an organization. 
• To explore the influence (if any) of diverse parental and cultural backgrounds on 
the overall success of Variable performance linked pay. 
• To assess the difference, if any, in perceptions of blue and white collared 
employees towards variable pay. 
• To assess the difference, if any, in perceptions of employees towards variable pay 
as per varied length of service. 
• To explore the differences in perceptions of employees before and after 
implementation of variable pay. 
• To ascertain the influence of variable pay on performance management system in 
the organization. 
• To suggest measures for effective implementation of VPLP Program. 
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5. Null Hypotheses 
On the basis of above objectives, the following null hypotheses were formed -
No. 
Hoi 
Ho2 
Ho3 
HQ4 
Ho5 
Ho6 
Ho7 
Ho8 
Ho9 
Holo 
Hon 
Hon 
Hypotheses 
Variable pay has no relationship with individual perceived performance 
Variable pay has no relationship with employee satisfaction 
Variable pay does not lead to employee retention in an organization 
Variable pay has no association with market strength of the organization 
Significant differences do not exist in perception of employees with varied 
length of service, towards variable pay programs 
Significant differences do not exist in perception of "Blue and White 
Collared" employees, towards variable pay programs 
Significant differences do not exist in perception of employees "before and 
after" implementation of variable pay programs 
Significant differences do not exist in perception of employees with varied 
cultural backgrounds, towards variable pay programs 
Variable pay does not lead towards improved employee earnings 
Variable pay has no relationship with camaraderie and teamwork among 
employees 
Variable pay has no relationship with performance evaluation of individuals 
Significant differences do not exist in satisfaction of employees with 
performance management systems "pre and post" implementation of 
variable pay programs 
6. Research Design 
The study follows a descriptive (quantitative) research design. The study employed 
qualitative measures as well in the initial stages to crystallize factors influencing 
employee performance due to variable pay. 
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The framework of this research borrows primarily from TRI*M, a global research 
model for measuring stakeholder satisfaction. The model was developed by Infratest 
Burke Germany. The TRI*M Model is used in India by TNS Global, a world 
renowned market research group with presence in 110 countries. It specializes in 
carrying out employee perception and satisfaction studies. It has carried out such 
studies in more than 500 companies worldwide in past 18 years. Necessary official 
permission was obtained before starting the research work. As per TRPM, to have a 
holistic view, one needs to measure the top of the mind 'satisfaction' state firstly 
towards that particular service in question, before measuring operational/actionable 
specifics. The variable pay offered by employee to their employers was taken as 
product/service. The "operational specifics" in this case were "factors" reported by 
employee indicating/ contributing to their performance due to introduction of variable 
pay schemes. 
So at this stage we divided the research into two parts -
1. Measuring the employee satisfaction with variable pay 
2. Measuring the employee perceived performance before and after 
implementation of variable pay 
In order to develop a reliable and valid scale that could measure the former i.e. 
employee satisfaction, earlier research work and measurement scales on the similar 
themes perused. Some of these instruments have been developed by Wanous and 
Lawler (1972), Saiyadain (1985), TRPM (1990) and Sturman and Short (2000). 
Initially the problems areas were identified through exhaustive literature review. The 
constructs to measure employee satisfaction with variable pay were coined at this 
stage. In the absence of a valid and available instrument, which could apprise us the 
impact of variable pay on employee performance, we decided to design it using 
scientific measures. Employee performance is dependent on various factors in an 
organization. However for the purpose of this study, we wanted to know that, when 
variable pay is introduced in an organization, how does it impact on various working 
dimensions that could lead to either enhanced performance or can deteriorate it? In 
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order to do so, we targeted respondents who had worked in the same organization 
before and after implementation of any sort of variable pay program in last 1 year or 
more. As a next step in this direction, we carried out Focus Group Discussions 
involving three batches of respondents comprising of a total of 20 respondents, 
ensuring a minimum of 6 participants in each group. The respondents for focus groups 
were employees who had experienced variable pay for more than 1 year at least. 
During these focus groups, the researcher asked the respondents about their 
experiences for the period, when they were not introduced to variable pay. They were 
asked to compare it with the situation post implementation of such schemes. On this 
basis, they were asked to elaborate statements/factors, which in their opinion were 
either contributor or indicator of their own performance. They were encouraged to be 
specific and vocal about key factors which were either direct contributor to their 
performance or constituting elements towards their capability and/or willingness to 
perform. The moderator (researcher) ensured that the entire conversation was flowing 
in context of variable pay only and not to any other factor, which could have an 
impact on employee performance. 
The focus group imparted deeper understanding of the subject to the researcher. The 
FGDs provided valuable insights from the respondents and key factors impacting their 
performance in context to variable pay. All statements were recorded in the actual 
order how they were being received. This was followed by "Content Analysis" to club 
similar sounding statements together (eliminating rest), which resulted to bringing 
down the total statements to 32. 
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7. The Research Process 
The research involved following stages: 
Review of Literature 
1 ' 
Identification of dimensions to assess 
employee satisfaction towards variable 
pay. Total 6 Dimensions were chosen 
„ Conclusions, and 
; "'Recommeridations / 
n i l 4 
Problem Are i» lucnuucu 
• Widespread use of variable pay, however no 
clarit)' on its impact on individual performance 
• Most studies attempted to measure satisfaction 
with pay, not variable pay 
• Negligible research work in India in this respect 
i 
Focus Groups 
20 Respondents in 3 Groups 
1 ' 
Identification of factors indicating/ 
contributing to employee performance due 
to variable pay. 32 statements crystallized 
'" 
Design of Research Instrument by 
careful selection of items 
1 r 
Pilot Test to assess the flow of 
questionnaire and to assess its Face 
Validity 
Interpretation of Findings and Discussions 
Pre-Testing of the instrument with 
subject experts (Content Validity). Only 
26 statements finalized 
Statistical Analysis using M, SD, Test of 
significance such as't ' test, 'Z Test, 'F' Test 
and Matrix Correlation 
Reliability Test of the Instrument using 
Cronbach alpha. Statements with alpha value 
less than 0.7 were deleted. A total 23 
statements were finally selected for further 
analysis 
Defining Population and Sample 
300 Respondents from 8 Companies with 4 
different countr)' of origin namely US, UK. 
Korea and Japan 
Data Collection from Target 
Respondents who had experienced 
variable pay scheme during last 1 year or 
more 
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8. Development of Research Instrument 
The research instrument was primarily designed in two parts -
1. To measure employee satisfaction with variable pay 
2. To measure employee perceived performance 
Part 1 - Satisfaction with Variable Pay - In this section, macro analysis in respect to 
variable performance linked pay experience was done using the key constructs of 
employee satisfaction such as overall satisfaction, recommendations, key benefits, 
value, retention/continuity of relationship and motivation (TRI*M Model). The above 
six constructs to measure satisfaction are also supported by Wanous and Lawler 
(1972) and Saiyadain (1985). The detail about six constructs is as follows -
1. Overall satisfaction with the variable pay scheme/ top of the mind view 
without passing on any specific details (likes or dislikes). 
2. Recommendation of variable pay scheme to your friends; that is a broad and 
strong measure of the response to experiences and perceptions. 
3. Key BeneHt (Individual), which measures any major individual benefit due to 
the usage of said service, which in this case was 'impact on individual 
performance'. 
4. Key Benefit (Mutual) that translates into key mutual benefit helping both the 
individual as well as the organization, which in this case was "market 
strength". 
5. Intent to continue relationship is a measure of the immediate response to 
experience and hence the existing level of loyalty with the product and/or 
service, which in this case was "retention"/ "willingness to stay with the 
organization due to variable pay". 
6. Motivation level measures the intensity of interest and the way it translates 
into a desire to contribute positively to the company's objectives. 
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Part 2 - Diagnostics / Operational Specifics to measure Perceived Performance 
As discussed earlier, there were 32 statements short-listed post FGDs reported by 
respondents which either indicate or contribute to employee performance (due to 
variable pay). Two equal rating scales were used in this part of the questionnaire (both 
scales had same score attributes)- the left side scale denoted employee responses , 
before implementation of the scheme while right side scale denoted employee 
responses after implementation of the scheme in the organization. In this section, 
we used six point even scale for employee response. We considered that respondents 
should have at least a slightly positive or slightly negative attitude towards the 
evaluated attribute. Specific attributes that have an impact on an employee's overall 
perceptions about the scheme were added in this part of the questionnaire. Details of 
these factors are presented in Table 1. 
The earlier section was meant to assess satisfaction of employees with variable pay. 
This section was meant to explore the impact of these schemes on employees' 
perceived performance by studying the factors which directly or indirectly indicating/ 
contributing to employee performance due to introduction of variable pay schemes. 
9. Pilot Test (Face Validity) 
After the questionnaire was done, a pilot test was carried out on a small sample size of 
20 to clarify the overall structure of the questionnaire. The respondents chosen for the 
pilot test matched the criterion, which was chosen for the actual target respondents, 
but these respondents were from organizations other than those that participated in the 
actual study. Here we got feedback from the respondents who confirmed flow of 
questionnaire and provided/ace validity of items chosen in the questionnaire. 
10. Pre-Testing with Subject Experts (Content Validity) 
After Pilot Test the same instrument was shared with 8 (eight) subject experts for their 
views. The idea was to understand if the 32 factors included in the list were actually 
reflecting "employee performance" or not. After pre-testing, the subject experts 
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recommended to eliminate a few questions, which were either repetitive or had no 
clear relevance to employee performance in respect to variable pay. At this stage the 
total factors were reduced to 26. 
11. Reliability Test 
These 26 factors were further subject to the reliability test. Post reliability test of the 
instrument, factors with Cronbach alpha <0.7 were further deleted. The 26 factors 
were finally reduced to 23. 
Table 1 - Assessment of Reliability of factors chosen to measure employee perceived 
performance 
Factors indicating /contributing Employee 
Performance 
Ability to meet deadlines/ timelines 
Desire to learn to perform 
Earnings and monetary returns 
Fair Feedback on Performance 
Functional Competencies 
Genera! Environment 
Goal Clarity 
Level of control on your own work 
Level of interest at work 
Level of motivation towards achieving results 
Positive competitive spirit 
Reward/bonus for a positive outcome of results 
Satisfaction with Last Pay Appraisals 
Self Dependence at work 
Confidence & faith in variable performance linked 
pay schemes 
Co-operation and camaraderie among employees 
Frequency of individual performance evaluation 
Level of motivation of your friends and colleagues 
Overall output of work 
Quality of work 
Cronbach's Alpha' 
(Before VPLP) 
0.819 
0.816 
0.824 
0.814 
0.823 
0.823 
0.817 
0.822 
0.864 
0.868 
0.816 
0.828 
0.815 
0.827 
0.824 
0.837 
0.816 
0.865 
0.827 
0.835 
Cronbach's Alpha^ 
(After VPLP) 
0.803 
0.806 
0.81 
0.852 
0.793 
0.814 
0.812 
0.815 
0.853 
0.857 
0.803 
0.868 
0.859 
0.817 
0.784 
0.816 
0.802 
0.858 
0.821 
0.82 
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Trust between management and employees 
Work life balance 
Understanding of Performance Management System 
0.819 
0.821 
0.816 
0.808 
0.806 
0.853 
12. Sampling 
The research began with identification of multinational companies with parental 
background in 4 different countries namely, US, UK, Japan and Korea operating in 
National Capital Region. After initial identification, those organizations that had or 
introduced any sort of variable performance linked pay programme in place in last one 
year or more were short listed for this research. Out of these, organizations which had 
adequate number of employees who had experienced working under both schemes i.e. 
before and after implementation of any sort of variable performance linked pay 
plan, for at least 1 year or more were further short-listed for this study. In all, 20 
companies short-listed by the researcher that had requisite number of employees for 
the purpose of this research i.e. 5 from each parental base. All of these 20 
organizations were approached by the researcher to participate in this study (target of 
5 companies from each parental background). A formal letter was sent to their HR 
heads/ people responsible for managing such schemes in their respective organizations 
for obtaining their consent to participate in the research. After numerous attempts 
(considering the sensitiveness of the issues) heads of 9 companies only (2 from each 
country segment US, UK and Korea and 3 from Japan) confirmed to participate in the 
research. One of the Japanese companies did not respond effectively later, therefore 
deleted from the list. The list of 8 companies (25% success rate) covered (2 from each 
country) is as follows -
1. Mitsubishi Motors (parental base, Japan) 
2. Yamaha Motors (parental base, Japan) 
3. Samsung Electronics (parental base Korea) 
4. LG Electronics (parental base Korea) 
5. Max New York Life Insurance (parental base US) 
6. Gillette ltd. (parental base US) 
7. Standard Chartered Bank (parental base UK) 
8. LaingoVourke ltd. (parental base UK) 
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The eight companies covered in the study employed a total of 11112 employees. Out 
of those employees, target respondents for this study were employees who had been 
appraised under both fixed as well as variable performance linked pay programs 
(before and after implementation of VPLP scheme) for at least 1 year under each. 
There were a total 1196 such employees in these organizations. Initially we targeted to 
interview at least 500 respondents, however after rigorous follow up we were 
managed to finish only 300 successful personal interviews for this study that 
represented over 25% of total population available. Considering the sensitivity of the 
issue, the idea was to interview respondents in person and not through any other 
medium such as electronic (email) or telephonic interview. Had we used other ways to 
gather data, we would have increased the sample size significantly, but we were not 
sure whether employees will answer them correctly, fully and meaningfully or not. 
Overall, there were approximately 150 employees in each organization except one 
(Laingo'rourke) who were matching the profile required for the purpose of this study. 
One of the essential requirements of any study was that the sample should be chosen 
in such a manner that the result of research could be safely generalized which could be 
possible only when the sample selected should be representative of the population. As 
there was no significant difference in population size of the companies therefore, 
we decided lieep the sample size equal from each organization. 50 executives (1 in 
3) were targeted from each organization for the purpose of data collection. However 
we were successful in getting on an average only 35 out of 50 from each company 
except one (LG) from where we could get 41 out of 50 targeted respondents. 
Profile and characteristics of the respondents 
In total, 300 respondents were personally interviewed across 8 companies having 
parental base in four countries, namely - US, UK, Japan & Korea. In all the 
companies, some sort of VPLP scheme had been introduced in the last 1 year. The 
average age of the employees covered under the study was 32 years. 85% of the 
respondents were male and rest were female. The average work experience of the 
employees was 8 years and all of them were appraised under both schemes i.e., under 
fixed pay scheme and under variable performance linked pay scheme for at least one 
year each. The average tenure of the employees in non-variable performance linked 
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pay environment was around 5 years and the average tenure of employees in variable 
performance linked pay environment was around 4 years. Most of the employees were 
having 17 completed years of formal education. The total percentage of white-collar 
employees was 40% and correspondingly the percentage of blue-collar employees was 
60%. Respondents belonged to different career bands and different functions in the 
organizations. There were 98 employees who had worked under variable performance 
linked pay program for less than 3 years while 111 employees had worked under the 
scheme between 3-5 years. The number of employees who had worked under the 
scheme for more than 5 years were 91. 
13. Data Analysis 
The data so collected was quantitatively tabulated with any additional comments 
noted. The units of the analysis were the individual employees. The means, standard 
deviations, 't' test, 'Z' tests for the outcome were computed. Factor analysis of the 
inter-correlations was conducted using SPSS software to determine which outcomes 
clustered together. Means, Standard Deviations, Paired Test, Matrix Correlations, 
One-way ANOVA test and 'Z' test were the major statistical tools used in the 
research. 
14. Summary of Findings 
1. Variable pay has 'no' to 'insignificant' impact on employee satisfaction 
2. Variable pay has a positive impact on an individual performance 
3. Variable pay schemes are yet to win confidence and trust of employees and 
they would prefer not to recommend it to their best friends 
4. Variable Pay scheme is not a medium to retain employees. It has a negative 
impact on employee retention and motivation 
5. UK parental culture may be considered as best for success of variable pay 
programs and satisfaction of employees with it 
6. Japanese parental culture is least recommended for success and satisfaction 
with variable pay experience 
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7. Variable pay programs are good measure of performance of White collared 
employees in comparison to blue collared employees 
8. Employees with less experience are more dissatisfied with their variable pay 
experience in comparison to senior employees 
9. Variable pay inspires an employee's desire to learn in order to perform better 
10. Variable Pay helps employees have better "Goal Clarity" 
11. Variable pay enables individuals have better "level of control" on their own 
work 
12. "Better frequency of performance evaluation" leads to "improved 
performance" 
13. Variable pay enhances the employee's "ability to meet deadlines/ timelines" 
14. Variable pay leads to loss of "Work Life Balance". This is even true even in 
case of all ardent supporters of variable pay 
15. Variable pay negatively impacts the "cooperation and camaraderie" among 
employees 
16. Trust between "management and employees" is highly compromised post 
launch of variable pay 
17. In a long run variable pay leads to "decline in motivation" of team force 
18. Variable pay has no significant impact on employee's earnings and monetary 
benefits 
19. There was no major significant difference in performance management system 
before and after implementation of variable pay 
20. Employees in Japanese companies complained that their PMS was declined 
post launch of PMS 
21. Employees in US companies were more supportive of their PMS post 
implementation of VPLP 
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Table 2 - VPLP and Employee Satisfaction (Test of Significance) 
Pair 1 
Pair 2 
Pair 3 
Pair 4 
Pair 5 
Pair 6 
Overall Satisfaction & Satisfaction 
with variable pay 
Recommendation and Satisfaction 
with variable pay 
Individual Performance and 
Satisfaction with variable pay 
Market Strength & Satisfaction 
with variable pay 
Retention & Satisfaction with 
variable pay 
Motivation and Satisfaction with 
variable pay 
Paired Differences 
Mean 
0.0228 
-0.1072 
0.2561 
0.2394 
-0.1272 
-0.2839 
Std. 
Deviation 
0.4212 
0.5438 
0.5662 
0.5183 
0.4827 
0.5696 
Std. Error 
Mean 
0.0243 
0.0314 
0.0327 
0.0299 
0.0279 
0.0329 
't' value 
0.937 
-3.415 •• 
7.835 ** 
8.001 ** 
-4.565 ** 
-8.632 ** 
Df 
299 
299 
299 
299 
299 
299 
p value 
0.350 
<0.OI 
<0.01 
<0.01 
<0.01 
<0.OI 
N = 300, ** P<0.01 
Table 3 - Satisfaction with VPLP (As per Country of Origin) 
Dimensions 
Overall Satisfaction 
Recommendation 
Individual Performance 
Market Strength 
Retention 
Motivation 
USA 
IMean 
2.86 
2.9 
2.91 
3 
2.73 
2.04 
S.D. 
0.94 
1.01 
1.09 
0.72 
1.09 
1.19 
;3.7""pi).9f" 
Japan 
Mean 
^•'vf^v^-; 
: :3.41:, 
\--l£i:' 
; ;>2 . (S<I ;•; • 
2.63 
2.69 
S.D. 
i.?;i.05,r: 
ft'83 
1.26 
>'#98.: ' 
1.04 
1.22 
Korea 
Mean 
2.83 
2.74 
3.17 
3.08 
2.54 
2.73 
S.D. 
1 
0.97 
1.24 
1.08 
0.91 
1.12 
'F ' value 
4.669** 
5.428** 
18.447** 
15.904** 
3.576* 
0.384 
A' = iOQ, Study - Impact of variable pay on employee performance 
* P<0.05, ** P<0.01 
Tables 4 - Correlation of factors indicating / contributing to employee 
performance 
"Reward/bonus for a positive outcome of results" 
"Desire to learn to perform" 
"Ability to meet deadlines/ timelines" 
"Level of interest" at work 
"Level of motivation towards achieving results" 
"Confidence & faith" in variable performance linked pay schemes 
"Positive competitive spirit" 
"Trust between management and employees" 
"Confidence & faith" in variable performance linked pay 
schemes 
"Co-operation and camaraderie" among employees 
"Earnings and monetary returns" 
Correlation 
'r' value 
0.67** 
0.59** 
0.79 ** 
0.54 ** 
0.57** 
0.71 ** 
0.64 ** 
'r' 
-0.39 ** 
0.04 
**P<0.01,*P<0.05 
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Table 5 - Employee Performance, Before and After Implementation of 
VPLP (Overall) 
Performance Indicators 
(In the order of Descending Mean Score 
After implementation of VPLP) 
Desire to learn to perform 
Goal Clarity 
Functional Competencies 
Level of control on your own work 
Ability to meet deadlines/ timelines 
Frequency of individual performance 
evaluation 
Level of motivation towards achieving results 
Quality of work 
Overall output of work 
Earnings and monetary returns 
Work life balance 
Level of interest at work 
Positive competitive spirit 
General Environment 
Co-operation and camaraderie among 
employees 
Level of motivation of your friends and 
colleagues 
Your understanding of Performance 
Management System 
Fair Feedback on Performance 
Satisfaction with Last Pay Appraisals 
Self Dependence at work 
Reward/bonus for a positive outcome of 
results 
Trust between management and employees 
Confidence & faith in variable performance 
linked pay schemes 
All Statements Combined 
MEAN 
BEFORE 
VPLP 
N = 300 
3.41 
3.45 
3.61 
3.29 
3.31 
3 18 
3.50 
3.42 
3.46 
3.60 
3.70 
3.21 
3.41 
3.47 
3.72 
3.54 
3.38 
3.42 
3.32 
3.21 
3.30 
3.52 
3.75 
3.44 
AFTER 
VPLP 
N= 300 
4.10 
4.05 
3.90 
3.75 
3.70 
3.68 
3.65 
3.63 
3.56 
3.54 
3.52 
3.50 
3.49 
3.49 
3.46 
3.44 
3.43 
3.40 
3.39 
3.38 
3.38 
3.34 
3.28 
3.57 
SD 
BEFORE 
VPLP 
0.36 
0.32 
0.44 
0.30 
0.36 
0.30 
0.31 
0.60 
0.32 
0.56 
0.39 
0.19 
0.28 
0.37 
0.31 
0.35 
0.23 
0.27 
0.23 
0.45 
0.38 
0.79 
0.29 
0.37 
AFTER 
VPLP 
0.25 
0.20 
0.59 
0.24 
0.23 
0.14 
0.40 
0.39 
0.17 
0.10 
0.21 
0.31 
0.30 
0.13 
0.64 
0.36 
0.31 
0.21 
0.31 
0.22 
0.28 
1.02 
0.23 
0.31 
DF 
598 
598 
598 
598 
598 
598 
598 
598 
598 
598 
598 
598 
598 
598 
598 
598 
598 
598 
598 
598 
598 
598 
598 
598 
t value 
27.27** 
27.54** 
6.82** 
20.74 ** 
15.81 ** 
26.68** 
5.13** 
5.08** 
4.78** 
1.83 
7.04 ** 
13.81 ** 
3.38** 
0.09 
6.33 ** 
3.45 ** 
2.24* 
0.51 
3.14** 
5.88** 
2.94* 
2.42* 
21.99** 
4.66 ** 
Significance at 0.05 (p<0.05), ** Significance at 0.01 (p <0.01) 
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15. Discussions 
Findings of the research indicate that variable pay does not ensure employee 
satisfaction. Out of six major constructs of employee satisfaction, it has negative 
relationship with three of them namely motivation, retention and recommendation. 
Moreover employees with limited years of experience are less satisfied with their 
variable pay experience in comparison to those who have spent more years in the 
corporate world. Employees who are working in organizations with UK's origin are 
comparatively more satisfied with variable pay followed by US, Korea and Japan. 
Variable pay has a positive impact on an individual performance. Variable pay 
inspires employee's desire to learn in order to perform better. It enhances the 
employees' ability to meet deadlines/ timelines, thus benefiting the organization as 
well. It helps individuals have better "Goal Clarity" and better level of control on their 
own work. With increased frequency of performance evaluation the management may 
achieve improved employee performance. Variable pay has a positive impact on an 
individual performance, particularly in companies with UK and US origins. In 
contrast, employees having companies with Japanese origin saw decline in their 
performance. Therefore it would be meaningful to note that the culture, management 
practices and approach towards variable pay has a significant impact on its overall 
success in an organization. Former companies are focused on "individual 
performance" and latter are more oriented towards "team performance". Therefore, 
the researcher recommends that employers who wish to have successful variable pay 
plan need to reward "individual contributions" and where performance is 
"Independent" and not "inter-dependent". 
The white collared employees were more satisfied with variable pay in comparison to 
blue collared employees In contrast to the popular myth that "VPLP is more suitable 
to blue collared", the research findings pointed out that employees with intangible 
measures, such as white collared employees favour linking pay to performance. 
XX 
Therefore employers need to use variable pay as a performance measure for intangible 
functions. 
The research indicates that the variable pay schemes have yet not been able to win 
confidence and trust of employees who still prefer not to recommend it to their best 
friends. Further, variable pay schemes do not ensure retention of employees. It has a 
negative impact on employee retention and motivation. Trust between "management 
and employees" is compromised post launch of variable pay. In a long run variable 
pay leads to "decline in motivation" of team spirit. Variable pay negatively impacts 
the "cooperation and camaraderie" among employees. 
Our findings are supported by Kristine and Mark (2003) who in their research 
reported that the variable pay programs that truly reward individual performance are 
more beneficial to the organization. On the same lines Kathryn (1993) also states that 
a performance oriented compensation strategy can be highly effective if it is aligned 
with the organization's structure, work culture, and goals. However the study did not 
support the findings of Oliver (1996), who argued for no link between Variable 
Performance Linked Pay and performance. Some researchers like Mary and Mark 
(2006) hold a different view. They feel that variable pay plans in general are failing to 
provide individual performance results. 
XXI 
16. Summary of Hypotheses Testing 
No. Hypotheses Results 
Hoi Variable pay has no relationship with individual perceived 
performance 
Not 
Accepted 
Ho2 Variable pay has no relationship with employee satisfaction Not 
Accepted 
H, 03 Variable pay does not lead to employee retention in an 
organization 
Accepted 
Ho4 Variable pay has no association with market strength of the 
organization 
Not 
Accepted 
Ho5 Significant differences do not exist in perception of employees 
with varied length of service, towards variable pay programs 
Not 
Accepted 
H, 06 Significant differences do not exist in perception of "Blue and 
White Collared" employees, towards variable pay programs 
Not 
Accepted 
Ho7 Significant differences do not exist in perception of employees 
"before and after" implementation of variable pay programs 
Not 
Accepted 
HQ8 Significant differences do not exist in perception of employees 
with varied cultural backgrounds, towards variable pay 
programs 
Not 
Accepted 
H, 09 Variable pay does not lead towards improved employee 
earnings 
Accepted 
H, 010 Variable pay has no relationship with camaraderie and 
teamwork among employees 
Not 
Accepted 
HI Oil Variable pay has no relationship with performance evaluation 
of individuals 
Not 
Accepted 
H, 012 Significant differences do not exist in satisfaction of employees 
with performance management systems "pre and post" 
implementation of variable pay programs 
Accepted 
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17. Recommendations 
• On the basis of this research finding, it may be concluded that design of 
variable pay is the key to overall success of variable pay plan. While 
designing, the management may address the requirements of different category 
of employees. Unique strategy of implementation may be required for different 
group of employees. It has been reported that blue collared employees 
witnessed a decline understanding of performance management system after 
launch of variable pay. It is evident that they had poor understanding of the 
entire plan. It means that less educated employees could not understand the 
nitty gritty of the overall VPLP plan, that led to lack of satisfaction and overall 
scepticism for such programs. Therefore an effective communication plan for 
different level of employees is required. 
• Companies need to design their variable pay plan in such a marmer where 
greater emphasis is given on an Individual performance. The variable pay plan 
should be such that it makes the person more independent than inter-
dependent. The researcher's understanding from this finding is that "every 
individual" likes to be treated as an "individual" first before associating with a 
particular team or group. There is a need to value the importance of one's 
individuality. Companies that understand this viewpoint design their variable 
pay plan in such manner that "High Individual Performance" of team members 
is also given special status. 
• The employers need to use variable pay as a performance measure for 
intangible functions quite well. It will make more sense for people with 
management responsibilities. 
• These research findings suggest that the management should not rely solely on 
variable pay as a medium to retain people. Employers need to focus on other 
relevant measures for employee retention". The researcher's recommendation 
to the organizations, which are using variable pay as a retention tools, is to 
"reconsider their decision ". 
• Employees should have control over their performance. If employees are 
overly dependent on the actions and output of other employees or processes, 
they may have little control over their own performance. Variable pay 
XXIII 
programs that are not based on principles of employee empowerment are 
almost certainly doomed to fail. 
• Business goals must be clearly defined and adequately disseminated to 
employees, and they should be crystallized with their participation. 
• Performance must be measured regularly and credibly. A clear system of 
performance appraisal and feedback must be put in place, with regularly 
scheduled meetings as one component. 
18. Scope for Future Research 
• The current study was done within National Capital Region (New Delhi) 
involving 8 companies and 300 employees. However there is a scope for a 
wide national-level study where one may cover different geographic segments 
and varied business conditions. 
• A continent wise study could be very insightful such as difference in opinion 
of employees working in Asia Pacific vis a vis, employees working in Latin 
America, Middle East or Europe. 
• Implementation of variable pay is the key to success. There could be a study 
comparing successful VPLP design of different companies. 
• Another scope could be to understand one particular domain or industry such 
as financial services, BPO/KPO or Manufacturing etc. to see if there is any 
similarly in the overall response. 
• It would be interesting to examine whether gender difference in pay carries 
over into the realms of Variable Performance Linked Pay programs. 
• To have more depth of the subject, one may attempt exploring the downside 
factors of VPLP in greater detail, which have been highlighted in this study. 
End of Document 
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CHAPTER 1 - CONCEPTUAL & THEORETICAL 
FRAMEWORK OF VPLP 
1.1. Variable Performance Linked Pay 
Variable Performance Linked Pay (VPLP) was the idea of Frederick Taylor, tiie father of 
scientific management. It is a bonus salary increase awarded in line with an employee's 
achievement. Variable pay is a type of pay-for-performance compensation plan where 
one-time lump-sum payments based on performance are added to pay (Agarwal, 1999). 
In recent times the organizations are moving away from traditional compensation 
programmes, and toward more flexible pay systems that are more strategically aligned 
with complex, changing business environments (Heneman et al, 2000; Lawler, 2000). 
One element of this trend is to link pay and performance more tightly and increase the 
variability of pay. Variable Performance Linked Pay (VPLP) plans such as bonuses, gain-
sharing, and stock plans are increasingly complementing or replacing more traditional 
plans internationally (Flynn, 1999; Heery, 1996). VPLP is a form of organizational 
control in that it can align employee and organizational interests, and thus can be viewed 
as 'control by pay'. Control by pay can address employee's equity and justice concerns 
(Heneman et al., 2000; Wiseman et al., 2000), and from an organization's perspective, 
lower fixed cost by reducing compensation payment when individual, group, or firm 
productivity is low (Eisenhardt, 1985). Variable performance linked pay programs are 
generally viewed as an approach to the creation of a compensation strategy that assists an 
organization in defining its core values. Through identification of its core values and 
motivation of employees to achieve goals consistent with these values, companies stand 
to improve the quality of their business (Sigler and Santone, 1993). This type of 
compensation plan has become very popular, and its global usage has dramatically 
increased over the past decade (Hansen, 2005; McClenahen and Purdum, 2004; Smiiko 
and Van Neck, 2004). 
There are two reasons why this type of compensation plan has become so popular that 
most organizations worldwide are implementing some form of variable pay -
• there is a widespread assumption that variable pay leads to motivation and 
increased performance (Agarwal, 1999; Heneman et al, 2000). 
• variable pay reduces fixed operating costs by transforming a portion of fixed 
compensation costs to a variable cost, and by reducing total compensation 
costs in periods of poor organisational performance (Agarwal, 1999). 
Variable pay comes in many forms. However the main factors that distinguish the 
different types of variable pay plans are 1) whether the payment is added to base salary or 
is a one-time payment, 2) the performance aspects that determine the payment. Variable 
pay is viewed as a means of aligning the interests of employees with those of employers 
(Catherine, 1989). 
The concept of "variable" pay is a broad one. For the purposes of this study, variable pay 
is different from "normal" ("fixed") pay in that it implies an element of uncertainty, both 
for the employer and the employee(s). Variable Pay plan either group or individual may 
contain a) profit sharing, b) gain sharing, c) group incentive, d) individual incentive, e) 
recognition award, f) equity/ stock option, g) lump sum bonus, h) key contributor award, 
i) project incentive and employee referral award. 
With variable pay there is a relationship between the pay (that is, the amount of money) 
that an employee receives and individual or collective performance. This may be the 
performance of individual employees, of teams or departments, or of establishments, 
companies or group of companies. This approach can cut costs and bring more 
consistency to company reward practices. There is also evidence that in performance-
oriented cultures employees see Variable Performance Linked Pay as a more equitable 
reward system than systems that offer no relationship to performance. The progressive 
organizations analyze performance and the methods by which they pay their people. Such 
companies realize that in order to succeed, they need to establish a partnership with their 
employees. 
Performance-based variable compensation has become a key feature in the organizational 
landscape. With purported advantages ranging from increased firm performance, 
employee motivation, pay satisfaction, and job satisfaction to reduced absenteeism and 
turnover (Heneman, 1992), it is no surprise that 78% of North American organizations 
and an increasing number of organisations globally have implemented variable pay plans 
(Hansen, 2005). However, limited empirical evidence exists that clearly demonstrates 
whether variable pay plans motivate employees to perform better or create greater 
harmony with organisational goals. It is possible that by transferring a portion of the fixed 
costs of compensation to variable costs, organisations can reap a host of rewards that have 
nothing to do with human resource principles, and that it is these benefits that may be the 
driving force behind the widespread usage of variable compensation plans. Organisations 
that are able to effectively use variable pay to motivate employees are believed to be in 
minority. Only such organisations derive a strategic benefit from variable pay. 
1.2. Why variable pay? 
The business and employment conditions have become globally competitive. Two key 
challenges for the management are - shrinking profitability and employee retention. 
Pressure on performance has increased manifolds in the past few years. The HR 
professionals today are called upon to innovate new compensation strategies that ensure 
higher performance that are flexible enough to absorb the downturn of business and invite 
participation of team members ready to share the gains and pains of the organization. 
Pay is a powerful communicator of organizational goals and priorities. Companies that 
expect to be successful must make employees become partners in their success (Schuster 
and Zingheim, 1993). Pay is a strong communicator between an organization and its 
employees, and the success or failure of a pay system can ultimately have an effect on the 
overall success of a company (Hill, 1993). 
With increasing competition and globalization, the pressure on performance has 
increased, the impact of individuals on success has increased and people have become 
valuable, scarce and costly resource. Variable pay creates a belief among employees that 
good performance will lead to higher pay, minimize the perceived negative consequences 
of performing well and create conditions such that positive outcomes other than pay will 
be seen to be related to good performance (Lawler, 1971). Companies are improving 
performance and becoming more profitable by using these variable pay schemes 
(Bencivenga, 1997). 
1.2.1. Objectives of the Scheme 
Aisling Kelly (1996) identifies the main objectives of any variable pay schemes as 
follows-
• Improve performance of the organization 
• Reward good performance 
• Motivate employees 
• Increase commitment to the organization 
• Improve recruitment and retention of staff 
• Reinforce existing culture, values and performance expectations 
• Promote organizational change 
• Remove the bargaining process away from trade unions 
The economics of the situation are clear in many firms. For an average manufacturing 
company, payroll constitutes a major portion of the variable cost. In service 
organizations, the proportion is even higher. In people-oriented business it could make up 
over l/3rd of the total costs. In these circumstances varying pay in line with performance 
can have major economic value to the organization. The loss of high performers is 
extremely costly and disruptive, including direct replacement expenses (e.g., advertising, 
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search, and "on-boarding" new hires) and indirect opportunity costs (e.g., lost sales, lower 
productivity, and customer defections). Beyond retaining high performers. Variable 
Performance Linked Pay schemes have the potential to align and focus employee 
behaviors to achieve essential operational and strategic objectives. As a result, 
organizations invest significant amount of time and money to design, administer, and 
deliver competitive pay schemes for their employees (Lawler, 2000). Today's successful 
global companies are increasing their use of performance-based pay and are also moving 
to customize Variable Performance Linked Pay packages by region (Towers Perrin, 
2004). Research has provided supporting evidence that variable pay motivates people. 
Variable Performance Linked Pay can address employee equity and justice concerns 
(Heneman et al., 2000; Wiseman et al, 2000). 
The era of employees "just being happy to have a job" has begun to be accompanied by 
an increased attitude of distrust and disenfranchisement, and an unwillingness to align 
their efforts with organizational goals (Schuster and Zingheim, 1992). The search for a 
solution has led progressive organizations to analyze productivity and the methods by 
which they pay their people. These companies realize that in order to succeed, they will 
need to encourage a partnership with their employees. One of the contentious elements of 
performance management is Variable Performance Linked Pay. It is really one of the 
biggest challenges for today's HR managers to link the pay with individual's 
performance. 
1.3. Variable Pay - Bane or Boon? 
There is a mixed evidence regarding efficacy of variable pay. Some studies have reported 
that these Variable Performance Linked Pay programs may not be too beneficial to blue 
collared employees. For Blue-collar workers, who as a group be risk aversive, it was 
found that pay variability was associated with employee emotional distress (Shirom, 
Westman, and Melamed, 1999). Research reports published on incentive Variable 
Performance Linked Pay programs like (Wall Street Journal, 2003), (Oliver, 1996), 
(Hudson, 2005), (Kohn, 1993) have highlighted that the incentive Variable Performance 
Linked Pay programs implemented in various organizations are disbanded in initial years 
as employees are not aware of the Variable Performance Linked Pay programs in terms of 
performance criteria, performance targets, complexity in implementation of the Variable 
Performance Linked Pay program, ineffective communication systems, etc. Human 
resource professionals support this process by developing salary merit increase guidelines 
and objective performance measures (Hill, 1993). The difference between the pay 
increase for employees whose performance is exemplary and that for employees whose 
performance is average is typically not enough to motivate performance at a higher level. 
Too little money is going to top performers, while too much money is going to people 
with lower performance levels (Milkovich and Milkovich, 1992). Proponents of variable 
pay for performance systems assert that it improves employees' motivation, engenders a 
culture in which employees genuinely care about organizational effectiveness, and ties an 
organization's labor costs to its ability to pay (Guthrie and Cunningham, 1992). Variable 
pay for performance is not a new concept, nor is it without its detractors. Many 
compensation professionals opposing variable pay for performance relegate it to "has 
been" status among pay plan concepts. They contend that pay for performance does not 
work and newer approaches have come along that offer better ways to effectively 
administer pay programs tied to performance, such as skill-based pay, pay for knowledge, 
wide job bands, or new types of incentive programs (Solano, 1992). Another controversy 
associated with variable pay programs is the belief by many that the payment of money 
for performance does not create an incentive. Psychologists who say that money does not 
motivate affirm that motivation is a multifaceted issue. They contend that some factors 
motivate primarily in a positive direction with a neutral negative effect, while other 
factors motivate primarily in a negative direction with a neutral positive effect. Herzberg 
argued this concept with the two-factor theory of "hygiene maintenance" and 
"motivators". Herzberg's theory, however, does differentiate "salary" and "money". 
Salary is identified as a "hygiene factor" and as such could cause employee 
dissatisfaction if a salary expectation is not realized. Salary would, however, have 
virtually no effect on enhancing motivation. Additional monetary earnings, on the other 
hand, could be a "motivating factor" (a measurement of achievement). The issue 
therefore is whether variable pay is to be considered a "hygiene factor" or a "motivating 
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factor." Much depends on a variable pay plan's design and application. While some 
question the effectiveness of variable pay for performance, other theorists believe that 
variable pay plans can be effective if they are properly designed, implemented, and 
maintained. The critical factors in proper design and implementation of variable pay for 
performance plans are 1) senior management support, 2) employee acceptance, 3) clear 
goal definition and unambiguous performance measures clearly linked to employee 
efforts, 4) a supportive organizational culture, 5) clear communications, and 6) strong 
education and training. Incentive pay can pull a company out of the doldrums of 
complacency and create a new, vibrant operating environment in which all truly espouse 
the concept of "shared destiny" and believe that every individual can make a difference 
and will be rewarded based on that difference (Gross and Bacher, 1993). Many managers 
design a variable pay scheme merely to cut down the fixed expenses. Managers at times 
design compensation plans at the expense of shareholders (Core et ai, 1999 ; 
Core et ai, 2003). In such cases, VPLP could as well be a bane. 
1.4. VPLP Design Principles 
There are four basic principles of designing variable pay schemes (Milgrom and Roberts, 
1992). 
• The Informativeness Principle 
• The Incentive-Intensity Principle 
• The Monitoring Intensity Principle 
• The Equal Compensation Principle. 
1.4.1. Informativeness Principle 
The Informativeness Principle suggests that any measure of performance that (on the 
margin) reveals information about the level of effort put in by the employee should be 
included in the compensation contract (Holmstrom, 1979). This includes, for example. 
Relative Performance Evaluation - measurement relative to other, similar employees, so 
as to filter out some common background noise factors, such as fiuctuations in demand. 
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By removing some exogenous sources of randomness in the employee's income, a greater 
proportion of the fluctuation in the income falls under his control, increasing his ability to 
bear risk. If taken advantage of, by greater use of piece rates, this should improve 
incentives. 
1.4.2. Incentive-Intensity Principle 
The incentive-Intensity Principle states that the optimal intensity of incentives depends on 
four factors: the incremental profits created by additional effort, the precision with which 
the desired activities are assessed, the employee's risk tolerance, and responsiveness to 
incentives. However, setting incentives as intense as possible is not necessarily optimal 
from the point of view of the employer. The primary constraint on performance-related 
pay is that its provision imposes additional risk on workers. A typical result of the early 
principal-agent literature was that piece rates. In piece rate system employees tend to get 
100% (of the compensation package) on the basis of their actual output of work. In such 
systems, the worker becomes more adept at handling risk, as this ensures that workers 
fully internalize the consequences of their costly actions (Prendergast, 1999). In incentive 
terms, where we conceive of workers as self-interested rational individuals who provide 
costly effort (in the most general sense of the worker's input to the firm's production 
function), the more compensation varies with effort, the better the incentives for the 
worker to produce. 
1.4.3. Monitoring Intensity Principle 
This principle is complementary to the second principle. It states that situations in which 
the optimal intensity of incentives is high correspond to situations in which the optimal 
level of monitoring is also high. Thus employers effectively choose from a "menu" of 
monitoring/incentive intensities. This is because monitoring is a costly means of reducing 
the variance of employee performance. Constant monitoring makes more difference to 
profits in the kinds of situations where it is also optimal to make incentives intense. 
1.4.4. Equal Compensation Principle 
This principle states tiiat activities equally valued by the employer should be equally 
valuable (in terms of compensation, including non-fmancial things such as pleasantness) 
to the employee. Often employees may be engaged in several activities, and if some of 
these are not monitored or are monitored less heavily, these will be neglected, as activities 
with higher marginal returns to the employee are favoured. This can be thought of as a 
kind of "disintermediation" - targeting certain measurable variables may cause others to 
suffer. For example, teachers being rewarded by test scores of their students are likely to 
tend more towards teaching 'for the test'. Such teachers de-emphasise less relevant but 
perhaps equally or more important aspects of education. While AT&T's practice at one 
time of rewarding programmers by the number of lines of code written resulted in 
programs that were longer than necessary - i.e. program efficiency suffering (Prendergast 
1999). Following (Holmstom and Milgrom, 1979) and (Baker, 1992), this has become 
known as "multi-tasking" (where a subset of relevant tasks is rewarded, non-rewarded 
tasks suffer relative neglect). Because of this, the more difficult it is to completely specify 
and measure the variables on which reward is to be conditioned, the less likely that 
performance-related pay will be used: "in essence, complex jobs will typically not be 
evaluated through explicit contracts". The alternative to objective measures is subjective 
performance evaluation, typically by supervisors. However, a similar effect to "multi-
tasking" is evident here too, as workers shift effort from that subset of tasks which they 
consider useful and constructive, to that subset which they think gives the greatest 
appearance of being useful and constructive, and more generally to try to curry personal 
favour with supervisors. (One can interpret this as a destruction of organizational social 
capital - workers identifying with, and actively working for the benefit of, the firm - in 
favour of the creation of personal social capital - the individual-level social relations 
which enable workers to get ahead. 
After basic principles of designing variable pay, we shall discuss relevant theories in this 
context. 
1.5. Theories forming base of VPLP 
Following theories are relevant to understand the theoretical framework behind variable 
performance linked pay schemes: 
• Reinforcement Theory 
• Agency Theory 
• Contingency theory 
• Expectancy theory 
• Goal Setting Theory 
• Incentive Theory 
1.5.1. Reinforcement Theory 
Much of the foundation of variable pay is based on aspects of what has come to be known 
in the compensation»literature as reinforcement theory (Heneman, 1992), which has been 
proposed by thinkers such as Skinner. Briefly, the operant conditioning aspect of this 
theory purports that a behavior will increase in frequency if it is followed by a pleasant 
outcome (positive and negative reinforcement). Conversely, behaviour will decrease in 
frequency if it is followed by an unpleasant outcome (positive and negative punishment). 
There are two tenants of operant conditioning and they are both of particular relevance to 
this discussion (Skinner, 1948): 
• the outcome must be contingent on the behaviour, meaning that the reward 
presentation clearly depends on the execution of the proper behaviour. If the 
reward is presented occasionally without the proper behaviour the contingency is 
weakened 
• the reward must be contiguous or presented immediately following the proper 
behaviour. Motivation decreases when there is a lengthy delay between the target 
behaviour and the reward. 
These principles gave rise to the use of variable pay as a motivational tool and 
compensation professionals refer to them collectively as line oj sight. However published 
evidence indicates that variable pay plans are not providing individual performance 
results (Brown, 2002; Beer and Katz, 2003; Budman, 1997). Furthermore, many variable 
pay designs are moving away from the principles of reinforcement theory, thereby going 
against assumptions of compensation professionals. Many compensation plans are: 
• designed so that the pay-off is long-term (three to five years), it is in violation to 
the principle of contiguity 
• complex in design and involving so many variables that the employee is not able 
to easily see the connection or contingency between their behaviour and the 
reward 
• often based to some degree on organisational performance, which has little to do 
with the individual behaviours of most employees. 
Reinforcement theory has been shown to be very effective in shaping behaviour and 
motivating behaviour change in other settings. Based on these violations of its principles, 
it would not be effective in motivating individual performance. While the value of 
variable pay is seen in terms of its motivating capacity, there is little empirical evidence 
that demonstrates that this is the case. While the HR practices that are theoretically or 
empirically associated with firm performance vary within the literature, variable pay 
emerges as one of the most frequently mentioned successful practices (Hiltrop, 1996). 
Empirical studies have linked variable pay plans with firm-level measures of success, 
including productivity measures such as sales or units per worker, accounting-based 
measures such as ROA and gross rate of return on capital, and market-based measures 
such as stock price and Tobin's Q (Banker et al., 1996; Delaney and Huselid, 1996; 
Huselid, 1995; Lazear, 2000). 
The root notion of variable pay should motivate performance. However, many variable 
pay plans are complex, long-term, and based on organisational performance; all factors 
which would decrease the contingency or line of sight between an individual's 
performance and reward, if one or more of these factors are included in a variable pay 
plan, reinforcement theory would predict that the plan would not be as motivating. Thus, 
since many variable pay plans do include one or more of these factors (complexity, long-
term pay-offs or organisational-level targets), it is not surprising that evidence to support 
a link between variable pay and individual performance is scant. 
1.5.2. Agency Theory 
A great deal of present literature on incentives and compensation is influenced by the 
agency theory, which defines the firm as a construct of principal and agent relationships 
(Jensen, 1983). Agency theory outlines a set of assumptions about the relationships 
between agents, employees, and principals, employers, within firms. Agency theory 
addresses the decentralization of decision-making, which inevitably occurs in 
organizations in an effort to match decision-making and knowledge. The basis for 
decentralization is the information asymmetry that exists between principal and agents 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1992). According to (Baiman, 1990) this information asymmetry 
is often localized within the agent and it follows that the problem with information 
asymmetry lies within another agency theory assumption, that agents are opportunistic 
and value maximizing - a consideration stemming from the idea of 'the profit maximizing 
individual'. Goal incongruence implies that agents' decision making does not take the 
best interests of the firm at heart when this comes into conflict with the agents own profit 
maximization. Goal incongruence necessitates systems to ensure convergence of interests 
and these can take the form of compensation plans. An incentive system should thereby 
control self-interested behavior and motivate the pursuit of organizational goals. 
A second approach derived from 'agency theory' only highlights related aspects of 
incentive pay schemes. It reinforces the importance of good performance measurement 
for effective VPLP schemes. The employees can choose between two different levels of 
effort, or care, or whatever aspects of the work that management wishes to encourage. Let 
us assume that employees have a strong instrumental orientation in their work, so that if 
they could get the same money for less effort they would do so. Most important, let us 
assume that management cannot easily observe employees' effort, although they can 
observe certain performance outcomes, perhaps at a later date, and that there is a lot of 
'noise' in the relationship between effort and performance, for example, because an 
individual's performance depends on many other factors, such as on how well colleagues 
are working, the supply of work and management quality etc. 
Given this situation, if management were to pay a fixed salary, independent of effort, then 
many employees are likely to choose the 'low effort' level. Even those employees who 
would like to work hard could be demoralized because they see their colleagues getting 
away with little effort. One way of solving the problem is to link pay to the aspects of 
performance that management can observe. Then employees have an incentive to provide 
the higher level of effort. 
The crucial point, however, lies in the measurement. If an employee puis in effort level, 
maybe on average, his performance will equate with output. However, it is very likely 
that week-to-week, for the same level of effort, his achieved performance will fall on 
either side of this. Sometimes, his performance will be quite good: his colleagues work 
well, there is a good supply of casework, and even with 'low effort' he can achieve output 
level 'x'. In other weeks, however, he may be less fortunate. Likewise, an employee 
working hard at effort will experience good and bad weeks. This poses difficult problems 
for VPLP. Management has only information on observed performance 'x', and then has 
to decide whether to award VPLP. Management will want to avoid giving a performance 
award to the person who was 'lazy but lucky'. At the same, they may work to avoid 
punishing the one who was hard working but unfortunate. The latter would almost 
certainly feel demoralized and unfairly treated. One way in which management can try to 
address the problem is by improving performance measurement. 
14 
1.5.3. Contingency Theory 
Contingency theory is an amalgamation of a number of management theories. Several 
contingency approaches were developed concurrently in the late 1960s. They suggested 
that previous theories such as Weber's bureaucracy and Taylor's scientific management 
had limitations as they ignored the fact that management style and organizational 
structure were influenced by various aspects of the environment - the contingency 
factors. There could not be "one best way" for leadership or organization. Contingency 
theory rests on a different set of assumptions than agency theory. Although, both grand 
theories are within the functionalist paradigm (Hopper and Powell, 1985) a very 
important difference exists. Contingency theory assumes that no single compensation 
system can fit all organizations (Weill and Olson, 1989; Michael Beer et al, 2004). The 
compensation system must be aligned with a number of contingency variables. Thus, 
while agency theory expects that a compensation system will have an effect in most 
circumstances; contingency theory only expects a compensation system to be functional 
under a given set of circumstances. The relationship between business unit strategy and 
the incentives system has also been studied from a contingency perspective. Several 
classifications of strategies exist. Building on the typology of build vs. harvest (Fisher 
and Govindarajan, 1993), (Govindarajan and Gupta, 1985) find that for companies 
pursuing a build strategy it is better to rely on long-run criteria and the subjective 
approaches for evaluation. On the other hand, if the company pursues a strategy of 
harvest then it is counterproductive to base evaluations on such criteria. 
1.5.4. Expectancy Theory 
This theory proposes a simple relationship between the strength of employee motivation, 
the value of the reward to them, and the likelihood of gaining it if they provide the 
necessary effort (Lawler, 1971; Vroom, 1964). Figure 2.1 explains the essential linkages. 
Figure 1.1. 
Outline of the 'expectancy' framework. 
Obstacles: 
• Inadequate skills 
• Weak goal setting 
• Poor coordination 
Obstacles: 
• Poor performance measurement 
• Mgt. lack necessary money 
• Mgt.bad faith 
Performance 
f 
Value of 
reward 
to employees f 
Obstacles: 
• No scope to increase effort 
• Very tight management 
• Already work at max. 
Obstacles: 
• Performance rewards not valued 
• Other motivators more important 
• Conflicts with other motivators 
• Mgt. motives distrusted 
Source-(Lawler, 1971) 
The figure shows the relationship between an employee's effort, his/her performance and 
the reward. It also highlights some of the conditions that are needed for a performance 
incentive scheme to be effective motivationally. These conditions are also a guide to 
potential pitfalls. Employee effort may not translate into improved performance for a 
variety of reasons, such as lack of skills or poor management. Performance may not 
translate into reward if it is inaccurately ineasured, or if there are budgetary constraints. 
The rewards may not be valued, perhaps because public employees are motivated by 
other goals, such as the intrinsic interest of their work. Finally, the rewards, even if 
valued, may not call forth extra effort if, for example, employees' jobs give them no 
scope 10 increase their performance. A close reading of the boxes marked 'obstacles' pose 
a challenge in designing an effective VPLP programme. 
1.5.5. Goal Setting Theory 
Goal-setting theory maintains that human behavior is directed by conscious goals and 
intentions and can best be described as a social-cognitive theory (Locke & Latham, 
1990). The theory purports that goals serve as a guide for outcomes when an individual 
accepts them. Goals are seen as immediate regulators of human action. The theory does 
not assume that an individual will foresee every potential outcome or act solely based on 
goals but that the goal will influence how job tasks are accomplished and how well they 
are performed. Goal-setting theory asserts that there is a positive curvilinear relationship 
between degree of goal difficulty and performance. Goal difficulty is the extent to which 
the goal is challenging to the individual. The performance increases as long as the 
individual sees the goal as attainable; if the goal were seen as too difficult and 
unattainable, performance would decline. A second concept of the theory, goal 
specificity, defines the goal in quantitative terms. Goal-setting theory asserts that specific 
and difficult goals will lead to a higher level of performance than vague, non-quantitative 
goals such as "do the best you can" or the absence of assigned goals, if people work to 
achieve goals then they will work harder to achieve more difficult goals 
(Leee/a/., 1997). 
1.5.6. Incentive Theory 
Incentive theory states that firm owners should structure employee compensation in such 
a way that the employees' goals are aligned with owners' goals. It is more accurately 
called the principle-agent problem. Incentive theory's main paradigm is based on the 
presumption that 'what you measure is what you get' i.e. performance measurement 
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systems are vital tools for directing employee attention and thereby behavior (Milgrom 
and Roberts, 1988; Jensen, 2001) 
1.6. Variable Performance Linked Pay Plans and the Motivation Models 
Variable Performance Linked Pay plans are believed to motivate performance. 
Researchers in the field contend that this belief has a foundation. Variable Performance 
Linked Pay plans can increase performance above that attained in a fixed pay plan. But is 
it always the case? In fact, studies have shown that Variable Performance Linked Pay 
plans can also result in restriction of output and cause employee-relations problems. Also, 
it has been shown that the different kinds of Variable Performance Linked Pay plans 
produce different results. Thus it seems useful to examine Variable Performance Linked 
Pay plans in terms of performance-motivation and membership models: 
1.6.1 The Performance-Motivation Model: According to this model, for a 
compensation plan to motivate performance, employees must -
believe that good performance will lead to more pay, 
want more pay, 
not believe that good performance will lead to negative consequences, 
see that other desired rewards besides pay result from good performance, and 
believe that their efforts do lead to improved performance. Although the model 
specifies that the relationship among these variables is multiplicative (anything 
multiplied by a zero yields a zero), the first variable is clearly the most important. 
Variable Performance Linked Pay plans do foster the belief that good performance leads 
to more pay. But some plans do this better than others. Specifically, plans that relate the 
individual's pay to his or her output do better than plans applied to groups or other larger 
units. And plans based on objective standards and measurements create a stronger belief 
in the performance-pay relationship than plans based on less objective standards. With 
plans involving less objective standards, the belief is based in part on the employee's 
confidence that the measurements do reflect his or her performance. Since people do 
attach different values to pay, the second condition, desiring more pay, is variable. If 
employees do want more pay and nothing about the plan serves to reduce its importance 
to them, this part of the model is met. if, however, a variable performance linked pay plan 
is applied to employees who don't want more pay or who don't want pay based on 
performance, it is not. 
The belief that negative consequences will result from good performance is quite possible 
under Variable Performance Linked Pay plans, it has been shown that employees can 
believe that rates will be cut if they produce too much and that social rejection by peers, 
working themselves out of a job, or even getting fired if they fail to meet the standard can 
be anticipated. Thus, in some plans it is quite possible that the perceived negative 
consequences could offset the perceived positive consequences. A major negative 
consequence is the competitiveness generated by Variable Performance Linked Pay plans. 
Where cooperation, not competition, is required, a Variable Performance Linked Pay plan 
can lead to many dysfunctional behaviors. In some plans, good performance is likely to 
result in social acceptance, esteem, respect, and feelings of achievement. If a person feels 
that he or she benefits from another's good performance and it becomes the norm of the 
group to perform well, then the possibilities of good performance are increased. 
Employee perceptions about their own contributions to the organization may be the 
weakest link in Variable Performance Linked Pay plans. If employees feel that so many 
things beyond their control affect the performance measured that their efforts have little 
effect, this belief in the contribution-reward connection will be weak. If employees feel 
that the performance measure does not reflect a number of contributions that they make 
and that they feel the organization needs, the belief is likewise weak. If the incentive plan 
is based on such a limited conception of employee contributions that employees believe 
that it reflects neither the contributions they make nor those that the organization really 
requires, not only will the Variable Performance Linked Pay plan not work, it may 
weaken membership motivation because of resentment. 
1.6.2 The Membership Model: If Variable Performance Linked Pay plans work by 
creating or confirming beliefs; they can also affect the beliefs and perceptions that form 
the basis of membership motivation. If the Variable Performance Linked Pay plan signals 
employees that more of the rewards they want are available in this employment exchange 
in return for the contributions they want to make, their commitment to the exchange is 
likely to increase. If, however, the plan signals that additional money is the only reward 
available and they don't want more money; other rewards they value will be reduced by 
good performance. Only those contributions resulting in the measured performance result 
in more rewards but they do not want to provide more of those contributions; or the 
contributions they wish to increase are not going to result in higher rewards, then their 
commitment to the employment exchange may be significantly depressed. In fact, the 
employee may seek an employment exchange that meshes more closely with their 
contribution-reward desires. Thus attempts to improve performance motivation may 
weaken membership motivation. This is an example of the dilemmas faced by 
organizations in compensation administration. Fortunately, it is usually possible to treat 
different employee groups differently in matters of pay. 
1.7. Types of Variable Pay Plans in Practice 
Common classification types and descriptions of variable compensation plans are as 
follows: 
1.7.1. Individual-Based Variable Performance Linked Pay Schemes 
Individual Variable Performance Linked Pay has been recognized as a particularly 
powerful mechanism for changing organizational values and sending strong messages to 
employees and the outside world alike about "the kind of organization we are". It 
promotes an image, which stresses flexibility, dynamism, entrepreneurial spirit and the 
careful allocation of resources. This objective is reflected in the emphasis for the 
introduction of individual Variable Performance Linked Pay: "Dynamic markets need 
dynamic organizations. Individual contributions in leaner, more goal orientated 
enterprises can be seen to have real importance" (Rankin, 1988). The significance of this 
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particular objective is illustrated in circumstances where individual Variable Performance 
Linked Pay has been used as part of concerted attempt to change organizational culture. 
Attention has been drawn to the manner in which it has been used in public utilities as a 
means of generating a more market oriented approach culture. The importance of 
individual Variable Performance Linked Pay as part of a managerial strategy designed to 
breakdown the Post Office ideology of corporate paternalism and bureaucratic centralism 
(Batstone et ai, 1984). Moreover, there are examples of Greenfield sites where such a 
pay system has been specifically used to develop an organizational culture which 
emphasis the role and importance of the individual and is different from the culture 
prevailing on the old brown field site (Kessler and Purcell, 1992). 
1.7.2. Team-Based Variable performance linked pay scliemes 
Team based variable pay plan can be applied on the basis of how well employees have 
performed across the whole organization or it can be split up on the basis of geographical 
location, department or smaller unit/section. It is awarded on the basis of performance 
linked to a cash bonus or a basic pay increase. Teams are awarded in return for 
improvements in operational outputs, financial performance or both. 
Three different approaches to team reward are 1) Rewarding individuals for their 
contribution to team performance in an identified service delivery area, 2) Rewarding a 
team of employees equally in an identified service delivery area for their performance 3) 
Rewarding all employees in the organization equally on the basis of its overall 
performance (Lawler, 1971). 
Team pay is a method of linking the pay of employees to the level of performance that 
they have achieved in a team. By reinforcing group performance by recognising team 
working, the collective potential of employees can be harnessed. It is claimed that this 
should lead to improvement in service delivery areas. 
Team performance can only be improved by financial reward if the individuals within it 
are strongly motivated by money. However, an even more crucial factor is the amount of 
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money that is available for this purpose. If employees deem that this amount is 
contemptible; it will have a limited impact as a mechanism for raising performance and 
productivity. 
Equally important is how team pay is to be awarded. A common method of linking pay to 
performance is to pay non-recurring bonuses. These can be shared with teams in a variety 
of ways including even cash sums, scaled or stepped cash sums or most popularly, as a 
percentage of basic salary. Considerable research also exists supporting the increased use 
of Variable Performance Linked Pay for groups vs. individuals. The firms utilize this 
strategy in an attempt to increase teamwork and promote flexibility, while also boosting 
performance. A group incentive plan as any Variable Performance Linked Pay scheme 
where compensation is awarded based on the unit or group to which an individual 
belongs. This could include team- or project-based incentives. It could also include gain-
sharing schemes. The corporate profit-sharing plans, individual incentive plans with 
group measures, and special recognition awards cannot be classified as group incentives 
(Wilson, 1990). Despite their obvious benefits, the point is also made that group 
incentives are not suitable for all organizations. 
1.7.3. Contribution Pay 
Contribution pay is a relatively new concept. It combines elements of both performance 
and competency based pay schemes by recognizing employee achievements and 
competencies. Contribution pay schemes are best suited to a broad banded pay structure 
because this allows the necessary flexibility to effectively reward the results employees 
are expected to achieve through the acquisition of defined skills and competencies. One 
of the main criticisms contribution pay receives is its short-term focus. Because its 
appraisal system is based on an agreed set of immediate targets, employees are 
encouraged to work towards these to secure more pay. This poses a danger that factors of 
equal importance for organizational success will be overlooked. Contribution pay can 
overcome this problem by incorporating the ability to 'factor in' rewards for individuals 
who can prove that they are developing a range of skills and competencies that link into 
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future organizational success. These include innovation, creativity and teamwork. In 
addition, it is believed that if the assessment and acquisition of skills, knowledge and 
competencies is linked to career development, it might serve as a better motivator than 
contribution pay on its own. 
1.7.4. Stock Plans 
Under these schemes individual or teams are given an option to purchase stocks of the 
company at a pre-determined price. Generally, top and middle level executives are given 
an option to participate in these schemes. A stock option gives the recipient (the 
"optionee") the right to buy a certain number of shares in the granting company at a fixed 
price for a certain number of years. Stock options are used both in private companies 
(mainly where there will be a market for the shares) and public companies. Many 
companies use employee stock options plans to compensate, retain, and motivate 
employees to give there best. These plans are contracts between a company and its 
employees that give employees the right to buy a specific number of the company's 
shares at a fixed price within a certain period of time. Employees who are granted stock 
options hope to profit by exercising their options at a higher price than when they were 
granted. 
1.8. VPLP and Organization Performance 
It has been noted earlier that benefits brought by the use of performance-based variable 
pay plans that are independent of HR considerations. For example, even when holding 
total compensation costs constant, a firm's operating leverage is lowered by the 
introduction of a variable pay plan (Burke and Terry, 2004; Gerhart and Trevor, 1996). 
Operating leverage is measured as the percentage of fixed costs to total (fixed plus 
variable) costs (Horngren et al, 1999). It is an indication of a firm's risk in that the 
income of organisations with lower levels of operating leverage (those with more variable 
costs) is less responsive to changes in revenues than the income of organisations with 
higher levels of operating leverage. Another benefit of higher levels of organisational 
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performance-based variable compensation is that a larger portion of the total payroll will 
increase or decrease with organisation performance. This leaves the organisation better 
able to meet its payroll in any competitive environment, and can function as a more stable 
employer by not having to terminate or lay-off employees in response to short-term 
economic conditions. This can have positive reputation and cost-saving implications for 
the firm (Gerhart and Trevor, 1996). 
1.9. Summary Discussion 
There are mixed views about variable pay. Many eminent authors see variable pay as a 
substitute to traditional pay. We also witness from the business environment around us 
that variable pay has now become an essential component of overall employee 
compensation plan. With organizations becoming hypercompetitive employees pay plan 
is linked with their performance for competitive advantage. However there is no 
conclusive evidence that by linking pay to performance, there is an enhancement in 
employee performance. In yesteryears some sort of variable pay plan was used to 
compensate blue collared workers such as piece rate pay. However in today's situation 
the variable pay seems to be more useful for white collar employees, who hold strategic 
positions in the companies and are responsible for overall profitability. It is the moot 
question today to know how effective these plans are in today's business context and for 
whom. It is worth exploring as to what kind of environment suits a particular pay plan, 
and which categories of employees are more benefited from such schemes. 
Based on reinforcement theory, variable pay should motivate performance. However, 
current compensation practices make it unlikely that the principles of reinforcement 
theory enter into variable pay plan design. Variable pay plans that are complex, have 
long-term pay outs, and are based on organizational performance would not be very 
effective in motivating performance. More research is required to establish whether 
variable pay plans influence performance, and if so, what aspects of the design of these 
plans make them more likely to be successful in this way. Different theoretical 
approaches to variable pay have been well developed such as expectancy theory (Vroom, 
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1964), justice theory (Greenberg, 1987), and reinforcement theory (Skinner, 1948), 
among others. 
Research could help to determine which theoretical approach is most appropriate. While 
agency theory predicts that employees are risk-averse, and will therefore require an 
inducement to forego straight base salary for a mix of base salary and variable pay, 
research does not find evidence that employees receive additional compensation for 
taking on the increased risk associated with variable pay (Stroh et al, 1996). 
The implication from agency theory is that employees would not choose a variable pay 
plan over straight salary unless paid to do so. Recent trends indicate that base salary 
comprises a smaller portion of total pay (Hansen, 2005), and yet scarcity of evidence 
exists to indicate the effect of increased risk on employee attitudes and behaviors as they 
pertain to variable pay, the degree to which employees will be willing to accept the risk 
associated with all variable pay plans, or the degree to which managers are willing to 
expose employees to such pay risk. 
Reinforcement theory suggests that it is possible, however, to leverage the organizational 
benefits brought about by moving payroll costs from a fixed to a variable amount to 
include increased employee performance. By moving toward simpler compensation plans 
that increase line-of-sight, and minimizing the impact and importance of distal 
performance measures such as organization-level performance on which employees could 
not expect to have any direct impact, practitioners could remove many of the barriers that 
may be preventing variable pay plans from motivating as they could. The lack of 
evidence of the link between variable pay, motivation, and organizational performance 
may be partly attributable to the multi-level nature of these issues. Research must move 
beyond the relation between pay and organization-level performance to focus more on the 
contextual nature of variable pay plans, such as the types of plans being used, cultural 
issues of the organizations, implementations of VPLP schemes, the degree of 
organisational support for the plans through feedback and attention to justice issues, and 
the degree of employee acceptance of the variable pay plans. 
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This requires that information be gathered at the organization level, the unit or team level, 
and at the employee level. Individual-level perceptions can be averaged to represent 
higher-level group, subunit, or organizational phenomena when people in groups and 
subunits are exposed to common features, events, and processes (Klein and Kozlowski, 
2000). By capturing and aggregating employee attitudes towards variable pay plans, 
motivation, and work, team-level attitudes, and organisational or business-unit level 
information about the use of and support for variable pay, researchers can gather 
information at all relevant levels of study. 
With understanding of various theories and conceptual bases of VPLP, in the next chapter 
we shall review the literature, various studies carried out on the efficacy or otherwise of 
variable pay concept. This will help us have deeper understanding of the subject. It shall 
help us crystallize research problem as well. 
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CHAPTER 2 - REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
2.1 Conceptual Evolution 
Variable Performance Linked Pay Schemes attempt to bring wages and salaries in line 
with companies' market performance. The concept is based on rewarding employees for 
increased sales or efficiency. Rather than rewarding every employee with a pay raise or 
bonus, Variable Performance Linked Pay Schemes rewards the individual worker or a 
team of workers for extraordinary efforts. 
Taylor (1911), the father of scientific management could be considered a pioneer in this 
account. He was interested to see whether a job or work could be designed to increase 
efficiency. He tried to break down tasks into smaller components. Having broken the 
production process down, he then looked at how workers could be most effectively used 
to achieve production. He introduced the idea of piece rate, a means of paying people for 
what they produce. This idea is based very much on belief that a worker is motivated by 
money and pay. That was the genesis of variable pay concept. 
Contrary to Taylor, another eminent thinker Herzberg (1959) in his motivational theory 
questions to what extent is money a motivator. Herzberg addressed money particularly 
(referring specifically to 'salary' in his study and analysis). Herzberg acknowledged the 
complexity of the salary issue (money, earnings, etc), and concluded that money is not a 
motivator in the way that the primary motivators are, such as achievement and 
recognition. In his view "when salary occurred as a factor in the lows (causes of 
dissatisfaction) it revolved around the unfairness of the wage system within the company. 
It was the system of salary administration that was being described. It concerned an 
advancement that was not accompanied by a salary increase. In contrast to this, salary 
was mentioned in the high stories (events causing satisfaction) as something that went 
along with a person's achievement on the job. It was a form of recognition; it meant more 
than money; it meant a job well done; it meant that the individual was progressing in his 
work". Herzberg concluded about salary (i.e., money, earnings, etc): "Viewed within the 
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context of the sequences of events, salary as a factor belongs more in the group that 
defines the job situation and is primarily a dissatistler." 
In the same era, another famous researcher Douglas (1960) proposed his famous X-Y 
theory in his book The Human Side of Enterprise'. Theory x and Theory y are still 
referred to commonly in the field of management and motivation, and whilst more recent 
studies have questioned the rigidity of the model, Douglas's X-Y Theory remains a valid 
basic principle from which to develop positive management style and techniques. 
McGregor maintained that there are two fundamental approaches to managing people. 
Many managers tend towards theory X, and generally get poor results. Enlightened 
managers use theory Y, which produces better performance and results, and allows people 
to grow and develop. 
As per theory'X' 
• The average person dislikes work and will avoid it he/she can. 
• Therefore most people must be forced with the threat of punishment to work 
towards organisational objectives. 
• The average person prefers to be directed; to avoid responsibility; is relatively 
unambitious, and wants security above all else. 
As per theory 'Y' 
• Effort in work is as natural as work and play. 
• People will apply self-control and self-direction in the pursuit of organisational 
objectives, without external control or the threat of punishment. 
• Commitment to objectives is a function of rewards associated with their 
achievement. 
• People usually accept and often seek responsibility. 
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• The capacity to use a high degree of imagination, ingenuity and creativity in 
solving organisational problems is widely, not narrowly, distributed in the 
population. 
• In industry the intellectual potential of the average person is only partly utilised. 
McClelland (1961) in his book "The achieving society" suggested characteristics and 
attitudes of achievement-oriented people. In his view a) achievement is more important 
than material or financial reward b) achieving the aim or task gives greater personal 
satisfaction than receiving praise or recognition c) financial reward is regarded as a 
measurement of success, not an end in itself d) security is not prime motivator, nor is 
status e) feedback is essential, because it enables measurement of success, not for reasons 
of praise or recognition (the implication here is that feedback must be reliable, 
quantifiable and factual) f) achievement-motivated people constantly seek improvements 
and ways of doing things better g) achievement-motivated people logically favour jobs 
and responsibilities that naturally satisfy their needs, ie offer flexibility and opportunity to 
set and achieve goals, eg., sales and business management, and entrepreneurial roles. 
McClelland believed that achievement-motivated people are generally the ones who make 
things happen and get results, and that this extends to getting results through the 
organisation of other people and resources, although as stated earlier, they often demand 
too much of their staff because they prioritise achieving the goal above the many varied 
interests and needs of their people. 
Adams (1963) in his "Equity Theory" on job motivation acknowledges that subtle and 
variable factors affect each individual's assessment and perception of their relationship 
with their work, and thereby their employer. However, awareness and cognizance of the 
wider situation - and crucially comparison - feature more strongly in Equity Theory than 
in many other earlier motivational models. The Adams' Equity Theory model therefore 
extends beyond the individual self, and incorporates influence and comparison of other 
people's situations - for example colleagues and friends - in forming a comparative view 
and awareness of Equity, which commonly manifests as a sense of what is fair. When 
people feel fairly or advantageously treated they are more likely to be motivated; when 
they feel unfairly treated they are highly prone to feelings of dissatisfaction and 
demotivation. The way that people measure this sense of fairness is at the heart of Equity 
Theory. Equity, and thereby the motivational situation we might seek to assess using the 
model, is not dependent on the extent to which a person believes reward exceeds effort, 
nor even necessarily on the belief that reward exceeds effort at all. Rather, Equity, and the 
sense of fairness which commonly underpins motivation, is dependent on the comparison 
a person makes between his or her reward/investment ratio with the ratio enjoyed (or 
suffered) by others considered to be in a similar situation. 
Renowned researcher Lawier (1990) in his article "Pay and Organizational Effectiveness" 
reported that Pay for performance as a central feature of the "New Pay" ideas in the 
global organizations. Schuster et al. (1993) identified Individual Pay for performance, 
group Pay for performance, gain sharing and lump-sum awards as providing the 
flexibility that is required by employers to match complex and dynamic change in the 
business environment. 
Core et al. (1999) added that Incentives compensation systems have; in light of shorter 
employment periods and increased pressure from shareholders have become increasingly 
important mechanisms for employee measurement and rewards. These systems provide a 
vehicle for employers to exert influence and align employee decision-making according 
to owners' wishes. Stock options and profit sharing are common compensation practices 
and increasingly, many companies express a keen interest and focus on fully integrated 
control and compensation models like economic value added (EVA) and the balanced 
scorecard (BSC). Hence, literature on and theory within compensation and reward 
systems is vast and research is driven by the wide variety of systems that exist within both 
private and public sectors. 
Now with this section, we understand that many researchers were of opinion that iini<ing 
pay to performance motivates employees. However, there is a contrary view as well. It is 
interesting to understand the basic question why these organizations plan to introduce 
VPLP in the first go. Let us review some literature that throws some light on it. 
2.2. Reasons for introduction of VPLP 
The reason for introducing VPLP could be multiple. However ever increasing competitive 
environment and demand for committed performance seem to be the core strategy behind 
it. 
Lawler (1971) pointed out that Variable pay creates a belief among employees that good 
performance will: I) lead to higher pay, 2) minimize the perceived negative consequences 
of performing well, and 3) create conditions such that positive outcomes other than pay 
will be seen to be related to good performance. 
Sigler & Santone (1993) found variable pay for performance programs as an approach to 
the creation of a compensation strategy that will assist an organization in defining its core 
values. Through identification of its core values and motivation of employees to achieve 
goals consistent with these values, companies stand to improve the quality of their 
business. Variable pay can be a key element to that end. Shuster & Zingheim (1993) 
viewed Variable pay as a means of aligning the interests of employees with those of 
employers. 
Tully (1995) noted that competitive pressures in the domestic and global market were 
placing demands on organizations to be more productive and efficient than ever. This 
competitive pressure is evident in human resource strategies utilized by corporations. To 
some degree, the risk faced by corporations is now being shared with the workers. He 
pointed out that employees are sensing an increased level of anxiety, since they might not 
know from one year to the next whether they will receive compensation increases or even 
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have a job. He further added that this collective risk is being operationalized in incentive 
schemes that often impact as much as 30% of a manager's income. 
The survey, conducted by Andersen (2005), provided a comprehensive look at 
competitive practices with respect to compensation philosophies, salary structures, 
"broad-banding", short- and long-term incentives, performance management/appraisal 
systems and more. Information was collected from 738 diverse organizations across the 
United States. Significant findings of this survey were as follows: a) the majority (69%) 
of companies have short-term incentive (bonus) plans. Relevant reasons for having these 
plans are to link individual goals to business goals (77%) and to reward superior 
performance (63%)) b) The most comrnon measures used for annual incentive plans are 
profit, revenue, individual goal attainment, and customer satisfaction c) 74% of public 
companies have long-term incentive plans. The most prevalent long-term incentives are 
nonqualified stock options (64%), incentive stock options (47%)), and performance-based 
restricted stock (26%)) d) Competency assessment is valued equally with other 
performance measures in 41%) of the companies, but in almost as many companies (37%), 
it is considered to be the primary driver of overall assessment. 
Hansen (2005) in his research paper "currents in compensation and benefits" commented 
that base salary costs have risen at a remarkably slow pace since 2003, and may continue 
to do so over the foreseeable future. The study further revealed that organizations are 
spending more on variable pay programs. One possible explanation is that firms are 
maintaining market-competitive pay rates by changing the total compensation mix to 
carry a stronger weighting of variable pay. This implies that firms may be increasingly 
converting fixed costs to variable costs not by reducing base salaries outright, but by 
reducing the proportion of base salary in total compensation through the application of 
market increases to the variable component of total compensation. When payout levels 
and operating leverage are reduced through variable pay tied to organisational level 
measures of performance, the firm benefits from improvements in many of the most 
important measures of success. For example, where compensation costs comprise a 
relatively small proportion of expenses, the cash savings from reducing incentive payouts 
can have a noticeable impact on measures of business risk, efficiency, and profitability 
ratios such as net profit margin, ROE, and earnings per share, and growth ratios such as 
price/earnings. The effect of decreasing variable pay costs in low-performing years 
increases as compensation costs comprise a larger proportion of total expenses. 
Now with our understanding of reason behind VPLP, it is paramount to explore what 
makes a good variable pay program. 
2.3. What makes an effective VPLP? 
While some theorists question whether variable pay for performance can ever be 
effective, other theorists believe that variable pay plans can be effective if they are 
properly designed, implemented, and maintained. 
Hammer (1975) pointed out that the "more frequent the formal and informal reviews of 
performance and the more the individual is told about the reasons for an increase, the 
greater his preference for a merit increase system and the lower his preference for a 
seniority system.' Frequent reviews, coupled with the opportunity to air grievances 
through a formal appeals process, may therefore eliminate many of the difficulties 
associated with employees' perceptions of unfairness. 
Several writers Kessler (1992), Armstrong and Murlis (1994), Procter et al. (1993) noted 
that a pay system can be used as a vehicle for organizational change. However, VPLP 
may simply be one of a number of initiatives designed to achieve cultural change. Procter 
et al. (1993) suggested that 'the necessary culture may already have to be in place for a 
system of VPLP to work effectively', as VPLP alone may be incapable of becoming the 
primary driving force of cultural change. VPLP may also serve the purpose of providing a 
statement to employees regarding what Kessler and Purcell (1992) described as the 'kind 
of company we are' and may reinforce existing organizational values and expectations. 
The strategy of culture change may also encompass broader objectives, which aim to 
change the relationship between management and employees. Thus, it has been suggested 
by Ribbens (1988), Kessler and Purcell (1992) and Procter et al. (1993) that the 
individualistic nature of VPLP can be used to side-step the collective bargaining process, 
thereby reducing the influence of the trade union in an effort to re-establish managerial 
control. Individual Pay for performance, group Pay for performance, gain sharing and 
lump-sum awards were identified by these writers as providing the flexibility that is 
required by employers to match complex and dynamic change in the business 
environment. 
Gross and Bacher (1993) identified some of the critical factors in proper design and 
implementation of variable pay for performance plans. These include; 1) senior 
management support, 2) employee acceptance, 3) clear goal definition and unambiguous 
performance measures clearly linked to employee efforts, 4) a supportive organizational 
culture, 5) clear communications, and 6) strong education and training. Incentive pay can 
pull a company out of the doldrums of complacency and create a new, vibrant operating 
environment in which all truly espouse the concept of "shared destiny" and believe that 
every individual can make a difference and will be rewarded based on that difference. 
There are a variety of reasons for the introduction of variable pay schemes. 
It is extremely important to understand whether the variable pay program introduced by 
the companies are benefiting to them or not. So, in the next section, we have perused a 
few studies which explore the benefits and downturn of VPLP. 
2.4. Benefits of VPLP 
Researchers who have studied the efficacy of VPLP have identified several benefits of the 
same. A few of them are as follows: 
Deming (1986) in his research found that with the use of individual incentive systems, 
precise, difficult goals can often be achieved quite successfully. Pagoago and Williams 
(1993) utilized the Hay Survey to ascertain pay practices of 1,256 hospitals and 350,000 
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individuals in tiie healthcare field. They found that over half the responding hospitals 
utilized some type of incentive plan for staff and that a growing number of these 
organizations used contingent pay such as discretionary bonuses, skill based pay, and 
team based pay. The survey indicated a significant decline in the growth rate for base 
salaries over the last two years suggesting that Variable Performance Linked Pay could be 
replacing more traditional pay practices. Since the late 1970s, there has been a steady 
growth in the number of organizations, especially in Britain and the United States, who 
practice, or claim to practice, systems of performance-related pay. Heneman (1992) 
reported that over 80 per cent of US companies explicitly practice performance-related 
pay system. He further reported that there was a relationship between performance ratings 
and 'changes in pay', that is, higher performance ratings are associated with higher 
increases in merit pay. According to a U.S. based survey of Hewitt (2001), 78% of 
companies currently have at least one type of broad-based Variable Performance Linked 
Pay schemes plan in place, up significantly from 1995, when just 59% of companies had 
this type of program. Plus, more companies are extending these programs to lower levels. 
Armstrong and Murlis (1991), Wright (1991) suggested that VPLP acts as a motivator, 
through both providing incentives in the form of monetary rewards and by recognising 
achievements. Further benefits cited include the fact that individuals can identify closely 
with their employers' goals and that this can increase productivity and encourage quality, 
flexibility and teamwork. In addition, VPLP can contribute to the successful recruitment 
and retention of staff. 
There is considerable empirical evidence of a positive effect of compensation on 
performance. In one study, Lazear (1999) saw productivity rising by 35% (and wages by 
12%) in a change from salary to piece rates, with a third of the productivity gain due to 
worker selection effects. Paarsch and Shearer (1996) found evidence supportive of 
incentive and productivity effects from piece rates, as do Banker et al. (1996), although 
the latter do not distinguish between incentive and worker selection effects. Fernie and 
Metcalf (1996) found that top British jockeys performed significantly better when offered 
percentage of prize money for winning races compared to being on fixed retainers. 
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McMillan et al. (1989) looked at Chinese agricultural and industrial data respectively and 
found significant incentive effects. 
Kahn and Sherer (1990) found that better evaluations of white-collar office vv/orkers were 
achieved by those employees who had a steeper relation between evaluations and pay. 
Nikkinen and Sahlstrom (2004) found empirical evidence that agency theory can be used, 
at least to some extent, to explain financial audit fees internationally. Overall performance 
related reward system has effectively led to increased organizational effectiveness in U.S. 
organizations. In fact overall two thirds of compensation managers were satisfied with the 
outcomes of Variable Performance Linked Pay schemes for performance schemes. 
In a study on VPLP, Bencivenga (1997) found that companies are enhancing performance 
and becoming more profitable by creating internal cultures of ownership. He sees this 
transition in culture coupled with sharing more information with employees and giving 
them input into how the company is managed as lynchpins to the success of such 
programs. 
Distinguished researcher Lawler (2000) opined that by tying compensation to the 
profitability of the firm and the wealth of the shareholders, shareholders encourage 
managers to work harder and take appropriate risks and, in general, align managerial 
incentives with shareholder well being. Variable Performance Linked Pay schemes are 
viewed as a means of aligning the interests of employees with those of employers. Pay is 
a powerful communicator of organizational goals and priorities and companies that 
expect to be successful must make employees become partners in their success. His 
research has provided supporting evidence that Variable Performance Linked Pay 
schemes succeeds at motivating people. Variable Performance Linked Pay schemes create 
a belief among employees that good performance will: 
• lead to higher pay, 
• minimize the perceived negative consequences of performing well, and 
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• create conditions such that positive outcomes other that pay will be seen to be 
related to good performance 
Towers Perrin's (2004) study reported that successful global companies were increasing 
their use of performance-based pay and were also moving to customize Variable 
Performance Linked Pay packages by region and cultures. 
In this section, we are given an understanding that variable pay is being widely used 
worldwide and a considerable positive impact has also been reported by various 
researchers. It will be interesting to review the research findings which are contrary in 
nature so that we may have a broader understanding. 
2.5. Adverse Impact of VPLP 
Variable pay for performance has its share of detractors as well. Many compensation 
professionals opposing variable pay for performance relegate it to "has been" status 
among pay plan concepts. 
Brown (1973) opined that indeed, a well established thought has been developed which 
has sought to analyze the degeneration or decay of the payment systems in terms of 
competing managerial and employee interests as they relate to the effort-reward bargain. 
This analysis has highlighted the "dysfunctional" or "destabilizing" impact certain 
payment systems can have within the organization and led some observers to stress the 
demotivating rather than the motivating affect pay can have upon employees. 
Solano (1992) contended that pay for performance did not work and newer approaches 
had come along that offer better ways to effectively administer pay programs tied to 
performance, such as skill-based pay, pay for knowledge, wide job bands, or new types of 
incentive programs. 
Researchers such as Dwyer (1994), Kessler (1992) and Marsden and Richardson (1994) 
questioned the extent to which VPLP actually acts as a motivator, or, indeed, the extent to 
which money itself can motivate. Most managers are aware of Herzberg's view that the 
job itself is the source of true motivation, not the pay or even the conditions of work'. A 
study by Kovach (1987) reported a mismatch between managerial and employee views 
concerning what motivates. While managers attributed high financial needs to employees, 
staff cited pay as fifth on a list often factors, while the first four were concerned with 
intrinsic motivators. 
Some researchers such as Filipczak (1996) advised against using money as a motivator. 
Filipczak viewed this as an extrinsic tool with minimal long-term value. Instead, he 
suggested that organizations which tap into employees' intrinsic motivation are much 
more likely to have staff who desire to do a good job, produce quality products, and take 
pride in their work. Further, he suggests that organizations achieve this through giving 
employees an opportunity to have input into their jobs, respecting employees and 
allowing them to do a good job. 
Another controversy associated with variable pay programs is the belief by many that the 
payment of money for performance does not create an incentive. Psychologists who say 
that money does not motivate affirm that motivation is a multifaceted issue. They contend 
that some factors motivate primarily in a positive direction with a neutral negative effect, 
while other factors motivate primarily in a negative direction with a neutral positive 
effect. Herzberg argued this concept in the two factor theory of "hygiene maintenance" 
and "motivators". Herzberg's theory, however, does differentiate "salary" and "money". 
Salary is identified as a "hygiene factor" and as such could cause employee 
dissatisfaction if a salary expectation is not realized. Kovach (1987) commented that the 
salary would, however, have virtually no effect on increased motivation. Money, on the 
other hand, could be a "motivating factor" (a measurement of achievement) but have little 
effect as a dissatisifier. The controversy lies whether variable pay is considered a 
"hygiene factor" or a "motivating factor." Much depends on a variable pay plan's design 
and application. 
Greenberg (1986) suggested several antidotes for the problem of 'perceived unfairness' 
due to VPLP. This included the extent to which employees have the opportunity to 
participate in pay design decisions, the quality and timeliness of information provided, the 
degree to which the rules governing pay allocations are consistently followed, the 
availability of channels for appeals, and the organization's safeguards against bias and 
inconsistency. Eminent researchers like Murphy et al. (1995), Kessler (1994) and Beer 
et al. (1984) observed that in addition to the issue of fairness, problems associated with 
VPLP include a tendency toward a short-term focus on quantifiable goals to the neglect of 
more long-term issues. There may also be measurement difficulties, in terms of both 
difficulty in measuring the work of professionals and attaining a fair and consistent means 
of assessing employees which will avoid the risks of subjectivity. Philpott and Sheppard 
(1992) identified a lack of communication as the principal factor for failing of VPLP. 
Armstrong (1993), Mabey and Salaman (1995) also reported that a lack of agreement on 
objectives and standards of performance and insufficient feedback may create further 
difficulties. Storey and Sisson (1993) argued that VPLP would appear to undermine 
utterly the whole concept of teamwork. From research in multinationals operating in 
Ireland, Geary (1992) found evidence of the contradictory nature of management's 
strategy, which attempted to develop simultaneously a collective identity focused around 
teamwork, while discriminating between individual contributions. Hayes & Abernathy 
(1980) in their research attributed a significant amount of blame to the design of their 
compensation (e.g., linking bonuses to short-term, for example, quarterly financial 
performance. 
For an incentive program to meet the objective of contributing to an organization's 
success, it is critical that it measures and rewards the right things. The extent that this is 
achieved, pay serves as an important tool for communicating business priorities. Britton 
(1997) suggested that incentive programs have a negative impact on motivation when 
they measure the wrong things. It can then result in destruction of long term motivation, 
handicapped employee relationships, and an aversion to taking risks. Britton views 
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incentive programs as a carrot and stici< approach. He supported this contention by 
offering Kohn's (1993) conclusion that rewards intended to motivate certain behavior are 
actually bribes. The surprising argument is made that employees worth retaining do not 
truly believe that Variable Performance Linked Pay and Variable Performance Linked 
Pay schemes motivate them to achieve objectives, especially when it is seen as the sole 
motivating factor. 
Oliver (1996) argued that no one could prove Variable Performance Linked Pay improved 
performance. This argument is heavily challenged by overwhelming case studies citing 
the positive impact these programs have had on organizational performance. Despite the 
obvious advantages of Variable Performance Linked Pay programs, researchers and 
organizations have failed to show the impact of these programs over extended periods of 
time. One major objection against performance-based pay has been that it does not cover 
the whole staff rather a small group of executives are covered only under this scheme. 
Much of the discussion amongst practitioners and commentators has focused upon the 
application of merit pay to white collar staff rather than to manual, supervisory or clerical 
groups. Smith I (1992), for example, highlighted this point by noting that: "The only 
group not experiencing the changes brought about by the reward culture is shop floor 
employees" 
These views and prescriptions are supported by recent evidence on the application of 
merit pay. The Workplace (Industrial Relations Survey) IPD (1992), for instance, 
indicated that merit pay is much less likely to be found moving down the organizational 
hierarchy. Thus, while merit pay covered middle and senior managers in 40% of 
establishments, it was only found in 31% of establishments for lower or operative level 
employees. 
Anfuso (1995) noted that individual incentive programs were losing their popularity, in 
part, because they do not promote teamwork, quality improvement, and other important 
business issues. He further suggested that these programs can work against these 
objectives. Difficulty in measuring individual performance is offered as a significant 
causal effect of these results. Other research not only criticizes the structure of programs, 
but also the purpose of the programs. Arrowsmith (1999) opined that the incentive 
programs utilized by businesses in highly regulated industries have been characterized as 
highly sophisticated, but lacking effectiveness since these organizations are not driven by 
business necessity. 
Hudson and Patricia (2005) highlighted the negative trends in Variable Performance 
Linked Pay schemes, such as "only half (49%) of U.S. workers thought they were paid on 
par with others who do similar work, either at their company or in the general 
marketplace". While earlier researchers Brickley et al. (1985) and Tehranian and 
Waegelein (1985) found that pay for-compensation plans are generally good news for 
shareholders. However later Core et al. (1999) and Core et al. (2003) found that 
managers can and do sometimes design compensation plans at the expense of 
shareholders. As a defining characteristic of the employment relationship and 
consequently as a powerful technique in the exercise of managerial control, the pursuit of 
ever more "efficient and effective" reward systems is hardly surprising. However, as a 
technique for managerial control payment systems have been subject to countervailing 
workplace pressures exercised by employees, work groups and their representatives. 
Now we have both versions of VPLP. In the next few sections, let us explore the impact 
of VPLP on team performance and productivity. 
2.6. VPLP Impact on Team/ Individual Performance 
Perusal of literature indicates that there are divergent views as to whether variable pay 
programs are best suited for individual performance or team performance. 
42 
Alchian and Demsetz (1972) noted that, where output reflects the contribution of many 
individuals and individual contributions cannot be easily identified, and compensation is 
therefore based largely on the output of the team. In the words of Holmstrom (1982), pay-
for-performance increases the incentives to free-ride, as there are large positive 
externalities to the efforts of an individual team member, and low returns to the 
individual. 
Nash et al. (1975) confirmed the negative incentive effects. Leibowitz and Tollison 
(1980) found that larger companies typically result in worse cost containment. As a 
counter, peer pressure can potentially solve the problem, but this depends on peer 
monitoring being relatively costless to the individuals doing the monitoring/censuring in 
any particular instance (unless one brings in social considerations of norms and group 
identity and so on). 
Drago and Garvey's (1997) study of variable pay on team performance showed that when 
employees are placed on individual pay-for-performance schemes, they are less likely to 
help their coworkers. This negative effect is particularly important in those jobs that 
involve strong elements of 'team production'. 
So far it is reflected that variable pay has not so good impact on team performance. So let 
us also study its impact on overall productivity. 
2.7. VPLP Impact on Productivity 
Smoot and Duncan (1997) conducted an experiment looking at the impact of three 
different incentive programs on worker productivity. They found a systematic 
relationship amongst the incentive programs and worker performance in all of their 
experiments. Further, they found that these programs elicited higher performance than flat 
pay systems in the experiments. The negatively accelerated program was found to have 
the most profound impact. The fact is that a Variable Performance Linked Pay scheme 
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does act as a performance enhancer. This was illustrated by a study conducted by Hay 
Group (2004) on US managers. Compensation managers were asked to rate their Variable 
Performance Linked Pay schemes for managers and professional employees on several 
dimensions. Properly implemented variable plans do boost profitability of organizations, 
they reported. Their study found a difference in earnings between companies who 
adopted bonus plans or performance incentive plans. The 32 firms with no bonus plans 
showed no decline in a measure of earnings. However, the 21 firms who adopted 
performance incentive plans showed a significant increase in a measure of earnings. 
The Hewitt (2001) study showed that the linkage between pay and performance is getting 
stronger. The results revealed that an outstanding performer typically earns more than 
twice the salary increase earned by an average performer. Nearly all (85%) respondents 
reported having a Variable Performance Linked Pay schemes in 2003. Specifically, 
Senior / Top Management accounts for the largest share of variable pay, at 18.4%, which 
is a jump from previous year's 16.5%. There is some indication that companies utilize 
incentive programs for more than just increasing performance. Bencivenga (1997) 
acknowledged the notion among some experts that incentive programs are also being used 
to offset wage stagnation and to avoid layoffs during profitable periods. 
When considering labor costs, organizations often overlook expenses related to turnover. 
Gerhart and Trevor (1996) conducted a study examining the strategic compensation 
practices in 152 organizations. They found that the design of compensation programs in 
these organizations was related to employment variability in two important ways. First, 
they concluded that there was less employment variability in organizations relying more 
heavily on long-term incentives. They also concluded that employment variability was 
lower when incentives were extended to teams or groups. They point out the obvious 
advantages in reducing employment variability such as lower costs associated with costs 
of layoffs, severance pay, and lower unemployment insurance taxes. 
Filella and Hegewisch (1994) expanded the examination of the impact of incentive 
programs on productivity by looking at productivity in conjunction with other innovative 
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work practices including flexible job assignments, employment security and teams. Their 
first significant finding was that clusters of complementary HR practices had a positive 
impact on performance. They concluded the opposite for individual work practices. 
Further, they found that work practices such as utilization of problem solving teams had 
more of an impact on productivity when used in conjunction with such practices as 
training and Variable Performance Linked Pay. 
Research on complementary HR practices is supported by the work of Chen et al. (1997). 
This study revealed how several companies align their compensation structures to support 
ethical business practices. Creating pay programs that truly reward performance is also 
one of the six complementary HR practices that entrepreneurial firms utilize (Cantoni, 
1997). Abandoning use of performance appraisal systems, discontinuing use of published 
salary grades and ranges, and injecting flexibility into the pay program are also cited. 
A study of 84 subjects by Stone and Ziebart (1995) suggested that performance based 
incentives led to changes in information processing behavior and improvements in 
decision-making. Information processing was enhanced by closer examination of 
alternatives, more liberal use of time in making selections and employment of decision-
making strategies, which lead to more accurate choices. 
Banker et al. (1996) set out to examine the impact that contextual factors such as 
competitive intensity, customer focused strategy and behavior based control had on an 
outcome based incentive plan focusing on customer service. They found that sales, 
customer satisfaction and profits increased as a result of the outcome based incentive 
program. It is interesting to note that these same measures decreased with the level of 
supervisory monitoring. Moreover, policy makers, in particular, have been keen to extend 
merit pay schemes from the private sector to the public sector. A variable Performance 
Linked Pay scheme, for example, is a key feature. It stated that pay systems in the public 
sector need to make a regular and direct link between a person's contribution to the 
standards of the service provided and his or her reward. 
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In the last section, we shall explore the significance of various cultural environments and 
origin of country on VPLP's success. 
2.8. VPLP across major Countries / Cultures 
Each country has its own culture and attitude towards fixed and variable pay for different 
level of employees. This thinking and culture get reflected down the line in management 
policies of companies with different origin of countries. Some management policies are 
quite successful towards implementation of VPLP while some are not. In this section, we 
attempt to explore how does variable pay has its significance in different cultural 
environment. 
As per the research done by IPD (1999), 40% of organisations in UK had VPLP schemes 
for management employees, but only 25% have such schemes for non-management 
employees. A higher proportion of non-management employees (11%) than management 
employees (6%) were paid under competency pay schemes. The survey reported that in 
Britain, Variable Pay schemes have become increasingly popular over the past two 
decades. Throughout 1980s and early 1990s these schemes were seen as a means of 
improving both individual and organisational performance, and as such were heavily 
promoted by the governments of the day. However, as opinions differed as to their 
motivational effects, the schemes have witnessed a relative decline. Yet, as there have 
been no large-scale studies on the extent of VPLP, very little is known about its real 
nature and coverage. The study further showed that anywhere between 20% and 45% of 
companies have at least some proportion of their staff paid via such schemes. Individual 
VPLP (not to be confused with payment by results or piecework) has been used for a long 
time in the UK, but was traditionally used as a merit payment over and above the annual 
pay award, and more as a means of rewarding "good behaviour" rather than performance. 
It was also largely concentrated in white-collar managerial occupations. Since the 1980s, 
however, VPLP schemes are purported to have been utilised for a wider range of 
occupations and have been increasingly linked to organisational objectives, against which 
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individuals are appraised on an annual basis. The rating awarded at the appraisal is used 
to award the individual a certain pay raise or bonus payment. There are a range of 
schemes that utilise a variety of individual, team-based and skill-based criteria for 
offering awards - in reality the schemes often involve some combination of the three. In 
many schemes, the employees involved now have all of their annual pay increase offered 
through this method. 
Hoerr (1998) reported that in UK, 63% of workplaces had one or another type of 
incentive scheme. By 1998 the figure was 58%. Despite this the author argued that it 
would be safe to conclude that there was little change over the period. There were, 
however, changes in the way that Variable Performance Linked Pay was used. In 1990 
VPLP schemes were more commonly used for manual rather than white-collar employees 
whereas by 1998 the reverse was true. Also, there was a slight intimation that VPLP was 
less commonly used than before, hinting that these types of schemes may have reached 
their peak. Evidence also suggests that larger workplaces and those without recognized 
unions continued to make greater use of Variable Performance Linked Pay. There were 
no detailed figures available in the UK to signify the true extent of Variable Performance 
Linked Pay nor is there a commonly agreed definition of what it is. Both the 1990 
Workplace Industrial Relations Survey (WIRS) and the 1998 Workplace Employee 
Relations Survey (WERS), however, included data on Variable Performance Linked Pay. 
Although overall comparisons can be made for some aspects, the structure of the 
questions differed making meaningful comparison of others difficult. 
As per (European Industrial Relations Observatory) EIRO (1998) Variable Performance 
Linked Pay plan is more common in manufacturing sector in comparison to others. They 
were monitoring variable-pay plans at a variety of companies—from automobile 
manufacturers to financial institutions—since 1996. They reported that while 75% of 
companies felt that their variable-pay plan helped improve business results, only 49% of 
those polled actually met or exceeded their main objective. However the same study 
found that the degree of reliance on Variable Performance Linked Pay and other types of 
remuneration still changes considerably from one country to another because of cultural 
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and regulatory differences. Variable Performance Linked Pay as a share of total 
remuneration for accountants worldwide ranged from zero in Venezuela to 15% in South 
Africa. Variable Performance Linked Pay as a share of total remuneration for chief 
executive officers (CEOs) worldwide ranged from 15% in New Zealand to 63% in the 
U.S. Perquisites in some countries amounted to as much as 40% of total pay. Variable 
Performance Linked Pay schemes is playing an ever increasing role within the overall pay 
package, especially at management level and for qualified employees. For the long time, 
US organizations have been the front-runners. Here, particularly in the top management, 
two-thirds of the annual income typically consists of variable elements: short-term 
incentives (annual bonus), longer-term bonus schemes (from three to five years) and 
stock options. The use of variable compensation plans in American organization is 
increasing. 
In a study commissioned by Ministry of Labour in Japan, (Dale and Koji, 2005) covering 
5,300 firms throughout Japan revealed that 4.3% of the total, and 7.9% of the firms with 
over 1,000 employees, used a performance-based wage system. About 60% of companies 
surveyed had switched over to a merit-based pay system. Performance-based annual 
wages seem set to win over an even bigger share of the Japanese corporate world in the 
near future. The system traditionally employed by most Japanese companies tied annual 
wage increases to employees' ages and number of years spent working for the firm. Most 
companies have a system of periodic wage increases for regular workers according to 
which, barring exceptional circumstances, there is a virtually automatic annual increase in 
wages as employees move up the wage scale. This annual increment accounts for the 
major portion of the spring wage increase so that the so-called 'base-up' portion is in fact 
very small. The history of performance-based salaries in Japan is short; they were said to 
have been used first in 1969 when a major electronics firm introduced them for its 
managerial ranks. However, since speculative bubbles collapsed in the early 1990s, 
prompting corporate restructuring along with a trend toward weighting employees' skills 
and records, more and more Japanese companies are switching to a system of annual 
salaries with pay scales based on workers' yearly performance. At present the typical 
annual-salary system in Japan ties less of the employees' salaries to the assessment of 
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their performance than the U.S.-style system; it remains to be seen whether a more full-
scale performance-based system will develop in Japan. Despite this trend towards merit-
based pay, some companies are reverting back to the seniority-based system, as 
companies struggle to effectively assess an employee's work progress and level of 
performance. Among the Japanese companies that introduced performance-based pay 
systems, over 75% experienced difficulties managing them. At Tokai Rubber in Komaki, 
Japan, the performance-based system was introduced in 1999. But, as its employees 
struggled to perform using the plant's old machinery, the company decided to revert back 
to the seniority-based wage system. Since pay-for-performance systems were introduced 
in Japan about 10 years ago, companies and employees have been debating their 
effectiveness. About 3 in 10 of the survey's respondents strongly agreed, "Promotions and 
salary payments should be based on performance." When asked if they have received a 
promotion or a raise in pay because of pay-for-performance, however, only 8% of 
respondents strongly agreed; the percentage for engaged employees (41%) was 
significantly higher. Japanese employers, it appears, embrace the concept of pay-for-
performance more in theory than in practice. Gallup (2005) study of variable pay in Japan 
found that Variable Performance Linked Pay schemes are clearly not practiced in 
Japanese organizations. Over half of the employee surveyed reported that they had 
received a performance appraisal in last year. However, only 35% say that their 
performance are recognized and only 21% say that they are properly rewarded for their 
performances This weaknesses is also established by high level of dissatisfaction shown 
when Japanese employees are asked if staff are fairly given their performance and 
contribution to the organization 
As per Takao et al. (2005), contrary to a popular belief that Korean corporate governance 
and the structure of Korean executive compensation is vastly different from elsewhere in 
the West, it has been found that cash compensation of Korean executives is significantly 
related to stock market performance and that the magnitude of the sensitivity of pay to 
stock market performance is comparable to Japan and the U.S. Moreover, alternative 
performance measures (such as accounting performance and sales) turn out to play a less 
important role in the determination of Korean executive compensation. Since the financial 
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crisis a soaring number of companies took up tine profit-sharing program and annual pay 
system (the mix of merit pay and lump sum bonus) as their way of implementing the 
performance-based pay. The adoption rate of the annual pay system almost tripled from 
15.1% in 1999 to 48.4% in 2005, and that of the profit sharing rose twofold from 16% to 
32.1% during the same period. In summary the pay policy of Korean corporations since 
the financial crisis tended to heighten pay flexibility by predominantly adopting the 
performance-based pay, rather than seeking alternative base pay system. 
Towers Perrin (2004) study showed how compensation structures differ in various 
cultures. They reported that all compensation systems are affected by two cultural issues-
Corporate culture of the organization and the local culture in which the organization 
operates. Compensation schemes that might be extremely effective in a home-country 
location will fail if they are not congruent with local cultural values. Industries, which 
tend to use individual rewards and variable performance linked pay as both a motivator 
and core compensation component around the world risk their compensation strategies 
backfiring. Successful compensation approaches differ according to the type of 
organization. 
Table 2.1. Comparison between Compensation Structures in Different Countries 
Country 
USA 
UK 
Japan 
Korea 
Basic 
Compensation 
27% 
43% 
56% 
48% 
Variable 
Performance 
Linked Pay 
62% 
35% 
22% 
39% 
Benefits 
6% 
19% 
15% 
10% 
Perquisites 
5% 
3% 
7% 
3% 
Source - Towers Perrin (2004) 
Schemes that are aimed at differentiating individual performances are likely to be far less 
welcome in group-oriented societies like Japan and Korea where fear of loss-of-face may 
turn an employee program that may be successful in the U.S. into a demotivator. Such 
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schemes may be equally unwelcome in nurturing societies, that attach greater importance 
to solidarity among colleagues, and individual prominence could provoke resentment and 
jealousy. Anglo-Saxon culture tends to have the following impact on compensation 
design: 
• Variable Performance Linked Pay Schemes measured in fmancial terms with a 
relatively short-term horizon; 
• Differentiation - both by responsibility level and within equivalent job 
responsibilities; 
• Flexibility in benefit provision allowing for individual choice; and 
• Little emphasis on perquisites. 
Zhang (2004) study reported that in Japanese society, culture has a different effect again. 
Pay-for-performance is linked to the entire company's success and long-term horizons. 
In addition, differentiation may be constrained by respect for age and rewards may have 
to operate around a built-in age escalator; benefit provision is often inflexible; and 
perquisites play a strong role in reward but, typically, much less overtly than in Europe. 
Within the recent past there has been a strong trend among the more progressive Japanese 
companies to move towards variable incentives/bonuses 
Ritts (2000) guided that in Japan, each person is expected to conform to societal ways and 
norms, though there are exceptions with much of the radical younger generation and a 
few individuals that intentionally mock conformity. Japan is a collectivist society where 
group needs and wants are placed above those of the individual and Japanese people tend 
to be other-directed. Subsequently, they are extremely sensitive to and concerned about 
relationships. A noteworthy Japanese quote, "The nail that sticks out is hammered down". 
Russo (2005) indicated how individualism is negatively viewed in Japanese society. 
Japanese are guided by their heritage, or possibly parental teachings, consciously or 
unconsciously, to conform to societal expectations. In American schools, for instance, 
students are valued and frequently receive better grades if they speak up and participate, 
even if their participation is unnecessary. Japanese society views such contributions as 
rude and disruptive, and active participators might very possibly receive lower grades. 
Japanese people believe that sensei (teachers) always know best and students should 
listen only to them. 
Ho (1992) reported that assimilating to American society may be difficult for someone of 
Japanese heritage because of divergent thought patterns. Several other traditional values 
that may make assimilating to American society difficult for someone with Asian heritage 
include: filial piety, shame as a method of reinforcing expectations and proper behavior, 
self-control, emphasis on consensus, fatalism, and inconspicuousness. 
Imamura (1990) opined that historically, the family rather than the individual has been the 
basic unit of Japanese society, however, that is changing to some degree. Whereas the 
traditional family ways and norms no longer strictly apply in many Japanese families, 
neither do contemporary individualistic norms. There is also still a strong gender-based 
division of labor. 
Hur & Hur (1999) reported that the essence of Korean culture is harmony with order. 
Influenced by Confucianism, Koreans value harmony within family, community and 
society as a whole. They have strong ties to family, and value education, hard work, and 
ambition to excel. Commonly cited virtues in traditional Korea include filial piety, respect 
for elders, benevolence, loyalty, trust, cooperation, reciprocity, and humility. These 
traditional values are often challenged, however, by younger generations influenced by 
western culture. Because Koreans emphasize harmony with order, they tend to be 
influenced by the opinions of other members of their family or community when taking 
decisions. If they take a decision based on their own preferences without considering 
others, they are likely to be labeled "selfish." Koreans regard family as the basic social 
unit and consider harmony at home the first step toward harmony in the community and 
in the nation as a whole. Many Koreans consider themselves extensions of their families 
and often regard the welfare of the family as more important than that of individual 
members. The roles of family members are based on gender and age. Exchanging roles 
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and sharing power are not encouraged, due to strong beliefs that order and harmony exist 
when there are distinctions between the roles and duties of men and women. 
Books like Bowling Alone (2000) guide us that the American society, on the other hand, 
values individualism and uniqueness. American parents frequently want their children to 
stand apart from the crowd. Japanese culture discourages individualism whereas 
American culture embraces it. In American schools, for instance, students are valued and 
frequently receive better grades if they speak up and participate, even if their participation 
is unnecessary. As the United States is a very diverse nation, it is home to numerous 
organization and social groups and individuals may derive their group affiliated identity 
from a variety of sources. Many Americans, especially white collar professionals belong 
to professional organizations such as the APA, ASA or ATFLC, although indicate that 
Americans affiliate with these sorts of groups less often than they did in the 1950s and 
1960s. Today, Americans derive a great deal of their identity through their work and 
professional affiliation, especially among individuals higher on the economic ladder. 
Hofstede (1980) reported that what works well in one society can cause a complete 
disaster in another. For example, the collectivist culture of Japan determines how 
Japanese conduct meetings, how they make decisions, and how their teams work together. 
When we send Europeans to Japan with their standards of individual achievement, we are 
courting trouble. When we use our yardstick to recognize a team leader by singling him 
or her out for an award, it is inevitable that it is going to get a negative reaction. It is also 
important to understand the impact of culture on national legislation and through 
legislation on company compensation strategies. It is best not to agree to pay an 
employee a monthly salary unless you know the number of months that constitute an 
annual salary. Also, do not offer bonuses unless you are certain they will remain as a 
variable "add-on" to base pay. Many corporations are trying to spread stock options 
across the globe, but it can have unfortunate and unintended effects. In Holland, options 
are taxed at the point of grant; in France, at the point of exercise, and in the United 
Kingdom, at the point of sale. Thus, the compensation plan will be perceived very 
differently in each country. Indeed, if the employee who is unfortunate to be granted 
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stock options in Holland moves to France when he or she needs to exercise those options, 
and to the U.K. when liquidating his or her profits, the benefits of the plan will not be 
apparent. Conversely, he or she would be delighted to move in the opposite direction. The 
continued globalization of markets means that we will have to increasingly consider 
whether the effect of different pay strategy is likely to differ from country to country, or 
between culture within a country. 
Hofstede (1980) work on identifying cultural differences on dimensions such as Power 
distance (i.e., the degree of inequity considered normal), individualism, masculinity, 
uncertainty avoidance and short-versus long-term time orientation has been used to begin 
this question. Variable Performance Linked Pay Schemes may face difficulties in 
countries that have a high need for uncertainty avoidance such as Japan, South Korea and 
Taiwan. Individualistic schemes such as "Merit Pay" could be a problem in cultures 
where collectivism is a stronger norm than individualism. In nations identified as 
individualistic (U.S., U.K.), compensation and rewards would support employability and 
individual and performance-based pay. Those in more collectivist nations (Japan) would 
choose more group-based approaches, and so on. It has long been recognized that 
compensation and reward systems, because of their social as well as economic 
significance, exemplify and reinforce cultural norms. However, this does not mean that 
social and cultural norms necessarily coincide with national boundaries. Indeed, 100 
years ago, writers recognized that mining and textile companies developed their own 
unique social norms and that the compensation systems of these companies reflected 
those norms. 
Hofstede (1980) analysis of cultural dimensions provides some insights into the United 
Kingdom's culture. Not surprisingly, the British have very strong feelings towards 
individualism and masculinity. Interestingly, both dimensions are rated higher than in the 
United States, particularly masculinity. This indicates that the U.K. culture places 
significant emphasis on individual decision making and performance-based rewards 
systems. Performance tends to be task driven rather than people driven. Results are 
considered more important than relationships. Both power distance and uncertainty 
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avoidance are relatively low in the U.K., indicating that corporate cultures fall into what 
Hofstede refers to as the "village/market" quadrant—where rules are flexible and the 
focus of work is on getting the job done. 
In fact a study on the cultural dimensions done by Hofstede showed how these cultures 
ranked on the 5 dimensions taken for research: 
Table 2.2. National Culture Clusters (Hofstede's Analysis) 
Regions/ 
Country 
JAPAN 
KOREA 
UNITED STATES 
UNITED 
KINGDOM 
Power 
Distance 
High 
High 
Low 
Low 
Individualism 
Low 
Low 
High 
High 
Masculinity 
High 
Low 
High 
High 
Uncertainty 
Avoidance 
High 
High 
Low 
Low 
Source: Hofstede(1980) 
2.9. Conclusions from the chapter / Need for Research 
The review of the literature suggests that leading organizations are moving away from 
traditional pay system towards linking pay to performance. The organizations are not 
ready to carry the burden on their own and they want to include their stakeholders 
(employees) in the whole process. One can ascertain from the literature review that the 
VPLP concept has emerged significantly in last two decades only. Various researchers 
have mixed or different views on this subject. Some find it good for organizations health. 
It has also been reported by many researchers that variable pay has no linkage to 
employee performance. Most of the available literature is from European and US based 
companies and there is negligible research material available in India. There is no 
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standard research instrument available to measure satisfaction and perception of 
employees with their variable pay experience. 
Indian Economy now has a major presence by leading MNCs. They employ significant 
chunk of people in these MNCs. These companies come from different parental/cultural 
background. The parent culture is expected to influence design and success of VPLP 
Schemes. India is eying to become a superpower in coming years, it is essential for 
companies operating in India to be globally competitive. Linking pay to performance 
could assist the objectives of such organizations in meeting their strategic objectives. 
However, the sufficient research work is not available on the impact of variable 
performance linked pay on performance. Therefore, there is a need to explore the subject 
in detail, especially in a set up where an individual has worked in both the environment 
i.e. before and after the launch of any variable performance linked pay in his/her 
respective organization. Today companies are becoming more competitive and 
employees' stability and loyalty is shrinking fast. Variable pay is assumed to be an 
alternative system for withholding and retaining talent. The impact of various cultural 
environments on the success of variable pay scheme and many more issues are yet to be 
explored. That is the genesis of the study. We attempt to explore answers to relevant 
questions in respect to variable performance linked pay and its impact on employee 
performance in varied cultural context in India. 
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CHAPTER 3 - RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
3.1. Statement of Problem 
Variable Performance Linked Pay Schemes such as bonuses, gain sharing, and stock 
plans are increasingly complementing or replacing more traditional Pay for Performance 
plans internationally. Organizations are investing time and money to design, administer 
and deliver competitive pay schemes to their employees (Lawler, 2000). The pressure is 
mounting on organizations to stay competitive for their sustainability. They need 
employees who can deliver results in this hypercompetitive environment. With or without 
applying too much thought, most companies are linking pay of their employees with their 
performance, anticipating enhanced performance. The available literature provides a 
mixed picture on the issue of linking pay to performance. 
The literature, however, suggests that success of variable pay programs is likely to be 
influenced by cultural background. However there is lack of clarity on the kind of culture 
best suited for VPLP. In a country like India, there is a significant presence of foreign / 
multi-national players. These MNCs operate as per Global Best Practices. This applies to 
their variable pay programs as well. There is limited research evidence available in India 
that confirms that such variable pay programs motivate employee to perform better. 
Employee satisfaction and motivation with variable pay is a real issue here. Even the 
most ardent supporters of variable pay recognize the difficulties in managing variable pay 
schemes well in different cultures (Hofstede, 1980). 
There is enough literature available worldwide linking employee satisfaction with overall 
pay. But there is limited research available linking variable pay and employee 
performance & satisfaction. We could not lay our hands on a validated research 
instrument that can measure employee perception with variable pay before and after 
implementation of the scheme to measure the difference. We understand that Satisfaction 
with pay is different than satisfaction with variable pay (Sturman and Short, 2000). The 
58 
lack of a valid measure of variable pay significance Jiinders researcli into its antecedents 
and effects. The money associated with variable pay plans relative to total compensation 
is growing; however, research has yet to examine how such plans can be designed and/or 
implemented to maximize employees' performance and satisfaction with such schemes. 
To summarize, there is lack of enough research evidence in India in respect to variable 
pay significance on employee performance. Developed nations have wide interest in 
Indian market. Indian businesses are also making their presence felt worldwide with large 
acquisitions and mergers. India is becoming a centre of attraction for all potential 
investors. The widespread and growing use of variable pay in India has made it an 
important subject of research. However, the literature on pay, pay satisfaction, and its 
measurement have not adequately produced a measure of variable pay impact on 
employee performance, especially in Indian context. Therefore the important issue here 
today is to understand the effectiveness of Variable pay and its impact on employee 
performance and satisfaction. There is a need to study as to which type of cultural 
environment is best suited for overall success of VPLP Schemes. The present study 
attempts to address these questions. It is expected that the study shall provide insight to 
Indian corporate to help them re-design their compensation plan in a more meaningful 
manner. 
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3.2, Objectives of the study 
In light of the growing importance of the variable performance linked pay schemes, the 
present study aimed at the following key objectives: 
1) To ascertain the impact of variable pay on employee performance (as perceived 
by them). 
2) To assess the employee satisfaction with variable pay. 
3) To explore benefits of variable pay in an organization. 
4) To explore the drawbacks of variable pay in an organization. 
5) To explore the influence (if any) of diverse parental and cultural backgrounds on 
the overall success of Variable performance linked pay. 
6) To assess the difference, if any, in perceptions of blue and white collared 
employees towards variable pay. 
7) To assess the difference, if any, in perceptions of employees towards variable pay 
as per varied length of service. 
8) To explore the differences in perceptions of employees before and after 
implementation of variable pay. 
9) To ascertain the influence of variable pay on performance management system in 
the organization. 
10) To suggest measures for effective implementation of VPLP Program. 
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3.3. Null Hypotheses 
On the basis of above objectives, tiie following null hypotheses were formed 
^o. Hypotheses 
Hi 01 Variable pay has no relationship with individual perceived performance 
H, 02 Variable pay has no relationship with employee satisfaction 
H< 03 Variable pay does not lead to employee retention in an organization 
H, 04 Variable pay has no association with market strength of the organization 
H, 05 Significant differences do not exist in perception of employees with varied 
length of service, towards variable pay programs 
H, 06 Significant differences do not exist in perception of "Blue and White 
Collared" employees, towards variable pay programs 
H, 07 Significant differences do not exist in perception of employees "before and 
after" implementation of variable pay programs 
H, 08 Significant differences do not exist in perception of employees with varied 
cultural backgrounds, towards variable pay programs 
HI 09 Variable pay does not lead towards improved employee earnings 
HI 010 Variable pay has no relationship with camaraderie and teamwork among 
employees 
HI oil Variable pay has no relationship with performance evaluation of individuals 
HI 012 Significant differences do not exist in satisfaction of employees with 
performance management systems "pre and post" implementation of 
variable pay programs 
3.4. Operational Definitions 
The main variables used in the research are: 
1. Pay: pay is a periodic payment from an employer to an employee, which is 
specified in an employment contract. It is the cost of acquiring human resources 
for running operations in an organization. Pay for the purpose of this research 
means any wage and salary earned at work. 
2. Performance: For the purpose of this study the definition of performance is 
actually the employee perceived performance. Performance may be defined as the 
activity of an employee to accomplish an intended task/ objective. Performance 
requires the application of spirit, passion, skills, knowledge, aptitude, attitudes and 
competencies etc. Performance of an employee could be dependent on various 
internal, external, social or environmental factors. One of those factors is the 
compensation policy, such as variable pay. In the study, we intend to measure, 
what impact, variable pay has on employee's perceived performance, 
3. Variable performance Linked Pay: variable performance linked pay is defined 
as "direct compensation that does not become a permanent part of base pay/salary 
and which may vary in amount from period to period." Basically this pay is 
contingent on the level of performance an individual employee, a team, a 
department, or an undertaking is able to achieve. 
4. Parental background: since, the research covered eight companies from four 
different parental backgrounds namely USA, UK, Japan and Korea that had 
entirely different cultures both in terms of social values as well as management 
practices, it was an important variable in understanding the policies of these 8 
respondent companies. Parental background may be defined as the social, 
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economic, working philosophy, management culture constituents of environment 
at force in the parent country of the organizations. 
3.5. Research Design 
This study is primarily a descriptive (quantitative) one. it employed qualitative measures 
as well in the initial stages to crystallize factors influencing employee performance due to 
variable pay. 
The framework of this research borrows primarily from TRI*M, a global research model 
for measuring stakeholder satisfaction. The model was developed by Infratest Burke 
Germany. The TRI*M Model is used in India by TNS Global, a world renowned market 
research group with presence in 110 countries. It specializes in carrying out employee 
perception and satisfaction studies. It has carried out such studies in more than 500 
companies v/orldwide in past 18 years. Necessary official permission was obtained before 
starting the research work. As per TRI*M, to have a holistic view, one needs to measure 
the top of the mind 'satisfaction' first towards the particular service in question, before 
measuring operational/actionable specifics. The variable pay offered by employee to their 
employers was taken as product/service. The "operational specifics" in this case were 
"factors" reported by employee that either indicated or contributed to their performance 
due to introduction of variable pay schemes. 
The research has two distinct focuses: 
1. Measuring the employee satisfaction with variable pay 
2. Measuring the employee perceived performance before and after implementation 
of variable pay 
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In order to develop a reliable and valid scale that could measure the former i.e. employee 
satisfaction, earlier research work and measurement scales on the similar themes perused. 
Some of these instruments have been developed by Wanous and Lawler (1972), 
Saiyadain (1985), TRI*M (1990) and Sturman and Short (2000). Initially the problems 
areas were identified through exhaustive literature review. The constructs to measure 
employee satisfaction with variable pay were coined at this stage. We shall discuss about 
the said constructs in detail in "Research Instrument" section. 
In the absence of a valid and available instrument, which could apprise us the impact of 
variable pay on employee performance, we attempted designing it on our own using 
scientific measures. 
Employee performance is dependent on various factors in an organization. However for 
the purpose of this study, we wanted to know that, when variable pay is introduced in an 
organization, how does it impact on various working dimensions that could lead to either 
enhanced performance or can deteriorate it? In order to do so, we wanted target 
respondents who worked in the same organization before and after implementation of any 
sort of variable pay program in last 1 year or more. As a next step in this direction, we did 
Qualitative Focus Group Discussions involving three batches of respondents comprising 
of a total of 20 respondents, ensuring a minimum of 6 participants in each group. The 
respondents for focus groups were employees who had experienced variable pay for more 
than 1 year at least. 
During these focus groups, the researcher asked the respondents about their experiences 
for the period, when they were not introduced to variable pay. They were asked to 
compare it with the situation post implementation of such schemes. On this basis, they 
were asked to elaborate statements/factors, which in their opinion either indicate or 
contribute to their performance. They were encouraged to be specific and vocal about key 
factors which were either direct measurement of their performance or constituting 
elements towards their capability and/or willingness to perform. The moderator 
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(researcher) ensured that the entire conversation was flowing in context of variable pay 
only and not to any other factor, which could have an impact on employee performance. 
The focus group imparted mature understanding of the subject to the researcher. The 
FGDs provided valuable insights from the respondents and key factors impacting their 
performance in context to variable pay. All statements were recorded in the actual order 
how they were being received. This was followed by "Content Analysis" to club similar 
sounding statements together (eliminating rest), which resulted to bringing down the total 
statements to 32. 
At this stage, these statements were crystallized to include in the main research 
instrument along with the constructs of employee satisfaction, as has been mentioned in 
the beginning of this section. 
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3.6. The Research Process 
The research involved following stages: 
Review of Literature 
Identification of dimensions to assess 
employee satisfaction towards vanable 
pay 6 Dimensions were chosen 
Conclusions and 
Reconunendations 
InterpiEtation of Findings and Discussions 
Statistical Analysis using M, SD, Test of 
significance such as 't' test, 'Z Test, 'F' Test 
and Matnx Corielation 
Reliability Test of the Instmment using 
Cronbach alpha Statements with alpha value 
less dian 0.7 weie deleted. A total 23 
statements were finally selected for furdier 
analysis 
Problem Areas Identified 
Widespread use of vanable pay, however no 
clanty on its impact on individual performance 
Most studies attempted to measure satisfaction 
with pay, not vanable pay 
N^igib le research work in India in this respect 
i 
Focus Groups 
20 Respondents in 3 Groups 
Identification of factors indicating / 
reflecting employee performance due to 
variable pay 32 statements were crystallized 
i 
Design of Research Instrument by 
care fill selection of items 
Pilot Test to assess the flow of 
questionnaire and to assess its Face 
Validity 
Pre-Testing of the instrument with 
subject experts (Content Validity) Only 
26 statements finalized 
Defining Population and Sample 
300 Respondents from 8 Companies with 4 
different country of ongin namely US, UK 
Korea and Japan 
Data Collection firom Taiget 
Respondents who had expeaenced 
vanable pay scheme during last 1 year or 
more 
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3.7. Development of Research Instrument 
The research instrument was primarily designed in two parts -
1. To measure employee satisfaction with variable pay 
2. To measure employee perceived performance 
Part 1 - Satisfaction with Variable Pay - In this section, macro analysis in respect to 
variable performance linked pay experience was done using the key constructs of 
employee satisfaction such as overall satisfaction, recommendations, key benefits, value, 
retention/continuity of relationship and motivation (TR1*M Model). The above six 
constructs to measure satisfaction are also supported by Wanous and Lawler (1972) and 
Saiyadain (1985). The detail about six constructs is as follows -
1. Overall satisfaction with the variable pay scheme/ top of the mind view without 
passing on any specific details (likes or dislikes). 
2. Recommendation of variable pay scheme to your friends; that is a broad and 
strong measure of the response to experiences and perceptions. 
3. Key Benefit (Individual), which measures any major individual benefit due to 
the usage of said service, which in this case was 'impact on individual 
performance'. 
4. Key Benefit (Mutual) that translates into key mutual benefit helping both the 
individual as well as the organization, which in this case was "market strength". 
5. Intent to continue relationship is a measure of the immediate response to 
experience and hence the existing level of loyalty with the product and/or service, 
which in this case was "retention"/ "willingness to stay with the organization 
due to variable pay". 
6. Motivation level measures the intensity of interest and the way it translates into a 
desire to contribute positively to the company's objectives. 
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Appropriate statements were framed using a valid 5-point Numerical Scale (Likert Style -
Ordinal) where 1 represented "extremely dissatisfied", and 5 meant, "extremely 
satisfied". One example of such question is ''Taking overall aspects into account, how 
satisfied are you with your overall variable pay experience in your company" The 
questions covered the above rationales to measure the intensity, how closely their feeling 
match the questions or statement on a rating scale that added to the overall perspective of 
employees with the variable performance linked pay scheme. The scale is widely used 
worldwide especially in market research for carrying our studies specific to attitude and 
perceptions. The model framework was used to design research instrument, which was 
independently analyzed by the researcher using appropriate statistical techniques. The 
reliability of the instrument was assessed by computing the coefficient alpha (Cronbach, 
1955) that measures the internal consistency of the items. We have discussed more details 
about the scale and its reliability tests in the next section. 
Broad Areas of Exploration 
Part 1 - Strategic 
V 
Satisfaction with Variable 
Pay Experience 
<} 
Part A - Overall 
Perspective 
Part 2 - Diagnostics 
Idieritifying Specific Factors 
: influencing employee-
performance (due to VPLP) 
Part B - Operational/ 
Actionable Specifics 
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Part 2 - Diagnostics / Operational Specifics to measure Perceived Performance 
As discussed previously, there were 32 statements short-listed post FGDs reported by 
respondents which were indicating/ contributing to employee performance (due to 
variable pay). 
Two equal rating scales were used in this part of the questionnaire (both scales had same 
score attributes)- the left side scale denoted employee responses before implementation 
of the scheme while right side scale denoted employee responses after implementation 
of the scheme in the organization, in this section, we used six point even scale for 
employee response. We contend that for many questions measuring perceptions against 
actionable specifics within satisfaction surveys, the use of a scale with an even number of 
response alternatives is a preferable choice. Use of even scale is the usual approach in 
European Customer Satisfaction Index (1998), Ball et al. (2004) and in the framework of 
American Customer Satisfaction Index (ACSI), Fornell et al. (1996), Fornell et al. (1998). 
Green and Rao (1970) comparing scales with 2, 3, 6 and 18 response categories 
recommend using at least six points per variable. With this reasoning, we considered that 
respondents should have at least a slightly positive or slightly negative attitude towards 
the evaluated attribute. Specific attributes that have an impact on an employees overall 
perceptions about the scheme were added in this part of the questionnaire. 
The earlier section was meant to assess satisfaction of employees with variable pay. This 
section was meant to explore the impact of these schemes on employees' perceived 
performance by studying the factors which either indicated or contributed to their 
performance directly or indirectly due to introduction of variable pay schemes. 
Using the above scales, at this stage a structured questionnaire was prepared, which 
had six sections, in the following manner: 
1. Section A: had a welcome note for the respondents and a paragraph was added to give 
the respondents general information about the research. 
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2. Section B: was meant for eliciting specific information about the company the 
respondent was wori<ing in. All necessary details regarding company's parental base, core 
business activities, total workforce (blue and white collared), and date of implementation 
of variable performance linked pay program in the organization and brief details about the 
schemes were collected. 
3. Section C: consisted of the item pertaining to individual information about the 
respondents. All possible information regarding department working in, parental base of 
the organization, nature of job (blue and white collared), total work experience and tenure 
in variable performance linked pay program were collected for the purpose of this 
research. 
4. Section D: this section consisted of a few questions to ascertain satisfaction 
employees with variable performance linked pay, as previously discussed. 
5. Section E: this section was meant to explore operational specific statements leading 
towards employee perceived performance in respect to their variable pay experience. Two 
rating scales were used in this part of the questionnaire (both scales had same score 
attributes)- the left side scale denoted employee responses before implementation of the 
scheme while right side scale denoted employee responses after implementation of the 
scheme in the organization. 
6. Section F: this section had a few open ended questions which were added to get 
employee views on whether they felt that these schemes were relevant in modern 
organizations, what were the advantages and disadvantages of these schemes and what 
management should do to make these schemes more beneficial. 
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3.8. Pilot Test (Face Validity) 
After the questionnaire was prepared, a pilot test was conducted witii a small sample size 
of 20 to clarify the overall structure of the questionnaire. The respondents chosen for the 
pilot test matched the criterion, which was chosen for the actual target respondents, but 
these respondents were from organizations other than those who participated in the actual 
study. We got feedback from the respondents who confirmed flow of questionnaire and 
provided/ace validity of items chosen in the questionnaire. 
3.9. Pre-Testing with Subject Experts (Content Validity) 
After Pilot Test the same instrument was shared with 8 (eight) subject experts for their 
views. The idea was to understand if the 32 statements included in the list were actually 
reflecting "employee performance" or not. After pre-testing, the subject experts 
recommended to eliminate a few questions, which were either repetitive or had no clear 
relevance to employee performance in respect to variable pay. At this stage the total 
statements were reduced to 26. These 26 statements were further subject to the reliability 
test. Post reliability test of the instrument, statements with Cronbach alpha <0.7 were 
further deleted. The 26 statements were finally reduced to 23. 
Table 3.1 - Short listed factors indicating / contributing to employee perceived 
performance, before and after implementation of VPLP (in alphabetical order) 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
"Ability to meet deadlines/ timelines" 
"Desire to learn to perform" 
"Earnings and monetary returns" 
"Fair Feedback on Performance" 
"Functional Competencies" 
"General Environment" 
"Goal Clarity" 
"Level of control" on your own work 
"Level of interest" at work 
"Level of motivation towards achieving results" 
"Positive competitive spirit" 
"Reward/bonus for a positive outcome of results" 
"Satisfaction with "Last Pay Appraisals" 
"Self Dependence at work" 
"Confidence & faith" in variable performance linked pay schemes 
"Co-operation and camaraderie" among employees 
"Frequency of individual performance evaluation" 
"Level of motivation of your friends and colleagues" 
"Overall output of work" 
"Quality of work" 
"Trust between management and employees" 
"Understanding of Performance Management System" 
23 "Work life balance" 
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3.10 - Rationale for selecting these performance indicators 
contributors 
These statements, originally proposed by the respondents during the focus groups, were 
later validated by the subject experts. The rationale as shared by the respondents is 
presented below. 
1. Ability to meet deadlines/ timelines - Employees reported during focus groups 
that post introduction of variable pay programs, they were more watchful towards 
meeting timelines. The timely or early completion of project is rewarded by 
organizations. In current environment, where "time cost" is one of the major 
expenses, inclusion of the same as a measure of performance was a natural choice. 
2. Desire to learn to perform - This was a direct measure of variable pay's impact. 
When VPLP is introduced in an organization, employees make efforts to enhance 
their skills, so that they could manage to PERFORM better, in order to draw 
benefits under VPLP. 
3. Earnings and monetary returns - The researcher was doubtful after FGDs, 
when couple of groups said that their company introduced variable pay only to cut 
down fixed expenses. However the amount told to them was only on papers and 
they do end up getting the same. In many cases, the VPLP amount is ceased, 
declined by the companies for factors which are not in control of an employee. 
Therefore employees' actual monetary earnings are in fact reduced. This could 
have serious impact on their performance, therefore included in the study. 
4. Fair Feedback on Performance - Without fair and factual information about 
conditions in relation to intended goals or results, no one can perform to standard. 
Such information is known as "feedback." It informs progress, enables corrections 
and, eventually, signals attainment of the objective. 
5. Functional Competencies - When employees are shown the way to earn more by 
demonstrating improved skills and competencies, does it motivate them to hone 
their competencies. Does VPLP influence them to woric on improving their 
functional competencies? This is a direct measure of performance. 
6. General Environment - When VPLP is introduced, how does it impact the 
general working environment? Does it promote group dynamics? Does it lead to 
unfair practices, which in turn could impact the performance of employees? 
7. Goal Clarity - In order to perform, employees must have in mind a clear picture 
of any end or goal they are to achieve. "Keep the end in view" has been sage 
advice. The time a manager spends in developing, communicating and clarifying 
the goals or ends to be achieved is time well spent. The researcher wanted to 
know that post VPLP, is there any improvement in Goal Clarity of individuals. 
Goal and performance are directly linked. 
8. Level of Control of own work - It was reported that in order to perform well, 
one needed to have control on one's own work. If it will be inter-dependent, they 
can be the loser, in spite of meeting targets. In order to achieve VPLP benefits, 
one needs to have better control of the working ambit, added by the group. 
9. Level of Interest at work - It is the most obvious choice. The researcher wished 
to know whether post introduction of VPLP, respondents have started taking more 
interest in their work or not. 
10. Level of motivation towards achieving results - It is self explanatory. The 
researcher wanted to know if VPLP is a motivator to achieve results, which in turn 
improves performance. 
11. Positive competitive spirit - This was to measure whether VPLP encourages an 
employee to compete with his colleagues in a friendly manner in order to achieve 
better results. 
12. Reward Bonus for a positive outcome of results - Based on reinforcement 
theory, past rewards for good work encourage people to perform better. The 
researcher wanted to know if post introduction of VPLP, the organizations have 
started celebrating small achievements of employees, by rewarding them. 
Periodical rewards for exemplary work help employees to keep up the morale. 
13. Satisfaction with Last Pay Appraisal - This was to assess employee satisfaction 
with last pay increment. How does an employee feel after getting a pay increment. 
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when one is introduced to VPLP? If employees are happy with their last increment 
experiences, they are likely to perform better subsequently. 
14. Self Dependence at work - The group reported that one of the issues with VPLP 
is that their work is inter-dependent. In order to perform well in VPLP 
environment, one needs to be self-dependent. This was the reason; this factor was 
kept in the questionnaire. 
15. Confidence and /faith in VPLP schemes - The researcher wished to know that 
the employees who experienced VPLP for more than a year, what is their level of 
confidence in such schemes. It is a common say that "confidence is a direct 
contributor to performance". 
16. Co-operation and camaraderie among employees - The literature suggested 
that VPLP has an impact on team work. Therefore the researcher asked that when 
VPLP was introduced, how it impacted the camaraderie amongst employees. 
Cooperation and camaraderie are essential to everyone to perform. 
17. Frequency of individual performance evaluation - The research literature 
suggests that, in presence of frequent evaluation, employee's performance abilities 
enhance. In order to have actual measure of VPLP, the employee needs to be 
appraised periodically, so that his output could be well documented. Therefore 
this factor was shortlisted. 
18. Overall output of work - Just like yesteryears "piece rate" system, the researcher 
wanted to know if VPLP encourages employee to increase his work output. 
19. Level of motivation of your friends and colleagues - Motivation of friends and 
colleagues seriously impacts performance of an individual. The researcher wanted 
to explore that besides him, how motivated were their friends and colleagues 
when Variable pay was in question. 
20. Quality of work - In places like call centers/ KPO, the employee salaries are 
linked to minimum errors made by an employee. Therefore the research wanted to 
see if VPLP has any role to play here. 
21. Trust between management and employees - The management introduced the 
VPLP for its employees. If there will be lack of trust between them, the scheme 
may not work. So, this factor was included to see, how VPLP bridges employees 
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with its management. In absence of trust, employees cannot work on a regular 
basis, it negatively impacts the performance. 
22. Understanding of Performance Management System - When pay was not 
linked to performance, many employees were not even aware about their existing 
performance management system, reported the focus group. Therefore researcher 
added this factor to see, how effective VPLP is in making employees understand 
about their PMS. It is a direct measure of performance. 
23. Work Life Balance - It was an important factor reported by majority of 
respondents during FGDs. In order to deliver results for VPLP, employees miss 
out on various other fronts, their health and family issues suffer, which later result 
into decline in performance. 
3.11 Sampling Plan 
3.11.1. Identification of Organizations 
The research began with identification of multinational companies with parental 
background in 4 different countries namely, US, UK, Japan and Korea operating in 
National Capital Region. The main rationale of selecting these countries was: 
• They were more visible in India in comparison to companies from other parental 
countries. 
• These countries were one of the largest foreign direct investors in India. These 
countries have a significant impact on the Indian economy in terms of overall 
trade. 
• Their parental cultures were quite different and we found it worthwhile to study 
its impact on the overall success of the variable pay scheme in India. 
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3.11.2. Short listing the Organizations 
After initial identification, those organizations that had or introduced any sort of variable 
performance linked pay programme in place in last one year or more were short listed for 
this research. 
Screening/ Filtration 
Out of these, organizations which had adequate number of employees who had 
experienced working under both schemes i.e. before and after implementation of any 
sort of variable performance linked pay plan, for at least 1 year or more were further 
short-listed for this study. 
In all, 20 companies short-listed by the researcher that had requisite number of employees 
for the purpose of this research i.e. 5 from each parental base. 
Reason for short-listing these companies -
• These companies were world leaders in their respective markets and were known 
to have a performance-oriented culture that rewards high performance. 
• There were sufficient number of respondents to cover for the purpose of this 
research. 
• They had exhibited willingness to participate and were interested in such study. 
• Besides, their compensation structures were quite advanced and transparent which 
were known to reward high performance. 
All of these 20 organizations were approached by the researcher to participate in this 
study (target of 5 companies from each parental background). A formal letter was sent to 
their HR heads/ people responsible for managing such schemes in their respective 
organizations for obtaining their consent to participate in the research. After several 
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attempts (considering the sensitiveness of the issues) heads of 9 companies only (2 from 
each country segment US, UK and Korea and 3 from Japan) agreed to participate in the 
research. One of the Japanese companies did not respond effectively later, therefore 
dropped from the list. The list of 8 companies (25% success rate) covered (2 from each 
country) is as follows -
1. Mitsubishi Motors (Origin - Japan) 
2. Yamaha Motors (Origin - Japan) 
3. Samsung Electronics (Origin - Korea) 
4. LG Electronics (Origin - Korea) 
5. Max New York Life Insurance (Origin - USA) 
6. Gillette (Origin - USA) 
7. Standard Chartered Bank (Origin - UK) 
8. Laingo'rourke Technical Service (Origin - UK) 
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Table 3.2. Profile of the Responding Companies included in the Research 
Company 
Mitsubishi 
Motors 
Yamaha 
Motors 
Samsung 
Electronics 
LG 
Electronics. 
Max New 
York Life 
Insurance 
Gillette 
Standard 
Chartered 
Bank 
Laingo'rourke 
Technical 
Service 
Parental 
Background 
Japan 
Japan 
Korea 
Korea 
US 
US 
United 
Kingdom 
United 
Kingdom 
Nature Of 
Business 
Motor Vehicle 
Manufacturer 
Motorcycle 
Manufacturers 
Manufacturers 
Of Consumer 
Durable 
Goods 
Manufacturers 
Of Consumer 
Durable 
Goods 
Insurance 
Manufacturers 
Of Blades 
And Batteries 
Banking 
Construction 
Total 
Employees 
600 
3000 
600 
2600 
1200 
1270 
1400 
442 
Employees 
(Target 
Population) 
152 
165 
145 
148 
152 
145 
157 
132 
Employees Interviewed 
Blue 
Collared 
Employees 
•*^ 
e 
• o 
o g. 
. </> 
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z OS 
23 
22 
23 
24 
25 
22 
21 
20 
c 
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25 
22 
22 
25 
23 
22 
22 
25 
White 
Collared 
Employees 
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13 
14 
14 
17 
15 
17 
15 
15 
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21 
24 
33 
25 
29 
25 
28 
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3.11.3. Population and Sample 
The eight companies covered in the study employed a total of 11112 employees. Out of 
those employees, target respondents for this study were employees who had been 
appraised under both fixed as well as variable performance linked pay programs (before 
and after implementation of VPLP scheme) for at least I year under each. There were a 
total 1196 such employees in these organizations. Initially we attempted to cover at least 
500 respondents. However after rigorous follow up we could complete only 300 
successful personal interviews for this study that represented over 25% of total population 
available. 
Considering the sensitivity of the issue, the idea was to interview respondents in person 
and not through any other medium such as electronic (email) or telephonic interview. Had 
we used other ways to gather data, we would have increased the sample size significantly, 
but we were not sure whether employees will answer them correctly, fully and 
meaningfully or not. 
Overall, there were approximately 150 employees in each organization except one 
(Laingo'rourke) who were matching the profile required for the purpose of this study. 
One of the essential requirements of any study was that the sample should be chosen in 
such a manner that the result of research could be safely generalized which could be 
possible only when the sample selected should be representative of the population. As 
there was no significant difference in population size of the companies therefore, we 
decided to keep the sample size equal from each organization. 50 executives (1 in 3) 
were targeted from each organization for the purpose of data collection. However we 
were successful in getting on an average only 35 out of 50 from each company except one 
(LG) from where we could get 41 out of 50 target respondents. Table 3.2. presents the 
segment and distribution of the respondents. 
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Table 3.3. Segment and distribution of the total interviews/ responses 
Particulars 
Qualitative focus group discussion 
Pilot test 
Interview of Subject Experts 
Number of respondents 
20 
20 
8 
Actual questionnaire based interview 
Employees from the 8 companies covered using 
Structured questionnaire 
300 
Profile and characteristics of the respondents 
In total, 300 respondents were personally interviewed across 8 companies having parental 
base in four countries, namely - US, UK, Japan & Korea, in all the companies, some sort 
of VPLP scheme had been introduced in the last 1 year. The average age of the 
employees covered under the study was 32 years. 85% of the respondents were male and 
rest were female. The average work experience of the employees was 8 years and all of 
them were appraised under both schemes i.e., under fixed pay scheme and under variable 
performance linked pay scheme for at least one year each. The average tenure of the 
employees in non-variable performance linked pay environment was around 5 years and 
the average tenure of employees in variable performance linked pay environment was 
around 4 years. Most of the employees were having 17 completed years of formal 
education. The total percentage of white-collar employees was 40% and correspondingly 
the percentage of blue-collar employees was 60%. Respondents belonged to different 
career bands and different functions in the organizations. There were 98 employees who 
had worked under variable performance linked pay program for less than 3 years while 
111 employees had worked under the scheme between 3-5 years. The number of 
employees who had worked under the scheme for more than 5 years were 91. 
A brief profile of the employees covered as per the nature of the job and experience is 
given in the following Table 3.4.: 
Table 3.4. Nature of job and work experience 
Particulars 
Nature of job 
Blue collared 
workers 
White collared 
workers 
Total 
Less than 
3 years 
51 
47 
98 
Work experience (VPLP) 
3-5 years 
75 
36 
111 
More than 
5 years 
54 
37 
91 
Total 
180 
120 
300 
3.11.4. Data Coliection 
The data collection was undertaken using the following methods: 
Preliminary Data before Questionnaire Administration 
• Understanding the company profile : 
Company's history, policy manual, standard operating procedures, literatures, 
background information, web portal, media reports and financial results were studied 
thoroughly to have a feel of the organization culture. 
• Administration of the questionnaire : 
The primary data collection method was used in the following manner -
1. Administration of 40% questionnaire in the companies covered, personally and 
after that a rigorous follow up by the researcher. 
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2. For the remaining questionnaire, the data collection part was outsourced to 
TNS GLOBAL. TNS is India's largest and most reliable Research Agency, where 
their Data Collection techniques are certified by ISO 9001 and the company is an 
active member of European Society of Market Research and MRSI India. 
(vvww.tnsglobal.com). TNS Group works for over 500 companies worldwide and 
it is world largest customized research group. 
These methods of administering questionnaires could ensure timely, quality and reliable 
data collection within the given timeframe. 
3.12. Reliability of Data 
The data was collected personally by the researcher as well as supported primarily by 
TNS Global (an outsourced market research agency) that has highest quality of data 
collection techniques duly certified by ISO and also a member of ESOMAR (The 
European Society for Opinion and Marketing Research). The reliability of items in both 
sections was assessed by computing the coefficient alpha (Cronbach, 1955). Cronbach's 
alpha is a measure of a scale's internal consistency, sometimes called a scale reliability 
coefficient. Cronbach's alpha assesses the reliability of a rating scale by summarizing the 
responses, which attempt to measure some underlying factor. Reliability is defined as the 
square of the correlation between the measured scale and the underlying factor the scale 
was supposed to measure. It is, in effect, the average inter-item correlation. For a measure 
to be acceptable, coefficient alpha should be above 0.7 (Nunnally, 1978). 
In our study, the reliability of items covered to measure "Satisfaction with variable pay" 
and "Impact on Employee Performance" was measured computing the coefficient alpha 
(Cronbach, 1951) using SPSS version 10.0. All the items covered were found in the range 
of 0.784 to 0.882 that indicated good consistency among the items (Tables 3.4 and 3.5.) 
Table 3.5 - Assessment of Reliability: Employee Satisfaction with Variable Pay 
Dimensions measuring "Satisfaction" with Variable Pay 
Overall Satisfaction with Variable Pay 
Recommendation to Friends 
Impact on Individual Performance 
Impact on market strength 
Impact on Retention 
Impact on Motivation 
Cronbach's Alpha' 
0.867 
0.879 
0.880 
0.855 
0.875 
0.882 
Alpha value of 0.7 or higher are considered acceptahle (NunnalK. 1978) 
Table 3.6. - Assessment of Reliability 
Factors Indicating / Contributing to "Employee Performance" 
Factors Impacting Employee Performance 
In Alphabetical order 
"Ability to meet deadlines/ timelines" 
"Desire to learn to perform" 
"Earnings and monetary returns" 
"Fair Feedback on Performance" 
"Functional Competencies" 
"General Environment" 
"Goal Clarity" 
"Level of control" on your own work 
"Level of interest" at work 
"Level of motivation towards achieving results" 
"Positive competitive spirit" 
"Reward/bonus for a positive outcome of results" 
"Satisfaction with "Last Pay Appraisals" 
"Self Dependence at work" 
"Confidence & faith" in variable performance linked 
pay schemes 
"Co-operation and camaraderie" among employees 
Cronbach's Alpha' 
(Before VPLP) 
0.819 
0.816 
0.824 
0.814 
0.823 
0.823 
0.817 
0.822 
0.864 
0.868 
0.816 
0.828 
0.815 
0.827 
0.824 
0.837 
Cronbach's Alpha' 
(After VPLP) 
0.803 
0.806 
0.81 
0.852 
0.793 
0.814 
0.812 
0.815 
0.853 
0.857 
0.803 
0.868 
0.859 
0.817 
0.784 
0.816 
"Frequency of individual performance evaluation" 
"Level of motivation of your friends and colleagues" 
"Overall output of work" 
"Quality of work" 
"Trust between management and employees" 
"Work life balance" 
"Your understanding of Performance Management 
System" 
0.816 
0.865 
0.827 
0.835 
0.819 
0.821 
0.816 
0.802 
0.858 
0.821 
0.82 
0.808 
0.806 
0.853 
Notes 
1. Coefficient Alpha "before variable pay impleinentation". Alpha Values of 0.7 or higher are considered acceptable and reliable 
(Nunnally. 1978) 
2, Coefficient Alpha "after variable pay implementation". Alpha Values of 0,7 or higher are considered acceptable and reliable 
(Nunnally. 1978) 
3.13. Data Analysis 
The data collected was quantitatively tabulated with any additional comments noted. The 
units of the analysis were the individual employees. The means, standard deviations, 't' 
test, 'Z' tests for the outcome were computed. Factor analysis of the inter-correlations 
was conducted using SPSS software to determine which outcomes clustered together. 
Means, standard deviations, matrix correlations, one-way ANOVA test and 'Z' test 
were the major statistical tools used in the research. 
Mean is an important measure of central tendency. It was appropriate for this study 
because it affords comparison among means from several data sets. Standard Deviation 
gives additional information about spread in values in the data set. This enables us to 
judge the reliability of measure of central tendency. Moreover, important lessons can be 
drawn by comparing dispersions of various samples (Levin and Rubin, 1991). 
For finding significant differences among different groups of respondents, the t-test and 
analysis of variance (ANOVA) were used. For testing the hypotheses, Paired Sample test 
was used. When there were more than two sample means ANOVA was used to test the 
significance of difference. I-tailed correlation matrix and Paired Correlation techniques 
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were used to find the relationship among various constructs of employee satisfaction with 
variable pay. 
To measure the strong views of respondents (either side), top 2 and bottom 2 box scores 
were also clubbed separately. This technique is widely used in market research industry 
to measure perceptions, satisfaction and attitude of respondents. This method was used as 
a supplementary analysis in addition to above mentioned statistical analysis. 
In the section, that measured employee perceived performance before and after 
implementation of variable pay schemes, the "Single Score" technique was used. In this 
case the ratings of all 23 statements were clubbed together to get a "Single Mean Score" 
before implementation as well as " Single Mean Score" after implementation of variable 
pay schemes. These results were analyzed overall, as per country of origin of employees, 
as per length of experience as well as per nature of job of employees. Matrix correlation 
was done among all statements. 
While doing the analysis, the researcher observed that there were plenty of statements 
related to "Performance Management System". It prompted the researcher to group this 
section separately to do a detailed analysis using the above pattern to assess "employee 
satisfaction and views" about their performance management system, before and after 
implementation of variable pay schemes. The following 5 factors were taken into 
consideration for the analysis -
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
"Fair Feedback on Performance" 
"Reward/bonus for a positive outcome of results" 
"Satisfaction with "Last Pay Appraisals" 
"Frequency of individual performance evaluation" 
"Understanding of Performance Management System" 
Further, through this analysis exact level of confidence was also ascertained. Precise 
probability values helped suggest the confidence with which the inferences were drawn 
from the data. 
Table 3.7. Pattern of Analysis 
Section 1 Analysis Techniques Used 
Satisfaction 
with variable pay 
M, SD, Matrix Correlation, Paired Correlation, 'T' test, Top 2 
& Bottom 2 Scores combined to have another perspective of 
the data 
Country of Origin 4 Groups namely US, UK, Korea and Japan using M, SD & F 
Test 
Nature of Job 2 Groups, Blue 7 White Collared using M, SD & Z Test 
Length of Experience 3 Groups (0-<3 Years, 3-5 Years, 5+ Years) using M, SD & F 
Test 
Section 2 (Impact on employee performance before and after 
implementation of variable pay) 
Overall impact on 
performance 
Overall analysis and comparison of all factors before and after 
implementation of variable pay, using M, SD and T Test 
Country of Origin Overall analysis and comparison of all factors for 4 Groups, 
Before and After, M, SD, T Test for each group. 
Nature of Work Overall analysis and comparison of all factors for 2 Groups, 
Before and After, M, SD, T Test for each group. 
Length of Service Overall analysis and comparison of all factors for 3 Groups, 
Before and After, M, SD, T Test for each group. 
ANOVA 
Correlation 
Sections 
Among and within different countries of origin, between 
nature of job and country of origin, between country of origin 
and length of service, between and within nature of job. 
Among various factors indicating employee performance 
Impact on Performance Measurement before and after 
implementation of VPLP 
87 
Impact on 
Performance 
Measurement 
Country of Origin 
Nature of Job 
Length of Service 
Overall, Before and After Implementation, M, SD, Z Test 
4 Groups namely US, UK, Korea and Japan, Before and After, 
M, SD, Z Value, analysis of Variance between and within 
groups, analysis of Variance between parental base and nature 
of job, analysis of Variance, Parental Base and Work 
Experience 
2 Groups, Blue and White Collared, M, SD & Z Test, 
Analysis of Variance Between and Within Groups 
3 Groups, (0-<3 Years, 3-5 Years, 5+ Years), M, SD, Z Test, 
Analysis of Variance Between and Within Groups 
3.14. Limitations of the Study 
The limitations of the present study are as follows: 
• General: The research was intended to study the relationship between Variable 
pay schemes and its impact on employee performance, pre and post 
implementation of such scheme. However, the research could not cover different 
types of VPLP schemes or a particular variable pay scheme and its impact on 
employee performance, taking into account the organizational culture, 
management policies, performance criteria's, etc. 
• Response: The researcher tried, as far as possible, to eschew bias from the 
questions and expected responses. Also, not many people responded to the open 
ended questions thereby some crucial information might not have been elicited. 
• Sample Size: Since the idea was to do personal interview only so that we could be 
able to brief the employees correctly rather than sending them a mailed 
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questionnaire, the sample size was limited to 300 interviews. Had we used other 
measures, we could have increased the sample size. 
• Respondents - The list of respondents with matching criterion was provided to us 
by the concerned department heads/ HR Heads. The researcher had no control on 
the selection of the respondents, whether he/she was biased towards VPLP 
scheme or not. There might be some respondents who had bad experience with 
VPLP and there might be some who had good memories with such schemes. The 
researcher recognizes that this type of selection might be a constraint in this study. 
• Measures to Predict Performance - Although all necessary measures were 
considered at the time of designing the instrument, including validity and 
reliability test, however some more quantitative data in respect to their 
performance such as their actual PMS scores, could have added strength to this 
research. The researcher tried to gather this information, which was strictly denied 
by most of the organizations. 
• Lack of awareness about the VPLP Scheme in different career bands in the same 
organization was a tough challenge in the beginning that might have lead to a 
varied response. However due to personal nature of interview, it's scope was quite 
limited. 
• Human Errors: Since this study involved analysis of a huge data in a short span of 
time, the risk of human errors cannot be ignored, despite the fact that due care has 
been taken on the part of the researcher. 
• Parameter Selection: The parameters used here were determined on the basis of 
consultation with HR Heads, subject experts in the field, more specifically 
compensation, senior academicians, performance appraisal and organizational 
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behavior to better understand the issue. The researcher tried his best to cover all 
parameters in the research. 
Variety: In this study we primarily used 4 different country of origin, nature of job 
and length of service. We could not include respondents with different variable 
pay slabs. For example, someone with a major portion of pay as 'variable' in 
comparison to someone who had majority of the pay as 'fixed. 
Breadth: We did this study within a few selected MNCs in the National Capital 
Region and not specifically to a particular industry, across India such as KPO, 
Financial Institution, Direct Selling, FMCG or automotive etc. due to various 
constraints. 
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CHAPTER 4 
FINDINGS AND DISCUSSIONS 
4.1. Satisfaction with Variable Pay (Overall) 
4.1.1. Satisfaction with Variable Pay as per Country of Origin 
4.1.2. Satisfaction with Variable Pay as per Nature of Job 
4.1.3. Satisfaction with Variable Pay as per Length of Experience 
4.1.4. Key Findings from this section 
4.2. Variable Pay and Employee Performance (Before and After Implementation of 
VPLP) 
4.2.1. Employee Performance (Before and After Implementation of VPLP) 
4.2.2. Impact of VPLP on Employee Performance (USA origin Companies) 
4.2.3. Impact of VPLP on Employee Performance (UK origin Companies) 
4.2.4. Impact of VPLP on Employee Performance (Japan origin Companies) 
4.2.5. Impact of VPLP on Employee Performance (Companies with Korean 
Origin) 
4.2.6. Variable Pay - Impact on performance of Blue Collared Employees 
4.2.7. Variable Pay - Impact on performance of White Collared Employees 
4.2.8. Variable Pay - Impact on performance (< 3 Years of Work Experience) 
4.2.9. Variable Pay - Impact on performance (3 -5 Years of Work Experience) 
4.2.10. Variable Pay - Impact on performance (5+ Years of Work Experience) 
4.2.11. Analysis of Variance (post implementation of VPLP) 
4.2.12. Test of Correlation amongst factors indicating employee performance 
4.2.13. Key findings of this section 
4.3. Employee Satisfaction with Performance Management System (pre and post VPLP) 
4.3.1. Satisfaction with PMS (Pre and Post Implementation of VPLP, Overall) 
4.3.2. Satisfaction with PMS post implementation of VPLP (As per Country of 
Origin) 
4.3.3. Employees Satisfaction with PMS (Pre and Post Implementation of VPLP, 
As per Nature of Service) 
4.3.4. Employees Satisfaction with PMS (As per Length of Service) 
4.3.5. Key findings of this section 
4.4. Review of Hypotheses 
CHAPTER 4 - FINDINGS AND DISCUSSIONS 
In this chapter, we have presented the findings of the research. The findings have been 
divided into three sections. In Section 1, we have presented the findings of Employee 
Satisfaction with Variable Pay, which is analyzed on overall basis. This is followed by 
analysis as per country of origin, nature of job and length of service respectively. In 
Section 2, we have presented the impact of VPLP on employee performance before and 
after implementation of variable pay. Discussions and corroboration of the findings with 
other studies have been done attempted in each section. In the last section, we have made 
an attempt to understand the impact of variable pay on Performance Management system 
in an organization. The pattern of analysis remains the same in all sections. 
(SECTION I) 
4.1. Satisfaction witli Variable Pay (Overall) 
In this section, without entering into specifics, respondents were asked to consider 
variable pay as a product/ service offered to them by their management. They were asked 
to rate their overall satisfaction using six constructs namely; "overall satisfaction with the 
VPLP scheme, recommendation of the scheme to their friends, its overall impact on their 
individual performance, impact on organization's market strength, their desire to stay 
with the organization (due to VPLP) and lastly how does it influence their motivation in 
the organization". The logic of this section has been explained in Chapter 3 in research 
methodology in Para 3.7. The objective was to measure employee satisfaction towards 
variable pay schemes on the basis of its major constructs, which are overall satisfaction, 
recommendation, value addition to self and the organization, continual of relationship and 
motivation We did macro level analysis to assess overall feeling of respondents towards 
VPLP before exploring specific details. 
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Table 4.1. - Employee Satisfaction with Variable Pay 
Dimunsinns 
Overall Satisfaction 
Recommendation to Friends 
Individual Performance 
Market Strength 
Retention 
Motivation 
5 4 
N 
22 
17 
38 
21 
12 
14 
N 
7.33 ^ 72 
5.67 1 56 
12.67' 78 
\ 
1 92 
4 56 
4.67 46 
"•' 
24 
18.67 
26 
30.67 
18.67 
1533 
.3 
N 
91 
103 
85 
97 
119 
85 
••„ 
30.33 
34.33 
28.33 
32.33 
39.67 
28.33 
2 
N 
81 
86 
81 
78 
68 
111 
"„ 
27 
28.67 
27 
26 
22.67 
37 
1 
N 
34 
38 
18 
12 
45 
44 
" • • 
11.33 
12.67 
6 
4 
15 
14.67 
N = 
289 
276 
3.12 
3.11 
2.74 
2.58 
SI) 
1.12 
1.07 
1.13 
1 
1.05 
1.06 
N = 300 
Note- 5 denotes "highest satisfaction / most positive view" and 1 denotes "lowest satisfaction and most negative view" 
Table 4.2. - Correlation Matrix 
Correlation Matrix* 
Correlation 
Sig.d-
tailed) 
Overall Satisfaction 
Recommendation 
Individual Performance 
Market Strength 
Retention 
Motivation 
Overall Satisfaction 
Recommendation 
Individual Performance 
Market Strength 
Retention 
VIotivation 
Overall 
Satisfaction 
1.000 
.742 
.766 
.759 
.834 
.779 
.000 
,000 
,000 
,000 
,000 
Recommendation 
.742 
1,000 
,717 
.688 
.714 
.666 
.000 
.000 
,000 
.000 
,000 
Individual 
Performance 
,766 
,717 
1,000 
-726 
.688 
.628 
.000 
.000 
.000 
.000 
.000 
Market 
Strength 
.759 
688 
.726 
1.000 
.713 
.641 
.000 
.000 
.000 
.000 
.000 
Impact on 
Retention 
.834 
,714 
,688 
.713 
1.000 
.722 
.000 
.000 
.000 
.000 
000 
Impact on 
Motivation 
.779 
,666 
,628 
.641 
.722 
1.000 
.000 
,000 
-000 
,000 
-000 
a. Determinant = .006 
Table 4.3. - Paired Sample Statistics 
Pair 1 
Pair 2 
Pair 3 
Pair 4 
Pairs 
Pair 6 
Pair 
Overall Satisfaction 
Satisfaction with variable pay* 
Recommendation 
Satisfaction with variable pay 
Individual Performance 
Satisfaction with variable pay 
Market Strength 
Satisfaction with variable pay 
Retention 
Satisfaction with variable pay 
Motivation 
Satisfaction with variable pay 
Mean 
2.89 
2.867 
276 
2.867 
3.12 
2867 
3.11 
2.867 
2.74 
2,867 
2.58 
2.867 
N 
300 
300 
300 
300 
300 
300 
300 
300 
300 
300 
300 
300 
Std. 
Deviation 
1 117 
09383 
1.074 
09383 
1.125 
0.9383 
0.999 
09383 
1.053 
0.9383 
1.062 
0.9383 
Std. Krror 
Mean 
0.065 
00542 
0.062 
0 0542 
0.065 
0.0542 
0058 
0.0542 
0.06! 
0.0542 
0.061 
0.0542 
* Satisfaction with variable pay was calculated by taking average mean of all 6 dimensions 
Table 4.4. - Test of Significance 
Pair 1 
Pair 2 
Pair 3 
Pair 4 
Pairs 
Pair 6 
Overall Satisfaction & Satisfaction 
with variable pay 
Recommendation and Satisfaction 
with variable pay 
Individual Performance and 
Satisfaction with variable pay 
Market Strength & Satisfaction 
with variable pay 
Retention & Satisfaction with 
variable pay 
Motivation and Satisfaction with 
variable pay 
Paired Differences 
Mean 
0.0228 
-0.1072 
0.2561 
0.2394 
-0.1272 
-0.2839 
Std, 
Deviation 
0.4212 
0.5438 
0.5662 
0.5183 
0.4827 
0.5696 
Std. Error 
Mean 
0.0243 
0.0314 
0.0327 
0.0299 
0.0279 
0.0329 
't' value 
0.937 
-3.415** 
7.835** 
8.001 •* 
-4.565 ** 
-8.632 ** 
Df 
299 
299 
299 
299 
299 
299 
p value 
0.350 
<0.01 
<0.0I 
<0,01 
<0.0l 
<0.01 
N = 300, **P<0.01 
Contents of Tables 4.1, 4.2, 4.3, 4.4, 4.5. and 4.6. indicated that variable pay had no 
significant impact on employee satisfaction. The "overall employee satisfaction" towards 
variable pay was statistically insignificant (M = 2.867, Tables 4.3 and 4.4). However, in 
spite of low satisfaction towards variable pay, there was a positive impact on employee's 
individual performance (M = 3.12, 't' = 7.835, p <0.01). Variable pay led to improved 
market strength, thus benefiting the organization (M = 3.11, 't'= 8.001, p <0.01). In spite 
of improved individual performance, employees reported an inadequate trust towards 
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variable pay. This was evident from their less than enthusiastic orientation to 
recommending it to their best friends (M = 2.76, 't' = -3.415, p <0.0I). 
Table 4.5. - Paired Correlation 
Pair 1 
Pair 2 
Pair 3 
Pair 4 
Pair 5 
Pair 6 
Overall Satisfaction & Satisfaction with variable pay 
Recommendation and Satisfaction with variable pay 
Individual Performance and Satisfaction with variable pay 
Market Strength & Satisfaction with variable pay 
Retention & Satisfaction with variable pay 
Motivation and Satisfaction with variable pay 
Correlation 
0931 
0.862 
0.865 
0859 
0889 
0.845 
Sig. 
<0.01 
<0.01 
<0.01 
<0.01 
<0.01 
<0.01 
N = 300, **P<0.01 
Table 4.6. - Supplementary Analysis (Top 2 & Bottom 2 Scores Combined) 
Ql 
Q2 
Q3 
Q4 
Q5 
Q6 
Overall Satisfaction with Variable 
Pay 
Recommendation to Friends 
Impact on Individual Performance 
Impact on Organization's Market 
Strength 
Impact on Retention 
Impact on Motivation 
Satisfied 
Not Satisfied 
Recommend 
Not Recommend 
Improved 
Not Improvement 
Positive Impact 
Negative Impact 
Positive 
Negative Impact 
Positive 
Negative Impact 
31.33% 
38.33% 
24,33% 
41.33% 
38.67% 
33.00% 
37.67% 
30.00% 
22.67% 
37.67% 
20.00% 
51.67% 
N = 300 
The present study indicates that variable pay is not a medium to retain employees (M = 
2.74, 't' = -4.565, p < 0.01). Further, the study also confirmed that variable pay led to 
decline in employee motivation in the organization (M = 2.58, 't' = -8.632, p < 0.01). 
The current study found strong correlation between overall employee satisfaction towards 
variable pay and its key constructs (overall satisfaction, recommendation, individual 
performance, market strength, retention and motivation. Table 4.2, and Table 4.5). This 
meant that if employees would find value and trust in variable pay, they would 
recommend it to their best friends and it could lead to improved employee motivation and 
satisfaction in the organization. Another perspective of this finding it that in most of the 
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organizations, the variable pay was not effectively implemented, as in spite of its known 
positive outcomes, there was limited to low motivation and trust towards such schemes 
among majority of the respondents. 
To have overall insight from the data we clubbed the top 2 and bottom 2 scores to clearly 
ascertain as to how many employees were favorable towards variable pay and how many 
were against it. It emerged that 39% of respondents felt that that variable pay led to better 
individual performance. 38% of the respondents reported that variable pay schemes 
helped the organization gain market strength. However 38% employees felt that variable 
pay did not lead to improved employee stability in their organizations. Only 23% of 
respondents thought otherwise. Majority (52%) of them further reported that such 
variable pay schemes had negative impact on employee motivation, whereas only 28% 
reported positively. Only 41% employees were inclined to recommend variable pay 
schemes to their best friends that clearly indicated low level of employee trust with such 
schemes. 39% employees found that variable pay had no positive impact on their overall 
satisfaction in comparison to 31% who felt positive experience and overall satisfaction 
with variable pay schemes. 
4.1.1. Satisfaction with Variable Pay as per Country of Origin 
Overall Satisfaction: The responses of employees belonging to companies having their 
parental base in 4 countries are presented in Table 4.7. The results from 'F' test (Table 
4.7. and Figure 4.1.) indicated that there were significant differences among the responses 
of employees belonging to 4 different parental backgrounds (F= 4.669, df= 301, P<0.01). 
The overall mean value of employee responses indicated that employees belonging to 
companies having their parental base in UK felt greater satisfaction with variable pay 
schemes. Employees of UK based companies had distinctly different perception about the 
scheme vis a vis employees from other countries. Employees working in Japanese MNCs 
were feeling much unhappy with their experience with variable pay schemes. Satisfaction 
scores of employees in US and Korea based MNCs were closer to the mid range. 
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Table 4.7. - Satisfaction with VPLP (As per Country of Origin) 
Dimensions 
Overall Satisfaction 
Recommendation 
Individual Performance 
Market Strength 
Retention 
Motivation 
USA 
Mean 
2.86 
2.9 
2.91 
3 
2.73 
2.04 
S.D. 
0.94 
1.01 
1.09 
0.72 
1.09 
1.19 
M^ 
Japan 
Mean 
2.65 
2.42 
2.51 
2.64 
2.63 
2.69 
S.D. 
1.05 
0.83 
1.26 
0.98 
1.04 
1.22 
Korea 
Mean 
2.83 
2.74 
3.17 
3.08 
2.54 
2.73 
S.D. 
1 
0.97 
1.24 
1.08 
0.91 
1.12 
'F' 
value 
4.669** 
5.428** 
18.447** 
15.904** 
3J76* 
0J84 
A^  = 300, Study - Impact of variable pay on employee performance 
*P<0.05,**P<0.01 
Recommendation to Friends: The responses of employees belonging to companies 
having their parental base in 4 countries are given in Table 4.7. The results from 'F' 
test (Table 4.7. and Figure 4.1.) indicated that there were significant differences among 
the responses of employees belonging to 4 different parental backgrounds (F= 5.428, 
df= 301, P< 0.01). Although the mandate was not in favour of recommending this scheme 
to their best friends, however it was evident that Japanese employees were almost sure 
and certain about their decision. Recommendation of a product or service is widely 
considered as a symbol of trust and loyalty. However when we asked respondents, if they 
would like to recommend the existing variable pay scheme to their best friends, majority 
of them said "no" (Table 4.7.), which indicated an inadequate trust with the variable pay 
scheme. Even ardent supporters of variable pay schemes from UK driven companies, who 
were most satisfied with variable pay experience, still decided not to recommend 
wholeheartedly the same scheme to their best friends. Therefore it is evident from the 
findings of the research that even the best-managed companies are still trying to perfect 
their systems with respect to variable pay schemes. 
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Figure 4.1 - Employee Satisfaction with VPLP 
(as per country of origin) 
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Impact on Individual Performance: The responses of employees belonging to 
companies having their parental base in 4 countries are given in Table 4.7. The results 
from 'F' test (see Table 4.7. and Figure 4.1.) indicated that there were significant 
differences among the responses of employees belonging to 4 different parental 
backgrounds (F= 18.447, df= 301, P< 0.01). The mean response value indicated that 
employees belonging to companies having their parental base in UK and Korea felt that 
their individual performance had improved significantly due to the scheme. Whereas, the 
employees belonging to companies having their parental base in USA believed that there 
had been a marginal improvement in their performance post implementation of the 
schemes. However, the employees' belonging to companies having their parental base in 
Japan felt that there had not been any improvement in their performance due to the 
schemes. 
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Impact on Organization's Market Strength: The responses of empioyees belonging to 
companies having their parental base in 4 countries are presented in Table 4.7. The results 
from 'F' test (Table 4.7. and Figure 4.1.) indicated that there were significant differences 
among the responses of employees having 4 different parental backgrounds (F= 15.904, 
df= 301, P< 0.01). Except employees from Japanese organizations, everyone else 
perceived variable pay as a medium to improve the market strength of the organization. 
Employees from UK based companies as well as Korea and US (in that order) found 
variable pay as "good medium" to creating improved market strength. The findings 
reiterate that the UK culture is probably best-suited culture for success of VPLP Schemes 
and the Japanese team based culture is least preferred and least recommended to those 
who are planning to launch any sort of variable pay schemes. 
Impact on Retention: The responses of employees belonging to companies having their 
parental base in 4 countries are given in Table 4.7. The results from 'F' test (see Table 
4.7. and Figure 4.1.) indicated that there were statistically significant differences among 
the responses of employees belonging to 4 different parental backgrounds (F= 3.576, df= 
301, P< 0.05). The results showed that these schemes were not effective tools in helping 
management in retaining employees. Except UK based MNCs employees, no one found it 
helpful in retaining employees or improving stability in their respective companies. 
Findings clearly point out that variable pay is not the medium to improve employee 
retention. It does not bring stability in the organization. Majority of employees 
irrespective of their country of origin association agreed that variable pay did not help 
retaining the employees. Even employees from UK based companies; where majority of 
them were of strong opinion that it enhanced individual performance still felt that it had 
low impact on employee retention. 
Impact on Motivation: The responses of employees belonging to companies having their 
parental base in 4 countries are given in Table 4.7. The results from 'F' test (Table 4.7) 
indicated that there were no significant differences among the responses of employees 
having 4 different parental backgrounds (F= 0.384, df= 301, P> 0.01). Responses of 
employees from all 8 companies indicated that there existed no significant relationship 
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between responses of employees from different parental base and the impact of these 
schemes on there motivation to stay with the organization. The responses of employees 
from all 8 companies having 4 different parental backgrounds suggested that these 
schemes did not have much impact on their motivation. 
4.1.2. Satisfaction with Variable Pay as per Nature of Job 
This study reported that the White Collared employees were more satisfied with their 
variable performance linked pay experience in comparison to blue collared employees. 
White collared employees perceived its positive impact on their individual performance. 
The findings were contrary to the popular belief that variable pay schemes are more 
useful to blue collared employees. 
Overall Satisfaction: The responses of both blue and white collared employees are 
shown in the Table 4.8. Employee responses indicated that there were significant 
differences between responses of both blue and white collared employees (Z=2.8248, 
p<0.0!). As it is evident from the data that majority of white collared employees were 
satisfied with variable pay experience, whereas the blue collared employees said that they 
had limited satisfaction with their overall variable pay experience. 
Table 4.8. - Satisfaction with Variable pay (As per Nature of Job) 
Dimensions 
Overall Satisfaction 
Recommendation 
Individual Performance 
Market Strength 
Retention 
Motivation 
White Collared Employees 
Mean 
3.0833 
2.99 
3.341 
2.991 
2.81 
3.14 
S.D. 
1.007 
0.917 
1,24 
0.801 
1.045 
1.0694 
Blue Collared Employees 
Mean 
2.755 
2.61 
2.961 
2.977 
2.67 
2.53 
S.D. 
0.913 
0.921 
1.211 
1.108 
1.028 
1.19 
'Z' Value 
2.8248** 
3.369** 
2.913** 
0.1226 
1.156 
4.838** 
**P<0.01 
Recommendation: Employee's responses indicated that there were significant 
differences between responses of both blue and white collared employees (Z=3.369, 
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p<0.01). The responses of employees indicated that if the schemes were made optional 
then white collared employees would probably recommend the scheme to their best 
friends in the organizations. However given a chance, blue collared employees would not 
recommend the scheme to their best friends in their organizations. It is evident that blue-
collared employee have limited trust in the variable pay schemes (Figure 4.2.). 
Impact on Individual Performance: Employee's responses indicated that there were 
significant differences between the responses of both blue and white collared employees 
(Z=2.913, p<0.01). The responses indicated that white collared employees felt that their 
performance had improved significantly due to the implementation of the schemes. The 
mean response value of blue collared employees indicated that they felt that the 
implementation of the scheme had helped them in improving their perfomiance to a 
limited extent. 
Figure 4.2 - Employee Satisfaction with Variable Pay 
(as per nature of job) 
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Impact on Market Strength: The responses of both blue and white collared employees 
are presented in Table 4.8. Significant differences had not been observed between 
responses of both blue and white collared employees (Z=0.1226, p = 0.1226) on this 
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account. It is evident from the data that both blue and white collared employees felt that 
their work culture became more competitive due to the scheme. The mean response value 
of both blue and white collared employees indicated that they felt that there had been a 
marginal improvement in their work culture due to the scheme. 
Impact on Retention: Employee's response indicated that there were no significant 
differences between the responses of both blue and white collared employees (Z=I.156, p 
=1.156) on this factor. Results indicated that both blue and white collared employees felt 
that these schemes did not help management in retaining employees. The mean response 
and standard deviation values of both blue and white collared employees were almost the 
same which indicated that there were not much differences in their responses that these 
schemes were useful to a limited extent for management. 
Impact on Motivation: Employee's responses indicated that there were significant 
differences between responses of both blue and white collared employees (Z=4.838, 
p<0.01) on this account. Employee responses indicated that white collared employees felt 
that these schemes had motivated them to a significant extent within the organization. 
The responses of blue collared employees indicated that they felt not so motivated due to 
these schemes. A majority of blue collared employees did not feel that these schemes had 
any impact on their motivation. 
4.1.3. Satisfaction with Variable Pay as per Length of Experience 
Overall Satisfaction: The responses of employees belonging to 3 categories as per length 
of service are presented in the Table 4.9. The results of 'F' test indicated that there were 
significant differences among responses of employees (F= 9.416, df= 301, P<0.01). The 
results from the statistical analysis indicated that employees belonging to the group 
having more than 5 years of experience were more satisfied with their variable pay 
experience. Employees belonging to the group with 3-5 years of experience were satisfied 
to some extent. The mean response value of employees indicated that they felt that these 
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schemes were useful to a limited extent to them. Young recruits with less than 3 years 
experience were least satisfied with variable pay. 
Table 4,9. - Satisfaction with VPLP (As per Length of Experience) 
Dimensions 
Overall Satisfaction 
Recommendation 
Individual Performance 
Market Strength 
Retention 
Motivation 
Less than 3 years 
Mean 
2.66 
2.39 
2.95 
2.79 
2.52 
2.85 
S.D. 
0.951 
0.96 
1.129 
0.%2 
0.922 
1.099 
3-5 years 
Mean 
2.8 
2.93 
3.02 
3.26 
2.66 
2.69 
S.D. 
0.951 
0.917 
1303 
0.978 
1.056 
1217 
More than 5 years 
Mean 
3.23 
2.94 
3.38 
3.23 
3.04 
2.73 
S.D. 
0.895 
0.821 
1.227 
1.022 
1.063 
1.125 
'F' value 
9.416** 
11.887** 
3.728* 
6.927** 
6.636** 
2.792 
^P< 0.05, **P< 0.01 
Figure 4.3. - Satisfaction with Variable Pay 
(as per length of experience) 
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Recommendation: The results from 'F' test indicated that there were significant 
differences among responses of employees (F= 11.887, df= 301, P<0.01). New recruits 
reported limited faith in the variable pay scheme. 
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Impact on Overall Performance: The results from 'F' test (Table 4.9.) indicated that 
there were statistically significant differences among responses of employees (F= 3.728, 
df= 301, P<0.05). Even young employees with < 3 years of experience also felt that it 
resulted in improved individual performance. Employees with 3+ years of experience 
found these schemes more helpful enhancing their individual performance. 
Impact on Market Strength: The results of 'F' test indicated that there were significant 
differences among responses of employees (F= 6.927, df=^  301, P<0.01). Experience 
people with 3+ years of experience admitted that variable pay helped the organization 
develop its market strength. 
Impact on Retention: The responses of employees belonging to 3 categories are shown 
in Table 4.9. The results from 'F' test (Table 4.9.) indicated that there were significant 
differences among responses of employees (F= 6.636, df= 301, P<0.01). All employees 
felt that it had negligible impact on employee retention. Senior employees were partially 
in favour of this contention. 
Impact on Motivation: The results from 'F' test indicated that significant differences did 
not exist among responses of employees (F= 2.792, df= 301, P>0.01). Employee 
responses indicated that employees belonging to group with more than 5 years experience 
felt that these schemes had a limited impact on motivation. According to the responses of 
employees belonging to groups with less than 3 years and 3-5 years experience indicated 
their beliefs that these schemes had no impact on their motivation to stay longer in their 
organizations. 
4.1.4. Key Findings from this section 
• Variable pay has 'no' to 'insignificant' impact on employee satisfaction (Table 
4.1 to 4.6) 
• Variable pay has a positive impact on individual performance. (Table 4.1 to 4.6) 
Variable pay schemes have not yet been able to win confidence and trust of 
employees and they prefer not to recommend it to their best friends. (Table 4.1 to 
4.6.) 
Variable Pay schemes do not ensure retention of employees. It has negative 
impact on employee retention and motivation (Table 4.1 to 4.6) 
Employees in UK based companies are more satisfied with their variable pay 
experience (Table 4.7.). 
Employees in Japanese based companies report dissatisfaction with variable pay 
schemes (Table 4.7). 
White collared employees report greater satisfaction with their variable pay 
experience in comparison to blue collared employees (4.8). 
Employees with lesser length of experience report greater dissatisfaction with 
their variable pay experience in comparison to senior employees (Table 4.9.). 
(SECTION 2) 
4.2. Variable Pay and Employee Performance (Before and After 
Implementation of VPLP Scheme) 
The previous section covered macro aspects measuring satisfaction of employees with 
variable pay schemes. In this section, we present findings on the micro aspects that 
comprise employee performance as per their own perceptions. Factors that may indicate 
or contribute to employee performance were converted into statements. For this section, 
the questionnaire was designed in three columns. The statements were put in the middle. 
On the left hand side, employees rated their perception and experience on those 
statements before they were brought under variable pay scheme (when they not part of 
the VPLP plan). On right hand side they compared their responses based on their 
experience post implementation of variable pay schemes (after they were introduced to 
VPLP). 
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These statements were crystallized based on focus group discussion, which were later 
ratified by informed subject experts. These statements were subject to validity and 
reliability tests. Only valid and reliable statements, which were actually an indicator of 
employee performance were chosen for this section (details are available in research 
methodology section). For ease of reference these factors are also called as "Operational 
specifics/ Performance Indicators", as they were derived from day to day operations and 
were impacting employee performance. 
4.2.1. Employee Performance (Before and After Implementation of VPLP) 
Key results obtained on employee's perception of their performance before and after 
implementation of VPLP is presented in Table 4.10. 
The data clearly suggested that there were significance differences in perception of 
employees before and after implementation of variable pay schemes in their respective 
organizations. Results from the Table 4.10 indicate that variable pay has a positive and 
significant impact on employee performance. Five positive things which have emerged 
from this study, as an outcome of VPLP, which could enable the employee to perform 
better I) Employee's desire to learn to perform (before M = 3.41, after M = 4.10, t= 
27.27, p <0.01) 2) Goal Clarity (before M = 3.45, after M = 4.05, t = 27.54, p <0.01) 3) 
Frequency of Performance Evaluation (before M = 3.18, after M = 3.68, t = 26.68, p< 
0.01) 4) Level of Control on Own Work (before M - 3.29, after M = 3.75, t = 20.74, p 
<0.01) 5) Ability to meet deadlines/ timelines (before M = 3.31, after M = 3.70, t = 
15.81, p<0.01). Along with these five positive outcomes, variable pay also promotes 
employees' level of interest towards achieving results (before M = 3.50, after M = 3.65, t 
= 5.13, p<0.01). In this study we found that employees felt encouraged to develop their 
competencies (before M = 3.61, after M = 3.90, t = 6.82, p <0.01) in order to be eligible 
for VPLP benefits. Significant positive impact on quantity and quality of work was also 
reported by the study. Employees felt that VPLP environment encouraged them to be self 
dependent rather than inter-dependent (before M = 3.21, after M = 3.38, t = 5.88, p <0.01) 
Table 4.10 - Impact of VPLP on Employee Performance (Overall) 
Performance Indicators/ Contributors 
(In the order of Descending Mean Score After 
implementation of VPLP) 
Desire to learn to perform 
Goal Clarity 
Functional Competencies 
Level of control on your own work 
Ability to meet deadlines/ timelines 
Frequency of individual performance evaluation 
Level of motivation towards achieving results 
Quality of work 
Overall output of work 
Earnings and monetary returns 
Work life balance 
Level of interest at work 
Positive competitive spirit 
General Environment 
Co-operation and camaraderie among employees 
Level of motivation of your friends and 
colleagues 
Your understanding of Performance Management 
System 
Fair Feedback on Performance 
Satisfaction with Last Pay Appraisals 
Self Dependence at work 
Reward/bonus for a positive outcome of results 
Trust between management and employees 
Confidence & faith in variable performance 
linked pay schemes 
All Statements Combined 
MEAN 
BEFORE 
VPLP 
N = 300 
3.41 
3.45 
361 
3.29 
3.31 
3.18 
350 
3.42 
3.46 
3.60 
3.70 
3.21 
3.41 
3.47 
3.72 
3.54 
3.38 
3.42 
3.32 
3.21 
3.30 
3.52 
3.75 
3.44 
AFTER 
VPLP 
N = 300 
4 10 
4.05 
3.90 
3.75 
3.70 
3.68 
3.65 
3.63 
3.56 
3.54 
3.52 
3.50 
3.49 
3.49 
3.46 
3.44 
3.43 
3.40 
3.39 
3.38 
3.38 
3.34 
3.28 
3.57 
SD 
BEFORE 
VPLP 
0.36 
0.32 
0.44 
0.30 
0.36 
0.30 
0.31 
0.60 
0.32 
0.56 
0.39 
0.19 
0.28 
0.37 
0.31 
0.35 
0.23 
0.27 , 
0.23 
0.45 
0.38 
0.79 
0.29 
0.37 
AFTER 
VPLP 
0.25 
0.20 
059 
0.24 
023 
0 14 
0.40 
0.39 
0.17 
0.10 
0.21 
0.31 
0.30 
0.13 
0.64 
0.36 
0.31 
0.21 
0.31 
0.22 
0.28 
1.02 
0.23 
0.31 
DF 
598 
598 
598 
598 
598 
598 
598 
598 
598 
598 
598 
598 
598 
598 
598 
598 
598 
598 
598 
598 
598 
598 
598 
598 
I value 
27.27** 
27.54** 
6.82** 
20.74** 
15.81 ** 
26.68** 
5 13** 
5.08 ** 
4 78 •* 
1.83 
7.04 ** 
13.81 ** 
3.38** 
0.09 
6.33 ** 
3.45 ** 
2.24* 
0.51 
3.14 ** 
5.88 ** 
2.94* 
2.42* 
21.99** 
4.66 ** 
* Significance at 0.05 (p<0.05), ** Significance at 0.01 (p <0.01) 
Issues on which negative impact have been observed post implementation of VPLP are 1) 
employee's confidence and faith in VPLP programs (before M = 3.75, after M = 3.28, 
t= 21.99, p<0.01) 2) Cooperation and camaraderie among employees (before M = 
3.73, after M - 3.46, t = 6.33, p <0.01) 3) Work Life Balance (before M = 3.70, after M 
= 3.52, t = 7.04, p <0.0i). The study indicated that employees who experienced VPLP for 
over 1 year reported significant differences and lack of trust (before M = 3.52, after M = 
3.34, t = 2.42, p <0.05) with management in the context of VPLP, which had a negative 
impact on their performance. Employees who had an experience with VPLP reported a 
drop in level of motivation of their friend and colleagues (before M = 3.54, after M = 
3.44,t-3.45,p<0.0l) 
These findings indicate that when variable pay is introduced in an organization, 
employees develop interest in it. They see it as a measure to increase their earnings. They 
learn new skills so that they could perform better. Variable pay makes an employee more 
focused on his goals and performance objectives. As variable pay needs frequent 
monitoring and evaluation of performance, employees find it good. It encourages them to 
perform even better. In order to get full VPLP benefit, employees like to be more 
independent rather than inter-dependent. They like to have control of their own work. 
VPLP encourages employees to meet timelines as most of the VPLP targets are linked to 
timely completion of projects/ objectives. 
It is noteworthy that in spite of employees being appreciative of VPLP and its positive 
impact, there appears a visible lack of trust towards such schemes. It suggests that either 
these schemes are not properly administered or are not catering to employees 
expectations from such schemes. In this study, majority of employees reported that post 
VPLP, the cooperation and camaraderie among team members was negatively impacted. 
This means, VPLP makes a person think more about individual benefit rather than team 
benefit. Interestingly, employees reported that post implementation of VPLP; their work 
life balance was also compromised. That means if employee's pay is linked to 
performance, they even compromise their family issues in order to get the anticipated 
benefits. 
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India has witnessed tremendous growth in recent years, making it one of the most 
competitive mari<ets in the world. However with this growth, we have also seen the 
emergence of a highly competitive talent market and a rise in the cost of attracting, 
retaining and motivating key talent, as companies increasingly understand the importance 
of employing the best people. As companies continue to face aggressive competition and 
need to rope in scarce talent, there is trend towards enhanced monetary rewards. 
Companies are constantly exploring innovative ways of rewarding their workforce. 
Variable Pay Plans will continue to grow in popularity. Increasingly companies will use 
these plans to improve their competitive positioning, enhance performance, and adjust 
organization and business priorities to suit the changing business environment. 
Variable pay plans concern both employees and employers. Employers do not have any 
substitute but to link employee's pay to their actual performance. Employees do feel that 
VPLP positively influences their individual performance. We get an insightful picture by 
comparing the results of the present effort with that of Chen et al. (1997) and Cantoni 
(1997), who conducted studies on relationship between Variable Performance Linked Pay 
and performance and also found that variable pay schemes do help management in raising 
the performance of employees. A Variable Performance Linked Pay system can provide 
an organization with advantages such as "these programs elicit higher performance than 
flat pay systems" (Smoot and Duncan, 1997). The incentive programs can improve the 
quality of decisions made by individuals (Stone and Ziebart, 1995). The study 
corroborates the findings of Lazear (1996) who found increase in productivity by change 
of salary from fixed to variable. Paarsch and Shearer (1996) also found evidence 
supportive of incentive and productivity effects from variable performance linked (piece 
rates), as do Banker et al. (1996). Fernie and Metcalf (1996) also found that top British 
jockeys perform significantly better when offered percentage of prize money for winning 
races compared to being fixed retainers. In another study on VPLP, Bencivenga (1997) 
found that companies were enhancing performance and becoming more profitable by 
creating internal cultures of ownership. Approximately 80% of companies in US now use 
some form of broad-based variable pay. On one hand, 75% of the participants in a Hewitt 
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Associates study of variable pay expressed a general feeling that their plans helped 
improve business operations (Kenan, 1998). 
However the study did not support the findings of Oliver (1996), who argued for no link 
between Variable Performance Linked Pay and performance. Some researchers like Mary 
and Mark (2006) hold a different view. They feel that variable pay plans in general are 
failing to provide individual performance results. Improved organization level measures 
may be more attributable to the inherent financial changes that accompany variable pay 
plans than to human resources principles. They suggest that the true strategic advantage 
that can be derived from motivating employees through variable pay has yet to be fully 
realized or measured. 
The discussions presented above help ascertain that opinion with regard to efficacy of 
variable pay is divided. However there is clarity on one part. U can be safely inferred that 
a variable pay scheme is good for individual performance. 
Next we present an analysis of extent of satisfaction with variable pay amongst 
employees who were working in companies having four different cultural backgrounds 
namely US, UK, Japan and Korea. We attempt to explore if the organization culture as 
determined by parental base of MIMC had any impact on variable pay. Further we analyze 
the data on the basis of nature of job and length of experience, so that we had a deeper 
understanding of the subject before we move into operational/ actionable specifics that 
define various factors that impact employee performance due to introduction of VPLP. 
4.2.2. Impact of VPLP on Employee Performance (USA based companies) 
The mean, SD, DF and test of significance between before and after implementation of 
VPLP in companies with US origin is presented in Table 4.11. The data points towards 
significant difference in perception of employees in US based organizations before and 
after implementation of variable pay schemes in their respective organizations. 
Table 4.11 - Impact of VPLP on Employee Performance (Companies with USA 
Origin) 
Performance Indicators/ Contributors 
(In the order of Descending Mean Score After 
implementation of VPLP) 
Goal Clarity 
Level of motivation towards achieving results 
Level of interest at work 
Positive competitive spirit 
Desire to learn to perform 
Ability to meet deadlines/ timelines 
Functional Competencies 
General Environment 
Level of control on your own work 
Quality of work 
Overall output of work 
Frequency of individual performance evaluation 
Work life balance 
Co-operation and camaraderie among employees 
Your understanding of Performance Management 
System 
Fair Feedback on Performance 
Satisfaction with Last Pay Appraisals 
Reward/bonus for a positive outcome of results 
Confidence & faith in variable performance 
linked pay schemes 
Earnings and monetary returns 
Trust between management and employees 
Self Dependence at work 
Level of motivation of your friends and 
colleagues 
All Statements Combined 
MKAN 
BEFORE 
VPLP 
N = 79 
3.49 
3.22 
2.90 
3.84 
3.72 
3.73 
3.28 
3.54 
3.32 
3.40 
3.56 
3.05 
3.76 
3.94 
3.42 
3.72 
3.56 
3 19 
3.53 
3.09 
3.48 
3.59 
3.38 
3.47 
AFTER 
VPLP 
N = 79 
4.19 
4.11 
4.02 
3.91 
390 
3.89 
3.86 
3.71 
3.71 
3 68 
3.67 
3.63 
3.63 
3.58 
3.52 
3.5! 
3.49 
3.48 
3.48 
3.43 
3.42 
3.33 
3.30 
3.67 
SD 
BEFORE 
VPLP 
0.34 
0.22 
0.20 
0.54 
0.29 
0.34 
0.11 
041 
0.38 
0.33 
0.09 
0.23 
0.11 
0.19 
0.31 
0.17 
0.25 
0.25 
0.22 
0.45 
0.34 
0.55 
0.69 
0.30 
AFTER 
VPLP 
0.27 
0.32 
0.60 
0.52 
0.36 
0.23 
0.36 
0.27 
0.50 
0.23 
0.28 
0.11 
0.28 
0.23 
0.62 
on 
0.43 
0.29 
0.32 
051 
0.45 
0.23 
0.48 
0.35 
DF 
IS6 
IS6 
156 
156 
156 
IS6 
1S6 
156 
156 
156 
156 
156 
156 
156 
156 
156 
156 
156 
156 
156 
156 
156 
156 
156 
T 
VALUE 
14.33 ** 
20.37 ** 
15.73 ** 
0.82 
3.46 ** 
3.46 •* 
13.69 *• 
3.07 *• 
5.51 ** 
6.18** 
3.32** 
20.22 ** 
3.84 ** 
10.72 ** 
1.28 
9.21 ** 
1.25 
6.73 ** 
1.1.4 
4.44 ** 
0.94 
3.87** 
0.84 
2.22* 
•• Significance at 0.05 (p<0.05), ** Significance at 0.01 (p <0.0I) 
Employees in US based organizations reported major improvement in "Goal Clarity" post 
introduction of VPLP (before M = 3.49, after M = 4.19, t = 14.33, p <0.01). They found 
significant improvement in their level of motivation towards achieving results post 
introduction of VPLP (before M = 3.22, after M = 4.11, t = 20.27, p <0.01). Another 
positive finding reported was that post introduction of VPLP, the employees in US based 
organization had increased level of interest in their work (before M = 2.90, after M = 
4.02, t = 15.73, p< 0.01). Besides these major improvements, they reported significant 
improvement in their "level of control" of work. They found that with increased 
frequency of individual performance evaluation, there had been a positive impact on their 
overall performance (Table 4.11) 
The data further suggested an adverse impact of VPLP. Employees in US based 
organization felt a drop in "work life balance" post VPLP (before M = 3.76, after M = 
3.63, t == 20.22, p<0.01). They had doubts / concerns in respect to "fairness of the 
performance evaluation system" (before M = 3.72, after M = 3.51, t = 9.21, p <0.01). 
Cooperation and Camaraderie among employees were also negatively impacted post 
introduction of VPLP (before M = 3.94, after M = 3.58, t = 10.72, p <0.01). 
In a nutshell, we may conclude that employees working in US based companies are quite 
positive about variable pay. They find it a good medium to have better goal clarity. They 
accept it and get motivated towards achieving results and develop more interest in their 
work. 
However after experiencing it for over a year, they realized that it leads to lack of team 
work, cooperation and camaraderie among teams. They feel that they do not get fair 
feedback on their performance and are not quite satisfied with their last appraisals. 
Therefore, in order to ensure successful variable pay plan there is need to increase the 
frequency of appraisals. The feedback about the performance should be based on 
quantifiable data, acceptable to team members. Necessary measures need to be taken to 
maintain teamwork post implementation of variable pay. 
4.2.3. Impact of VPLP on Employee Performance (UK based companies) 
The mean, SD, DF and test of significance scores between before and after 
implementation of VPLP in companies with UK origin is presented in Table 4.12. The 
data suggested that there were significant differences in perception of employees in UK 
based organizations before and after implementation of variable pay schemes in their 
respective organizations. 
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Table 4.12 - Impact of VPLP on Employee Performance (Companies with UK 
Origin) 
Performance Indicators/ Contributors 
(In the order of Descending Mean Score After 
implementation of VPLP) 
Frequency of individual performance evaluation 
Goal Clarity 
Reward/bonus for a positive outcome of results 
Self Dependence at work 
Ability to meet deadlines/ timelines 
Your understanding of Performance Management 
System 
Level of control on your own work 
Desire to learn to perform 
Level of motivation towards achieving results 
Quality of work 
Overall output of work 
Positive competitive spirit 
Earnings and monetary returns 
Level of interest at work 
Fair Feedback on Performance 
Functional Competencies 
Work life balance 
Co-operation and camaraderie among employees 
Confidence & faith in variable performance linked pay 
schemes 
Satisfaction with Last Pay Appraisals 
General Environment 
Trust between management and employees 
Level of motivation of your friends and colleagues 
MFiAN 
BEI-ORE 
VPLP 
N = 7I 
3,44 
. 3,45 
3,39 
3,46 
3,10 
3,32 
3.37 
3,97 
3,20 
3,10 
3,37 
3,49 
3,27 
170 
3.27 
3.25 
4 00 
3.48 
3.32 
3.21 
3.28 
3.30 
3.58 
3.41 
AFTER 
VPLP 
N = 7I 
4.37 
4.18 
4.11 
4 06 
3 96 
3.94 
3.86 
3.85 
3.85 
3.85 
3.82 
3.75 
3.73 
3.71 
3.66 
3.49 
3.48 
3.41 
3.39 
3.37 
3.35 
3.30 
3.18 
3.72 
SD 
BEFORE 
VPLP 
0.45 
0.30 
0.20 
Oil 
0.27 
0.19 
0.17 
0.10 
080 
0.23 
012 
0.56 
0.52 
014 
0.23 
0.13 
0.27 
0.25 
0.08 
0.11 
0.43 
0.18 
0.19 
0.26 
AFTER 
VPLP 
056 
024 
0.29 
0.24 
0.34 
0.43 
0.34 
0.19 
0.50 
0.25 
0.23 
0.45 
0.43 
0.40 
0.12 
0.25 
0.44 
0.21 
0.19 
0.34 
0.28 
0.26 
0.26 
0.31 
DF 
140 
140 
140 
140 
140 
140 
140 
140 
140 
140 
140 
140 
140 
140 
140 
140 
140 
140 
140 
140 
140 
140 
140 
140 
r 
VALUE 
10.90** 
16.01 ** 
17.22** 
19.14** 
16.69** 
11.11 ** 
10.86** 
4.70 ** 
5 80 ** 
19.62** 
14.61 ** 
3.04 •* 
5.74 •* 
0.19 
12.66 •• 
7.17 ** 
8,48 ** 
1,80 
2,86* 
3,77** 
1,14 
000 
10,46** 
6.45 ** 
* Significance at 0.05 (p<0.05), ** Significance at 0.01 (p <0.01) 
The data suggested that employee in UK based companies were most favorable towards 
variable pay schemes (before M = 3.41, after M = 3.72, t = 6.45, p <0.01). They found 
that "frequency of performance evaluation" positively impacted their individual 
performance (before M = 3.44, after M = 4.37, t = 10.90, p <0.0]). Like employees of US 
based companies, UK based company's employees too found that "Goal Clarity" had 
significantly improved post introduction of VPLP (before M = 3.45, after M = 4.18, t = 
16.01, P < 0.01). These employees reported that "Reward/bonus for a positive outcome of 
results" was a motivating factor for them to perform better (before M = 3.39, after M -
4.11, t = 17.22, p <0.01). Besides these major improvements, they further reported that 
post launch of VPLP they felt more self dependant at work and their ability to meet 
deadlines/timelines improved significantly (Table 4.12). 
On the other hand post VPLP, employees in UK based companies like their counterparts 
from US based companies, too felt that their "work life balance" was disturbed and it had 
negatively impacted on their performance (before M ^ 4.00, after M = 3.48, t = 8.48, p 
<0.01). These employees felt that post introduction of variable pay the level of motivation 
of their friends and colleagues declined (before M = 3.58, after M = 3.18, t = 10.46, p 
<0.01). 
It may therefore be inferred that there were not much of difference in the opinion of US 
based and UK based company's employees. Employees in UK based companies found 
that VPLP helped them have better Goal Clarity. Increased "frequency of performance 
evaluation" encouraged them to perform better, they became more self dependent than 
inter-dependent and rewards for good work motivated them to perform better. However in 
order to achieve results, their work life balance was compromised. 
4.2.4. Impact of VPLP on Employee Performance (Japan based companies) 
The mean, SD, DF and test of significance between before and after implementation of 
VPLP in companies having Japanese origin is presented in Table 4.13. The data indicated 
that there were significant differences in perception of employees in these organizations 
before and after implementation of variable pay schemes in their respective organizations. 
Table 4.13 - Impact of VPLP on Employee Performance (Companies with Japanese 
Origin) 
Performance Indicators/ Contributors 
(In the order of Descending Mean Score After 
implementation of VPLP) 
Your understanding of Performance Management 
System 
Desire to learn to perform 
Goal Clarity 
Fair Feedback on Performance 
Ability to meet deadlines/ timelines 
Positive competitive spirit 
Earnings and monetary returns 
Functional Competencies 
Level of interest at work 
Quality of work 
Work life balance 
Co-operation and camaraderie among employees 
Overall output of work 
Satisfaction with Last Pay Appraisals 
Reward/bonus for a positive outcome of results 
Level of motivation towards achieving results 
Confidence & faith in variable performance Imked pay 
schemes 
Frequency of individual performance evaluation 
Level of control on your own work 
Level of motivation of your friends and colleagues 
Trust between management and employees 
Self Dependence at work 
General Environment 
All Statements Combined 
MEAN 
BhFORE 
VPLP 
N = 72 
3 43 
3 82 
3 54 
3 35 
351 
3 47 
3 43 
3 22 
3 54 
3 50 
318 
3 14 
3 38 
3 65 
3 26 
3 83 
3 44 
3 59 
3 28 
351 
3 58 
3 60 
3 56 
3.47 
APIFR 
VPLP 
N = 72 
3 64 
3 63 
3 58 
3 57 
3 40 
3 38 
3 36 
3 35 
3 32 
3 28 
3 24 
3 22 
3 19 
3 15 
3 13 
3 12 
3 11 
3 07 
3 06 
3 06 
3 04 
3 00 
2 93 
3.25 
SD 
BErORE 
VPLP 
0 36 
0 34 
0 08 
0 44 
0 28 
0 45 
0 36 
0 42 
0 37 
0 56 
018 
0 28 
0 36 
0 34 
0 43 
0 39 
0 37 
0 25 
0 34 
0 43 
0 29 
0 39 
0 24 
0.35 
AFTER 
VPLP 
044 
0 23 
0 26 
044 
0 39 
029 
0 57 
0 20 
0 34 
0 43 
0 25 
017 
0 33 
0 24 
0 34 
0 26 
017 
0 28 
0 24 
0 54 
0 25 
021 
0 35 
0.31 
or 
142 
142 
142 
142 
142 
142 
142 
142 
142 
142 
142 
142 
142 
142 
142 
142 
142 
142 
142 
142 
142 
142 
142 
142 
T 
VALUE 
3 13** 
3 92 *• 
124 
3 00 * 
1 94 
142 
0 88 
2 37 • 
3 71 ** 
2 64 • 
165 
2 07 * 
3 30** 
10 19** 
201 * 
12 85** 
6 87 ** 
11 75 ** 
4 48 ** 
5 53** 
11 96 * ' 
1149** 
12 59 ** 
3.99 ** 
' Significance at 0.05 (p<0.05), ** Significance at 0.01 (p <0.01) 
The data indicated that employees in companies with Japanese origin observed decline in 
performance post implementation of variable pay (before M = 3.47, after M = 3.25, t = 
3.99, p <0.01). In spite of overall negative feeling towards VPLP, they reported that 
variable pay helped them understand "performance management system" better (before 
M = 3.43, after M = 3.64, t = 3.13, p <0.01). There was marginal yet not very significant 
improvement in their Goal Clarity. 
After experiencing variable pay for more than a year, the employees in Japanese 
organization reported decline in their "desire to learn to perform" (before M = 3.82, after 
M = 3.63, t = 3.92, p <0.01). Their confidence and faith in VPLP schemes was quite low 
(before M = 3.44, after M = 3.11, t = 6.87, p <0.0I). One of the reasons which was quite 
evident from the data was that post VPLP, the employees felt that they were not "self 
dependent" for their performance (before M = 3.60, after M = 3.00, t = 11.49, p <0.0]). 
Overall decline in "General environment" at work was reported post implementation of 
VPLP Scheme (before M = 3.56, after M = 2.93, t = 12.59, p <0.01). Trust between 
management and employees also decreased after implementation of variable pay (before 
M = 3.58, after = 3.04, t = 11.96, p <0.01). 
In a nutshell, the organization climate of companies with Japanese origin was not suitable 
for success of variable pay schemes. Employees at Japanese companies were more inter-
dependent and least satisfied with such schemes. 
4.2.5. Impact of VPLP on Employee Performance (Companies with Korean 
origin) 
The mean, SD, DF and test of significance between before and after implementation of 
VPLP in companies having Korean origin is presented in Table 4.14. The data clearly 
suggests that there were significance differences in perception of employees before and 
after implementation of variable pay schemes in their respective organizations. 
Table 4.14 - Impact of VPLP on Employee Performance (Companies with Korean 
Origin) 
Performance Indicators/ Contributors 
(In the order of Descending Mean Score After 
implementation of VPLP) 
Desire to learn to perform 
Level of interest at wori< 
Goal Clarity 
Level of motivation towards achieving results 
Your understanding of Performance Management 
System 
Ability to meet deadlines/ timelines 
Frequency of individual performance evaluation 
Overall output of work 
Fair Feedback on Performance 
Functional Competencies 
Quality of work 
Positive competitive spirit 
Level of control on your own work 
Self Dependence at work 
Work life balance 
Trust between management and employees 
General Environment 
Earnings and monetary returns 
Co-operation and camaraderie among employees 
Confidence & faith in variable performance linked pay 
schemes 
Satisfaction with Last Pay Appraisals 
Reward^onus for a positive outcome of results 
Level of motivation of your friends and colleagues 
All Statements Combined 
MEAN 
BEFORE 
VPLP 
N = 78 
3.32 
3 79 
3.12 
3.58 
3.72 
3.22 
3.15 
3.46 
3.40 
3.49 
3.27 
3.67 
3.41 
3.46 
3.77 
3.54 
3.31 
3.22 
3.58 
3.78 
3.22 
3.27 
3.28 
3.44 
AFTER 
VPLP 
N = 78 
3.92 
3 90 
3.90 
3-85 
3.80 
3.76 
3.70 
3 69 
3.69 
3.65 
3.63 
3.61 
3.60 
359 
356 
3.49 
3.45 
3.44 
3.41 
3.41 
3.38 
3.37 
3.28 
3.61 
SD 
BEFORE 
VPLP 
031 
027 
0 31 
0.25 
0.28 
0.21 
0.34 
0.29 
0.34 
0.22 
0.26 
0.42 
028 
0.28 . 
0.21 
0.25 
0.28 
0.55 
0.45 
0.23 
0.32 
0.37 
0.40 
0.31 
AFTER 
VPLP 
0.37 
0.27 
0.37 
0.36 
0.35 
0.21 
0.44 
0.22 
0.37 
0.45 
0.38 
0.18 
0.27 
0.34 
0.33 
0.44 
0.44 
0.46 
0.28 
0.32 
0.18 
0.12 
0.22 
0.32 
DF 
154 
154 
154 
154 
154 
154 
154 
154 
154 
154 
154 
154 
154 
154 
154 
154 
154 
154 
154 
154 
154 
154 
154 
T 
VALUE 
10.97** 
2.54 * 
14.27** 
5.44 •* 
1.57 
16.05** 
8.73 *• 
5 58 ** 
5.09 ** 
2.82 * 
6.90 •• 
1.15 
4.31 ** 
2.60* 
4.74 ** 
0.87 
2.37 * 
2.70 * 
2.83 * 
8.29 •* 
3.84 ** 
2.27 * 
0.03 
3.36 ** 
* Significance at 0.05 (p<0.05), ** Significance at 0.01 (p <0.01) 
The data suggested that employees in companies with Korean origin found improvement 
in their performance post implementation of VPLP (before M = 3.44, after M = 3.61, t = 
3.36, p <0.01). Their desire to learn to perform improved post VPLP (before M = 3.32, 
after M = 3.92, t = 10.97, p <0.01). They reported major improvement in "Goal Clarity" 
post implementation of variable pay (before M = 3.12, after M = 3.90, t = 14.27, p<0.01). 
They also observed positive improvement in their "ability to meet deadlines/ timelines" 
(before M = 3.22, after M = 3.76, t = 16.05, p <0.01). Besides these major improvements. 
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they reported positive impact on their performance in the terms of "improvement in their 
level of interest" at work and their "functional competencies" (Table 4.14). 
On the other side, they reported a decline in "cooperation and camaraderie" among team 
members post implementation of VPLP (before M = 3.58, after M = 3.41, t = 2.83, p 
<0.05), which in turn led to decline in "confidence and faith in such schemes" (before M 
= 3.78, after M = 3.41, t = 8.29, p <0.01). 
It may be concluded that US, UK and Korea based companies, the VPLP has a positive 
impact on employee performance. VPLP helped employees have better Goal Clarity; it 
positively influences them to "Learn to Perform". However it somehow has a quite 
significant negative impact on the teamwork. Confidence and Faith in VPLP schemes is 
therefore yet to take a firm ground. 
The study reported that the management practices/ culture of UK based companies was 
found more suitable for "Variable Pay" success in India. The Japanese culture was found 
least attuned to ensure success of VPLP. The Japanese culture is originally known for 
Teamwork (Team based reward) and promotion by seniority, which probably is not 
acceptable to employees. This culture does not favor linking their pay to performance. 
The inter dependency nature of their work causes barrier in the overall acceptability and 
success of variable pay plan in such companies. 
The study corroborates the findings of Fernie and Metcalf (1996) who also reported that 
in UK culture the variable pay schemes are more successful. As per Institute of 
Personnel and Development Trend Report (1999), in UK the Variable pay is linked to 
Individual Objectives in 40% management employees in comparison to 25% employees 
in non-management cadre. The research highlighted the most popular type of scheme is 
individual performance-related pay for management employees. 
The study also buttresses the Hofestede's analysis (Hofstede H Greet, 1980), who 
assessed culture's consequences, comparing values, behaviours, institutions and 
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organizations across nations and provided some insights into the United Kingdom's 
culture. That also explains why variable pay schemes are so appreciated in these 
companies. As per Hofstede's analysis of cultural clusters, the British have very strong 
feelings towards individualism and masculinity. Interestingly, both dimensions are rated 
higher than in the United States, particularly masculinity. U.K.'s culture lays emphasis on 
individual decision making and performance-based rewards systems. Performance tends 
to be task driven rather than people driven. Results are considered more important than 
relationships. Both power distance and uncertainty avoidance are relatively low in the 
U.K., indicating that corporate cultures fall into what Hofstede refers to as the 
"village/market" quadrant—where rules are flexible and the focus of work is on getting 
the job done. Another researcher team of Martin et al (2001) in their study on 
Performance pay and corporate structure in UK found that performance based 
compensation schemes have grown in popularity in UK. Their results also revealed that 
"three quarters of companies in UK were operating individual performance related pay 
schemes and a large growth in the incidence of skill based pay. Deanne et al (2001) in his 
research on High performance work systems, organisational culture and firm 
effectiveness found a link between so-called high performance work systems and firm 
performance and related these to organisational culture. Results of regression analyses 
controlling for sector, firm size and age show a significant impact of this system on 
several performance outcomes (perceived economic outcomes, beyond contract and 
absenteeism), as well as positive relationships with organisational culture orientations. 
Benson et al (2000) in their study on Individual Performance Related Pay (PRP) and 
Enterprise Outcomes in Japan found little relationship of PRP to productivity, labour 
costs, absenteeism and the pursuit of quality. 
Schemes that reward individual performances are likely to be far less welcome in group-
oriented societies like Japan. Such schemes may be equally unwelcome in nurturing 
societies that attach greater importance to solidarity among colleagues, and individual 
prominence could provoke resentment and jealousy. In an interview conducted by 
Pennings (1992) about Executive Reward Systems, it was found that compensation in US 
firms varied greatly from almost fixed to extremely variable. They were linked to 
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accounting measures of individual performance in comparison to compensation in 
Japanese firms, which tend to have more uniform team based compensation system. In 
Japanese society, culture has a different facet. Pay-for-performance is linked to the whole 
company's success and long-term horizons. In addition, differentiation may be 
constrained by respect for age and rewards may have to operate around a built-in age 
escalator; benefit provision is often inflexible; and perquisites play a strong role in reward 
but, typically, much less overtly than in Europe. However in recent past there has been a 
trend among the more progressive Japanese companies to move towards variable 
incentives/bonuses (Zingheim and Schuster, 2005). 
Variable Performance Linked Pay Schemes may face difficulties in countries that have a 
high need for uncertainty avoidance such as Japan and Taiwan. Individualistic schemes 
such as "Merit Pay" could be a problem in cultures where collectivism is a stronger norm 
than individualism. In nations identified as individualistic (U.S., U.K.), compensation and 
rewards would support employability and individual and performance-based pay. Those 
in more collectivist nations (Japan) would choose more group-based approaches, and so 
on. It has long been recognized that compensation and reward systems, because of their 
social as well as economic significance, exemplify and reinforce cultural norms. 
However, this does not mean that social and cultural norms necessarily coincide with 
national boundaries. Indeed, 100 years ago, writers recognized that mining and textile 
companies developed their own unique social norms and that the compensation systems 
of these companies reflected those norms. The idea of "national culture" requires a leap 
of logic in assuming that social norms and cultural values are solely national in character. 
Clearly, geopolitical boundaries alone do not determine cultural values and social norms. 
Nations comprise a variety of subgroups and subcultures, and anecdotal and empirical 
evidence suggests that local cultural groups as well as values within organizations differ 
significantly. 
Another evidence of Individual based variable pay plan preference over team based, was 
observed in the research done by Kristine and Mark (2003). They conducted an 
experimental investigation of risk preferences in the context of compensation. Results 
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demonstrated that people were not generally risk averse in this context, aS found in earlier 
research, but rather that risk preferences depend on the nature of the variable pay plan. In 
particular, in both between- and within-subjects designs, variable pay was preferred more 
often when incentives were based on individual rather than collective (team or 
OTgau\zatiov\al) performance, and participants were n\ore optin\istic about the likelihood 
of receiving incentives as individuals. The effects of individual differences such as self-
efficacy and preference for group work were contingent on the format of the variable pay 
plan. 
4.2.6. Variable Pay - Impact on performance of Blue Collared Employees 
The mean, SD, DF and test of significance between before and after iniplementation of 
VPLP in respect to Blue Collared employees is presented in Table 4.15. The data clearly 
suggested that there were significance differences in perception of blue collared 
employees before and after implementation of variable pay schemes. 
Significant differences were not reported in their level of interest at work post 
implementation of variable pay (before M = 3.74, after M = 3.73, t = 0.33). However they 
reported that VPLP had a positive impact on their "Functional Competencies" (before M 
= 3.53, after M = 3.80, t = 8.49, p <0.01) and their Ability to meet deadlines/ timelines" 
(before M = 3.53, after M - 3.79, t = 5.60, p <0.01). They also reported that VPLP helped 
them had better "Goal Clarity" (before M = 3.28, after M = 3.79, t = 17.27, p <0.01). 
On the other hand, blue collared employees experienced significant drop in their 
"earnings and monetary returns" post implementation of variable pay (before M = 3.77, 
after M = 3.64, t = 3.67, p <0.01). Most of them reported that their understanding of 
"performance evaluation system" was unclear post VPLP Launch (before M = 3.66, after 
M = 3.33, t = 7.24, p <0.01). Their "confidence and faith in VPLP process dropped post 
implementation after they experienced it for over a year (before M = 3.51, after M = 3.25, 
t = 8.41,p<0.01) 
Table 4.15 - Impact of VPLP on Employee Performance (Blue Collared Employees) 
Performance Indicators/ Contributors 
(In the order of Descending Mean Score After 
implementation of VPLP) 
Functional Competencies 
Ability to meet deadlines/ timelines 
Goal Clarity 
Desire to learn to perform 
Level of interest at work 
Level of motivation towards achieving results 
Earnings and monetary returns 
Reward/bonus for a positive outcome of results 
Overall output of work 
Level of control on your own work 
Positive competitive spirit 
Fair Feedback on Performance 
Satisfaction with Last Pay Appraisals 
Quality of work 
Self Dependence at work 
Level of motivation of your friends and colleagues 
Co-operation and camaraderie among employees 
Work life balance 
Your understandmg of Performance Management 
System 
Trust between management and employees 
Frequency of individual performance evaluation 
General Environment 
Confidence & faith in variable performance linked pay 
schemes 
All Statements Combined 
MCAN 
BhhORE 
VPLP 
N = 180 
3 53 
3 53 
3 28 
3 59 
3 74 
3 42 
3 77 
331 
351 
3 48 
3 46 
3 54 
3 25 
3 32 
3 37 
3 20 
3 24 
3 34 
3 66 
3 34 
3 38 
3 20 
351 
3.43 
Al lER 
VPLP 
N= 180 
3 80 
3 79 
3 79 
3 76 
3 73 
3 66 
3 64 
3 63 
3 55 
3 47 
3 46 
3 46 
3 44 
3 44 
3 44 
3 42 
3 40 
3 38 
3 35 
3 33 
3 33 
3 33 
3 25 
3.51 
SD 
13tFO 
RE 
VPLP 
0 33 
0 43 
0 28 
0 47 
019 
0 25 
0 35 
0 22 
0 36 
0 29 
0 44 
0 38 
0 54 
0 36 
0 36 
0 30 
0 55 
044 
0 38 
0 29 
0 28 
013 
0 39 
0.35 
AH rbR 
VPLP 
0 27 
0 45 
0 28 
0 29 
0 35 
0 44 
0 32 
0 33 
0 29 
0 45 
0 36 
031 
0 46 
0 28 
0 40 
0 27 
0 22 
0 38 
0 43 
037 
0 37 
0 37 
0 14 
0.34 
DF 
358 
358 
358 
358 
358 
358 
358 
358 
358 
358 
358 
358 
358 
358 
358 
358 
358 
358 
358 
358 
358 
358 
358 
358 
1 
VALUE 
8 49 ** 
5 60** 
1727 ** 
4 12 ** 
0 33 
6 36** 
3 67** 
10 82 ** 
1 16 
0 25 
0 23 
2 18* 
3 59** 
3 53** 
174 
731 ** 
3 62** 
0 92 
7 24** 
0 28 
1 44 
4 44** 
841 ** 
2.19* 
* Significance at 0.05 (p<0.05), ** Significance at 0.01 (p <0.01) 
It hints that blue collared worker needs more clarity, communication and awareness in 
respect to variable pay schemes. In absence of "clarity on the scheme", they develop lack 
of confidence and faith in such schemes, which in turn, negatively impact their individual 
performance and leads to decline in their monetary earnings. 
4.2.7. Variable Pay - Impact on performance of White Collared Employees 
The mean, SD, DF and test of significance between before and after implementation of 
VPLP in respect to White Collared employees is presented in Table 4.16. The data clearly 
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suggests that there were significance differences in perception of white collared 
employees before and after implementation of variable pay schemes. 
Table 4.16 - Impact of VPLP on Employee Performance (White Collared 
Employees) 
Performance Indicators/ Contributors 
(In the order of Descending Mean Score After 
implementation of VPLP) 
Goal Clarity 
Level of control on your own work 
Desire to learn to perform 
Level of interest at work 
Ability to meet deadlines/ timelines 
Fair Feedback on Performance 
Quality of work 
Overall output of work 
General Environment 
Level of motivation towards achieving results 
Positive competitive spirit 
Reward/bonus for a positive outcome of results 
Earnings and monetary returns 
Your understanding of Performance Management System 
Confidence & faith in variable performance linked pay 
schemes 
Self Dependence at work 
Satisfaction with Last Pay Appraisals 
Work life balance 
Frequency of individual performance evaluation 
Co-operation and camaraderie among employees 
Level of motivation of your friends and colleagues 
Functional Competencies 
Trust between management and employees 
All Statements Combined 
MEAN 
BEFORE 
VPLP 
N = 120 
3 86 
3 33 
3 26 
3 11 
3 24 
3 52 
331 
3 40 
3 44 
3 37 
3 23 
3 59 
3 38 
3 58 
3 28 
3 46 
3 50 
391 
3 30 
3 46 
3 85 
3 39 
3 27 
3.44 
AFTER 
VPLP 
N = i20 
3 94 
3 90 
3 90 
3 89 
3 84 
3 82 
3 80 
3 73 
3 73 
3 65 
3 63 
3 59 
3 58 
3 56 
3 55 
3 54 
3 49 
3 49 
3 48 
3 45 
3 43 
341 
3 35 
3.64 
SD 
BEFOR 
EVPLP 
0 59 
0 44 
041 
0 45 
0 47 
0 37 
0 56 
0 24 
0 32 
0 67 
0 35 
0 36 
0 29 
0 38 
0 56 
0 47 
0 22 
0 49 
0 45 
017 
0 53 
0 54 
0 37 
0.42 
AFTER 
VPLP 
0 33 
0 37 
0 33 
045 
0 54 
0 44 
044 
0 27 
045 
0 56 
0 56 
031 
0 25 
038 
041 
0 39 
0 27 
0 46 
0 34 
0 22 
051 
0 37 
0 28 
0.39 
DF 
238 
238 
238 
238 
238 
238 
238 
238 
238 
238 
238 
238 
238 
238 
238 
238 
238 
238 
238 
238 
238 
238 
238 
238 
T 
VALUE 
1 29 
10 8 6 " 
13 3 2 " 
13 4 2 " 
9 18 " 
571 " 
7 53 " 
10 0 0 " 
5 75 ** 
3 51 »* 
6 63 " 
0 02 
5 72 ** 
0 40 
4 26 ** 
1 44 
031 
6 84 ** 
3 49** 
0 39 
6 25** 
0 33 
1 88 
3.82 ** 
Significance at 0.05 (p<0.05), ** Significance at 0.01 (p <0.01) 
The data suggested that the white collared employees were more favorable towards VPLP 
post implementation (before M = 3.44, after M = 3.64, t = 3.82, p <0.0I). They 
experienced better level of control on their work post VPLP (before m = 3.33, after M = 
3.90, t = 10.86, p <0.01). Their desire to learn to perform was even better post VPLP 
(before M = 3.26, after M = 3.90, t = 13.32, p <0.01). White collared employees reported 
that their ability to meet deadlines/ timelines improved post implementation of variable 
pay scheme (before M = 3.24, after M = 3.84, t = 9.18, p <0.01). Their overall output of 
work also got improved after VPLP was launched (before M = 3.40, after M - 3.73, t = 
10.00, p <0.01). However the white collared employees reported adverse impact on work 
life balance post Variable pay was launched (before M = 3.91, after M = 3.49, t = 6.89, p 
<0.01). In addition to work life balance, they also felt a drop in the motivation of their 
friends and colleagues at work (before M = 3.85, after M = 3.43, t = 6.25, p <0.01). 
The study indicated a significant difference in the approach of white and blue collared 
workers in respect to variable pay. The white collared employees were clear about their 
career goals even before the VPLP was launched and there was no statistically significant 
difference in their goal clarity post VPLP. White collared employees recorded an 
improvement in their earnings post VPLP and blue collared employees reported 
otherwise. White collared employees reported positive impact in their overall output post 
launch of VPLP. However in case of blue collared employees the impact was 
insignificant. 
The findings of this study presented above indicates that that variable pay is more suitable 
for "White Collared" employees than "Blue Collared" ones. This finding contradicts the 
traditional view. Variable pay schemes have originally been started for blue collared (e.g. 
piece rate etc). Therefore, it is assumed that their satisfaction with such schemes would be 
higher. However this research indicates otherwise. On the similar lines, W.D. 
McCausland et al (2005) in their research also reported that lower paid blue collared 
workers were dissatisfied with performance related pay. A plausible explanation for this 
pattern could be that for lower-paid employees, performance related pay is perceived to 
be controlling, whereas higher-paid "white collared workers" derive a utility benefit from 
what they view as supportive reward schemes. The study further found evidence from 
another similar study of Kahn and Sherer (1990) who also found that variable pay was 
better evaluation system for white-collared workers in comparison to rest of them. 
Another researcher team Angela et al (2001) also suggested that variable pay 
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plans are helpful in improving white collared managerial efforts to increase shareholder 
wealth in comparison to others. 
4.2.8. Variable Pay - Impact on performance (< 3 Years of Work Experience) 
The mean, SD, DF and test of significance between before and after implementation of 
VPLP in respect to employees with less than three years of experience is presented in 
Table 4.17. Significant differences had not been observed in perception of this group of 
employees before and after implementation of variable pay schemes. 
The data suggested that employees with less experience (< 3 years of total experience) 
were not very favorable towards variable pay (before M = 3.45, after M = 3.50, t - 1.06, p 
>0.05). Significant improvements had not been observed in their performance after VPLP 
schemes were administered on them for more than one year. 
Yet, these employees reported increased level of interest at work post VPLP (before M = 
3.44, after M = 3.65, t = 3.14, p <0.0I). They reported that in initial stages there was high 
level of interest towards achieving results (before M = 3.46, after M = 3.70, t = 6.74, p 
<0.01). Their ability to meet deadlines/ timelines also improved post VPLP (before M = 
3.13, after M = 3.53, t = 7.36, p <0.01). 
Young employees with < 3 years of experience witnessed decline in their earnings and 
monetary returns post VPLP (before M = 3.56, after M = 3.45, t = 3.66, p <0.0I). There 
were serious issues regarding the fairness of performance feedback (before M = 3.80, 
after M = 3.40, t = 12.20, p <0.01). They also reported decline in cooperation and 
camaraderie among team members before implementation of VPLP (before M = 3.63, 
after M = 3.35, t = 5.78, p<0.01). 
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Table 4.17 - Impact of VPLP on Employee Performance (< 3 Years of Work 
Experience) 
Performance Indicators/ Contributors 
(In the order of Descending Mean Score After 
implementation of VPLP) 
Work life balance 
Level of motivation towards achieving results 
Level of interest at work 
Your understanding of Performance Management 
System 
Functional Competencies 
Desire to learn to perform 
Ability to meet deadlines/ timelines 
Self Dependence at work 
Quality of work 
Overall output of work 
Reward/bonus for a positive outcome of results 
Goal Clarity 
Frequency of individual performance evaluation 
Level of control on your own work 
Satisfaction with Last Pay Appraisals 
Earnings and monetary returns 
General Environment 
Level of motivation of your friends and colleagues 
Trust between management and employees 
Confidence & faith in variable performance linked pay 
schemes 
Fair Feedback on Performance 
Positive competitive spirit 
Co-operation and camaraderie among employees 
All Statements Combined 
MEAN 
BEFORE 
VPLP 
3.78 
3.46 
3.44 
3.45 
3.40 
3.45 
3.13 
3.50 
3.34 
3.40 
3.42 
3.40 
3.25 
3.45 
3.41 
3.56 
3.34 
3.60 
3.42 
3.39 
3.80 
3.26 
3.63 
3.45 
AFTER 
VPLP 
N = 98 
3 73 
3.70 
365 
3.60 
3.56 
355 
3.53 
352 
3.52 
3.51 
3.49 
3.49 
3.47 
3.47 
3.45 
3.45 
3.44 
3.43 
3.42 
3.41 
3.40 
3.36 
3.35 
3.50 
SD 
BEFORE 
VPLP 
0 33 
0.20 
038 
0.30 
0.25 
0.46 
039 
0.32 
0.36 
0.36 
0.35 
0.28 
0.35 
0.39 
0.32 
016 
018 
0.25 
0.34 
0.30 
0.27 
0.29 
0.44 
0.32 
AFTER 
VPLP 
0 45 
0.29 
0.54 
0.21 
0.37 
0.34 
0.37 
035 
0.28 
0.28 
0.36 
0.28 
0.44 
0.38 
0.39 
0.25 
0.29 
0.18 
0.41 
0.38 
0.18 
0.56 
0.19 
0.34 
DF 
194 
194 
194 
194 
194 
194 
194 
194 
194 
194 
194 
194 
194 
194 
194 
194 
194 
194 
194 
194 
194 
194 
194 
194 
T 
VALUE 
0.88 
6.74 ** 
3.14 • • 
4.05 ** 
3.54** 
1.73 
7.36** 
0.41 
3.90 *• 
2.38* 
1.38 
2.25* 
3.87** 
0.36 
0.78 
3.66** 
2.90* 
5.46 •* 
0.03 
0.40 
12.20** 
1.56 
5.78 ** 
1.06 
* Significance at 0.05 (p<0.05), ** Significance at 0.01 (p <0.01) 
It appears that young employees are in favor of more cash in hand and would not Hke to 
put their pay at risi<. They perceive that that they are performing better than the feedbaci< 
they get. They feel that variable pay has no significant impact on their overall output of 
work. 
4.2.9. Variable Pay - Impact on performance (3-5 Years of Work Experience) 
The mean, SD, DF and test of significance between before and after implementation of 
VPLP in respect to employees with 3-5 years of experience is presented in Table 4.18. 
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The data suggested that there were no major significance differences in perception of 
employees before and after implementation of variable pay schemes in their respective 
organizations. 
Table 4.18 - Impact of VPLP on Employee Performance (3-5 Years of Work 
Experience) 
Performance Indicators/ Contributors 
(In the order of Descending Mean Score After 
implementation of VPLP) 
Level of interest at work 
Goal Clarity 
Desire to learn to perform 
Confidence & faith in variable performance linked pay 
schemes 
Level of motivation towards achieving results 
Functional Competencies 
Your understanding of Performance Management 
System 
Ability to meet deadlines/ timelines 
Earnings and monetary returns 
Self Dependence at work 
Overall output of work 
Reward/bonus for a positive outcome of results 
Level of control on your own work 
Quality of work 
Fair Feedback on Performance 
Positive competitive spirit 
Satisfaction with Last Pay Appraisals 
Work life balance 
Frequency of individual performance evaluation 
General Environment 
Trust between management and employees 
Level of motivation of your friends and colleagues 
Co-operation and camaraderie among employees 
All Statements Combined 
MEAN 
BEFORE 
VPLP 
N= 111 
3.31 
348 
3.66 
3.89 
3.47 
3.43 
3.40 
3.26 
3.62 
3.28 
335 
3.41 
3.40 
3.25 
3.94 
3.30 
3.59 
3.95 
3.34 
3.25 
3.27 
3.40 
3.53 
3.47 
AFTER 
VPLP 
N= III 
4.11 
3.86 
3.69 
365 
3.63 
3.63 
3.61 
3.60 
3.58 
3.53 
3.52 
3.52 
3.50 
3.50 
3.47 
3.47 
3.47 
3.41 
3.40 
3.35 
3.34 
3.33 
3.32 
3.54 
SD 
BEFOR 
EVPLP 
0.33 
0.29 
0.26 
0.39 
0.34 
0.39 
0.35 
0.32 
0.29 
0.23 
0.38 • 
on 
0.32 
0.37 
0.45 
0.33 
0.44 
0.21 
0.27 
0.29 
0.23 
0.19 
0.48 
0.32 
AFTER 
VPLP 
0.24 
0.25 
0.24 
0.33 
0.36 
0.26 
0 19 
0.21 
0.28 
0.14 
0.43 
0.19 
0.31 
0.28 
0.54 
0.23 
0.43 
0.29 
0.21 
0.41 
0.28 
0.27 
0.43 
0.30 
DF 
220 
220 
220 
220 
220 
220 
220 
220 
220 
220 
220 
220 
220 
220 
220 
220 
220 
220 
220 
220 
220 
220 
220 
220 
T 
VALUE 
20.65 •* 
10.45** 
089 
4.94 ** 
3.40 ** 
4.49 *• 
5.55 •• 
9.35 *• 
1.04 
9.78 *• 
3.12 ** 
5.27 ** 
2,36* 
5.67 ** 
7.04 ** 
4.45 ** 
2.05* 
15.88** 
1.84 
2.09* 
2.03 * 
2.23 ** 
3.43 ** 
1.68 
* Significance at 0.05 (p<0.05), ** Significance at 0.01 (p <0.01) 
The data suggested insignificant difference in the disposition of employees post VPLP 
among this group of employees (before M = 3.47, after M = 3.54, t = 1.68, p >0.05). 
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Nevertheless, these employees with 3-5 years of experience reported some positive 
impact of VPLP on their performance. They reported increased level of interest (before M 
= 3.31, after M = 4.11, t = 20.65, p <0.01), better goal clarity (before M = 3.48, after M = 
3.86, t = 10.45, p <0.0I). They reported improvement in their abilities to meet 
timelines/deadlines post launch of VPLP (before M = 3.26, after M = 3.60, t = 9.35, p 
<0.0I). They became more self dependent after they experience variable pay for more 
than a year in their company (before M = 3.28, after M = 3.53, t - 9.78, p <0.0I). 
However it was evident that they too felt that lack of fair feedback was impacting 
negatively on their performance (before M - 3.94, after M = 3.47, t = 7.04, p <0.01) and 
majority of them were not satisfied with their last appraisal (before M = 3.59, after M = 
3.47, t = 2.05, p <0.05). They were of opinion that their work life was compromised post 
introduction of variable pay (before M = 3.95, after M = 3.41, t = 15.86, p <0.01). 
Cooperation and camaraderie among team members was also hit post they came under 
variable pay (before M = 3.53, after M = 3.32, t = 3.43, p <0.01) 
This indicates that in order to have better acceptance of variable pay, there is a need to 
ensure timely and fair feedback on performance. Companies need to address work life 
balance measures to make VPLP successful. 
4.2.10. Variable Pay - Impact on performance (5+ Years of Work Experience) 
The mean, SD, DF and test of significance between before and after implementation of VPLP in 
respect to employees with 5+ years of experience is presented in Table 4.19. The data suggested 
significance differences in perception of this group of employees before and after implementation 
of variable pay (before M = 3.39, after M = 3.66, t = 4.93, p <0.01). 
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Table 4.19 - Impact of VPLP on Employee Performance (5+ Years of Work 
Experience) 
Performance Indicators/ Contributors 
(In the order of Descending Mean Score After 
implementation of VPLP) 
Your understanding of Performance Management 
System 
Goal Clarity 
Functional Competencies 
Ability to meet deadlines/ timelines 
General Environment 
Level of interest at work 
Confidence & faith in variable performance 
linked pay schemes 
Fair Feedback on Performance 
Overall output of work 
Reward/bonus for a positive outcome of results 
Frequency of individual performance evaluation 
Level of motivation towards achieving results 
Level of control on your own work 
Desire to learn to perform 
Quality of work 
Positive competitive spirit 
Level of motivation of your friends and 
colleagues 
Trust between management and employees 
Earnings and monetary returns 
Co-operation and camaraderie among employees 
Satisfaction with Last Pay Appraisals 
Work life balance 
Self Dependence at work 
All Statements Combined 
MEAN 
Before After 
N = 9I N = 9I 
3.49 
3.69 
3 35 
3.20 
3.35 
3.41 
3.22 
3.25 
3.43 
3.47 
3,10 
3.56 
3.25 
3.6i 
3.43 
3.37 
3.34 
3.61 
3.29 
3.41 
3.19 
3.51 
3.43 
3.39 
4.13 
3.93 
390 
3.90 
3.8! 
3.79 
3.78 
3,78 
3.77 
3,77 
3,71 
3.65 
3.59 
3,58 
3,57 
3,55 
3,52 
3,52 
3.47 
3.46 
3.39 
3.34 
3.19 
3.66 
SD 
Before After 
0.17 
0.21 
0 31 
0.29 
0.18 
0.29 
0.37 
0.38 
0.25 
0.26 
0.17 
0.28 
0.21 
0.26 
0.37 
0.32 
0.34 
0.28 
0.32 
0.43 
0.25 
0.28 
0.15 
0.28 
0.48 
0.66 
0.48 
0.48 
0.27 
0.47 
0.41 
0,51 
0,27 
0,44 
0,43 
0,49 
056 
0,20 
0.42 
0.29 
0.28 
0.50 
0.46 
0.54 
0.26 
0.43 
0.90 
0.44 
DF 
180 
180 
180 
180 
180 
180 
180 
180 
180 
180 
180 
ISO 
ISO 
180 
ISO 
ISO 
180 
180 
180 
180 
ISO 
180 
ISO 
180 
T 
VALUE 
n.98 ** 
3.30 ** 
9.18 •* 
11.90 *• 
13.52 *» 
6.56 ** 
9.67 ** 
0.94 
8.81 ** 
5.59 ** 
12.58 *• 
1.51 
5,42 ** 
0.87 
2.38* 
3 97+* 
3.89* 
1.49 
3.06 ** 
0.69 
5.28** 
3.16** 
2.50* 
4.93 ** 
* Significance at 0.05 (p<0.05), ** Significance at 0.01 (p <0.0l) 
The employees reported better understanding of performance management system as a 
result of VPLP (before M = 3.49, after M = 4.13, t = 11.98, p <0.01). Their abilities to 
meet deadlines/ timelines improved after they came under variable pay (before M - 3.20, 
after M = 3.90, t - 11.90, p <0.01). Their confidence and faith in variable pay schemes 
also got enhanced after they experienced it for more than a year (before M = 3.22, after M 
= 3.78, t = 9.67, p <0.01). They also reported an improved output in their work after 
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implementation of variable performance linked pay scheme (before M = 3.43, after M = 
3.77, t = 8.81, p<0.01). 
On the other hand, they had a few concerns such as the imbalance in work and life 
(before M = 3.51, after M = 3.34, t = 3.16, p <0.01). The employees reported that they 
were no more self-dependent post implementation of VPLP (before M = 3.43, after M = 
3.19, t = 2.50, p <0.05). There was no significant change in their desire to learn to 
perform. 
It seems that with age and experience, employee starts understanding the ground realities 
of life. Variable pay is one of them. There is no way the companies can continue paying 
without measuring the actual performance. Therefore the senior employees appeared 
more supportive of the same. They had few complaints too, which were more related to 
the work life balance and lack of self dependency post launch of VPLP. So the data 
indicates that even those who are fully supportive of variable pay find that their work life 
balance is significantly imbalanced post they came under variable pay schemes. Another 
key concern is that they find that their work is not fully self-dependent. 
4.2.11, Analysis of Variance (post implementation of VPLP) 
The results from the one-way ANOVA test are presented in Table 4.20. The results 
indicated that there were significant differences among the responses of employees from 
companies having their parental base in 4 different countries post implementafion of the 
scheme (F-30.535, df=299, p<0.01). 
Table 4.20. - ANOVA among and within different countries of origin 
Source 
Among Countries 
Within Countries 
Total 
Sum of 
Squares 
9.896 
31.975 
41.871 
Df 
3 
296 
299 
Mean Squares 
3.299 
0.108 
F 
30.535** 
'^ P<0.05, **P<0.01 
Table 4.21. - ANOVA between Nature of Job and Country of Origin 
Source 
COUNTRY OF ORIGIN (P) 
NATURE OF JOB (B) 
P * B 
Error 
Total 
Sum of 
Squares 
9.719 
0.938 
10.834 
31.037 
41.871 
Df 
3 
1 
4 
295 
299 
Mean Square 
3.24 
0.938 
2.708 
0.105 
0.14 
F 
30.535** 
8.920** 
25.744** 
**P<0.01 
The relationship between countries and nature of job is given in Table 4.21. The 
responses of employees indicated that there was a significant difference between the 
responses of both blue and white collared employees in the 4 different countries ('F' = 
30.535, P< 0.01). The results suggested that there were significant differences between 
blue and white collared employees in the 4 different countries. 
Table 4.22. - ANOVA between Country of origin and Length of Service 
Source 
Parental Base 
No. of Years (Under VPLP 
Scheme) 
P*N 
Error 
Total 
Sum of 
Squares 
10.174 
1.667 
11.562 
30.309 
41.871 
df 
3 
1 
4 
295 
299 
Mean Square 
3.391 
1.667 
2.891 
0.103 
0.14 
F 
33.009** 
16.223** 
28.135** 
**P<0.01 
The relationship between countries and number of years under VPLP schemes is given in 
Table 4.22. The results from the table suggested that there were significant differences 
between employees with varied work experience under the VPLP schemes in 4 different 
countries ('F' = 28.135, df = 299, P< O.OI). 
4.2.12. Test of Correlation amongst factors indicating employee performance 
The results clearly indicated that by "payment of reward/ bonus for a positive outcome of 
results" had strong relationship with "employees' desire to perform (r = 0.67**, Table 
4.23) and their ability to meet timelines (r = 0.59**, Table 4.23). 
Tables 4.23 to 4.26 - Analysis of relationships among factors indicating employee 
performance (Based on Post Implementation Experience) 
Table 4.23. "Reward/bonus for a positive outcome of results" 
"Desire to learn to perform" 
"Ability to meet deadlines/ timelines" 
"Level of interest" at work 
"Level of motivation towards achieving results" 
"Confidence & faith" in variable performance linked pay schemes 
"Positive competitive spirit" 
"Trust between management and employees" 
Table 4.24. "Confidence & faith" in variable performance 
linked pay schemes 
"Co-operation and camaraderie" among employees 
"Earnings and monetary returns" 
Table 4.25. "Frequency of individual performance evaluation" 
"Level of interest" at work 
"Level of motivation towards achieving results" 
"Level of motivation of your friends and colleagues" 
Table 4.26. "Goal Clarity" / Clarity of career objectives" 
Understanding of "performance management system" 
"Confidence & faith" in variable performance linked pay schemes 
"Satisfaction with "Last Pay Appraisal" 
"Level of interest" at work 
"Desire to learn to perform" 
"Ability to meet deadlines/ timelines" 
Correlation 
'r' value 
0.67 ** 
0.59 ** 
0.79 ** 
0.54 ** 
0.57 ** 
0.71 ** 
0.64 ** 
'r' 
-0.39 ** 
0.04 
'r' 
0.67 ** 
0.71 ** 
0.59* 
'r' 
0.45* 
0.52 ** 
0.56 ** 
0.62 ** 
0.68 ** 
0.72 ** 
** P<0.01, * P < 0.05 
VPLP enhanced employees' level of interest in their work and motivated them towards 
achieving results (r = 0.79**, r = 0.54**) respectively. Effective management of reward 
mechanism helped employees develop confidence and trust in performance linked 
schemes and it promoted the positive spirit within the organization (r = 0.71 **). By 
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recognizing employee's efforts, the employees perceived more trust in the "performance 
management system" in their respective organization (r = 0.89**) 
It may be interpreted that by recognizing employee's immediate success by rewarding 
them for their efforts, the organization may win their trust in respect to variable pay 
schemes. Another interpretation of the result is that the culture of reward and recognition 
could lead to "better employee performance". 
4.2.12.1. Goal Clarity / Clarity of career objectives 
The results of this study indicate that to create an environment, where people may have 
confidence and trust on performance linked schemes, employees need to know clearly 
what is expected of them (r = 0.52**). There should be clarity of role, responsibilities and 
key objectives defined in order to appreciate any such schemes. Further the researcher 
interpreted from the results that "level of interest" among employees also increased, if 
they were clearly aware of their expectations (r = 0.62**). 
4.2.12.2. Frequency oflndividual performance evaluation 
The results of the study indicated that there was a high positive correlation among 
frequency of individual performance evaluation and their level of interest (r = 0.67*), 
level of motivation towards achieving results (r = 0.71**). It meant that in order to 
enhance the employee performance; companies need to improve their feedback 
mechanism by timely evaluating performance of individuals and sharing results with 
them. Companies that carries out an annual appraisal only may have difficulties 
implemenfing variable pay schemes. 
4.2.12.3. Variable Pay & Camaraderie among employees 
The results indicated that there was a significant negative correlation between 
"confidence & faith in VPLP schemes" among employees and their "co-operation and 
camaraderie" (r = -0.39**). The findings demonstrate that variable pay schemes do not 
promote "teamwork" and "cooperation" among employees. This may be tal<en as a 
downside of variable pay schemes. 
4.2.12.4. Variable Pay & Employees Earnings 
The results indicated that there was no significant correlation between "employees who 
had faith and confidence" in variable pay schemes" and "their improved earnings and 
monetary returns" (r = 0.04). This means that variable pay schemes may not necessarily 
lead high earnings or monetary returns. 
• Variable Pay and Employee Satisfaction, Motivation and Trust 
This study found that in spite of perceived positive impact on performance, employee's 
satisfaction and trust with such schemes was quite low. Post implementation of variable 
pay schemes, the employee motivation was found low. Employees were not inclined to 
recommend such schemes to their best friends that clearly indicated their lack of trust. 
Recommendation of a product or service is widely considered as a symbol of trust and 
loyalty. Even ardent supporters of variable pay schemes from UK driven companies, who 
were most satisfied with variable pay experience, still decided not to recommend 
wholeheartedly the same scheme to their best friends. One can clearly make out from the 
findings that even the best-managed companies are still trying to perfect their systems to 
incorporate variable pay schemes. 
There appears to be lack of overall satisfaction with variable pay experience among 
employees. There is a visible lack of trust among employees regarding such schemes. 
This indicates that either these schemes are not effectively implemented or employees are 
still doubtful about management objectives of linking pay to performance. It hints at lack 
of communication between employers and employees regarding these schemes. 
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The study finds support from the work done by Kohn (1993) who identified six reasons 
for the failure of incentive systems. He found that incentives succeed in obtaining 
temporary compliance, but fail in creating an enduring commitment to any value or 
action. He claimed that "there is no firm basis for the assumption that more pay 
encourages people to do better work, or in the long run, to do more work". Withholding 
incentives from those who had hoped to receive them is indistinguishable from being 
punished. The more desirable the incentive, the more demoralizing the effect when it is 
withheld. Linking pay to performance ignores the reasons for problems and the possible 
causes of improvement. Such systems require less effort on the part of management, but 
are poor substitutes for good management and even impedes the ability of managers to 
manage. These schemes motivate people to get higher pay, but the emphasis is on the pay 
rather than the work to be done. 
Similar views were echoed in Deci (1971) Self-Determination Theory. The theory 
suggests that extrinsic rewards such as monetary payments can undermine people's 
intrinsic motivation for the rewarded activity. This finding was the first evidence that 
desired outcomes such as rewards can have the unintended consequence of decreasing 
intrinsic motivation because they limit people's sense of self-determination-that is, 
because people come to feel controlled by the rewards. 
Another researcher Sara (2004) in her research on the importance of pay in employee 
motivation contended that majority of human resources professionals appear to believe 
that employees are likely to over report the importance of pay in employee surveys. 
However her research suggests the opposite. She reviewed evidence showing the 
discrepancies between what people say and do with respect to pay. She noted that pay is 
not equally important in all situations or to all individuals. Another research done by 
W.D. McCausland et al (2005) who conducted a study of the impact of performance pay 
on job satisfaction to investigate whether significant differences exist in job satisfaction 
(JS) between individuals receiving performance-related pay (PRP) and those on 
alternative compensation plans. They also found that while the predicted JS of workers 
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receiving PRP is lower on average compared to those on other pay schemes, PRP exerts a 
positive effect on the mean JS of (very) high-paid workers. 
To buttress our findings we reviewed more studies and found that Trevor et al, (2003) 
also reported that the presence of Long term incentive plans is actually associated with 
reductions in the sensitivity of executives' total rewards to shareholder return. This raises 
doubts concerning both the effectiveness of the LTIP instrument and the validity of an 
agency perspective in this context. 
However the present study did not support the research done by Robert (2006). in his 
study on the relationship between pay-for-performance perceptions and pay satisfaction, 
he found a positive relationship between pay-for-performance perceptions and pay-raise 
satisfaction, pay-level satisfaction, and overall pay satisfaction even after the effects of 
salary level, salary increases, performance ratings, job tenure, job satisfaction, and 
promotions were controlled. 
• VPLP and Camaraderie among co-workers 
The present study also reported that that variable pay had negative correlation with 
cooperation and camaraderie among co-workers. It suggested that VPLP and Teamwork 
may not go together. To some extent it is evident because no one would like to "wait" for 
others to "perform" so that they are suitably rewarded. It is a concern for companies and 
they need to do extra efforts to maintain harmony in the organization. They need to 
prioritize between teamwork and variable pay. It may make the organization competitive, 
however may not be healthy in the long run. Kohn (1993) also noted that rewards 
destroy cooperation. It forces people to compete for rewards. They often see each other as 
obstacles to their own success. VPLP, at times, encourage people to manipulate the 
numbers and even engage in unethical and illegal behavior. People who do exceptional 
work do it because they love what they do. Extrinsic motivators are poor substitutes for 
intrinsic motivation, i.e., for promoting a genuine interest in one's work. Incentives cause 
people to feel negatively about the work they are being assigned to do. On the similar 
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lines, Curtis and Susan (2005) in their study on incentive pay found that executives 
generally receive incentive pay based on accounting metrics reported by the executives 
themselves and not otherwise directly observable. They recorded higher cases of fraud 
post implementation of variable pay. Erickson et al (2005) also found that the probability 
of accounting fraud increased when executive compensation was variable, linked to 
financial performance of the organization. There were cases of conflicts and lack of 
cooperation among teams. 
• Variable Pay and Employee Retention 
The present study reported that variable pay schemes did not motivate employees to stay 
longer with the organization. Our findings corroborated the research done by Filipczak 
(1996) and Kohn (1993) who found that the Employees worth retaining do not truly 
believe that Variable Performance Linked Pay Programmes motivate them especially 
when it is seen as the sole motivating factor. In fact organizations can retain employees 
by giving them an opportunity to have their input in design of their jobs. They also need 
to respect them and allow them to do good job. 
• Making a good Variable Pay Scheme/ Employee Participation 
By collating various findings together, it may be inferred that "Variable Pay" is a good 
concept in principle. However, it is yet to be appreciated by both employee and the 
employer. The motive of introducing such scheme is not fully clear to both parties. 
Therefore, there is a lack of trust. This research shows that there is a strong correlation 
between employees "Knowledge and understanding of career objectives" and "Desire to 
learn to perform". If the employee has better understanding of his/her key expectations, 
the level of trust and performance will be higher. Frequency of performance evaluation 
can also lead to higher employee engagement and higher level of interest in work. 
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Managing variable pay systems is a contentious and challenging aspect of human 
resource management. Contingency theory approaches have dominated the thinking 
during past few decades. The companies need to move away from a fixation with 'best 
practice' to a focus on 'best process' as a lens through which to investigate the design, 
implementation and management of pay systems by involving employees at the inception 
stage, (Annette, 2000). The Performance-related pay is more prevalent in firms where 
workers of the main occupation have a high degree of autonomy in how to organise their 
work. Performance pay is also more widespread in large firms, but is less common in 
highly unionized firms and in firms where wages are determined through centralized 
bargaining. Involvement of workers make the implementation of PRP easier (Eriing et al, 
2008). The understanding of the pay plan, belief in the pay plan effectiveness, and 
organizational commitment were related to perceptions of procedural justice. Moreover, 
pay satisfaction, under-standing, belief in the pay plan effectiveness, and organizational 
commitment were associated with perceptions of distributive justice (James and Joseph, 
1998). 
Successful Variable Performance Linked Pay programmes programs are established on 
sound HR practices. As a part of this comprehensive, well-rounded HR program, a 
Variable Performance Linked Pay program can play a significant role in motivating 
employees to achieve organizational goals. The underlying assumption of Variable 
Performance Linked Pay programmes is to induce those behaviors and performance that 
are deemed supportive of strategic goals. It is crucial that these people who are working 
under such a pay system are fully responsible and capable of managing their performance 
requirements. 
Goal-setting theory asserts that specific and difficult goals will lead to a higher level of 
performance than vague, non-quantitative goals such as "do the best you can" or the 
absence of assigned goals. Locke believes that if people work to achieve goals then they 
will work harder to achieve more difficult goals (Lee and Locke, 1997). The success of a 
VPLP scheme does not lie solely with employee involvement in the initial stages, or 
indeed even with a particular set of procedures designed to administer such schemes. 
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According to Beer et ai. (1984), 'the motivational and satisfaction value of a reward 
system is a function of the perceived equity of the reward system'. Hammer (1975) 
also pointed out that the "more frequent the formal and informal reviews of performance 
and the more the individual is told about the reasons for an increase, the greater his 
preference for a merit increase system and the lower his preference for a seniority 
system.' Frequent reviews, coupled with the opportunity to air grievances through a 
formal appeals process, may therefore eliminate many of the difficulties associated with 
employees' perceptions of unfairness. 
4.2.13. KEY FINDINGS FROM THIS SECTION 
KEY BEENFITS OF VARIABLE PAY 
• Variable pay inspires an employee's desire to learn in order to perform better 
(Table 4.10 to 4.19) 
• Variable Pay helps employees have better "Goal Clarity" (Table 4.10 to 4.19) 
• Variable pay enables individuals have better "level of control" on their own work 
(Table 4.10 to 4.19) 
• "Better frequency of performance evaluation" leads to "improved performance" 
(Tables 4.23 to 4.26) 
• Variable pay enhances the employee's "ability to meet deadlines/ timelines" 
(Table 4.10 to 4.19) 
KEY CONCERN AREAS OF VARIABLE PAY 
• Limited confidence and faith among employees with respect to variable pay 
concept (Tables 4.10 to 4.19) 
• Variable pay leads to loss of "Work Life Balance". This is experienced even by 
ardent supporters of variable pay (Tables 4.10 to 4.19) 
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Variable pay negatively impacts the "cooperation and camaraderie" among 
employees (Table 4.10 to 4.19). 
Trust between "management and employees" is jeopardized post launch of 
variable pay (Table 4.10 to 4.19) 
in a long run variable pay leads to "decline in motivation" of team force (Table 
4.10-4.19) 
Variable pay has no significant impact on employee's earnings and monetary 
benefits (Table 4.10 to 4.19) 
(SECTION 3) 
4.3. Employee Satisfaction with Performance Management System 
Pre and Post Implementation of Variable Pay 
It may be noted that one fourth of the statements responded to by respondents in the 
questionnaire were in related to "performance management system". We therefore 
attempted to explore relationship between employee performance and their satisfaction 
with "performance management system" before and after implementation of variable pay 
schemes. Statements that were directly related to "Performance Measurement" (Table 
4.27) have been analyzed separately to get an insightful picture on this issue. 
Table 4.27. - Factors measuring effectiveness of performance management system 
post implementation of VPLP 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
"Fair Feedback on Performance" 
"Reward/bonus for a positive outcome of results" 
"Satisfaction with "Last Pay Appraisals" 
"Frequency of individual performance evaluation" 
"Understanding of Performance Management System" 
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4.3.1. Satisfaction with PMS (Pre and Post Implementation of VPLP, Overall) 
The mean, standard deviation and 'Z' value of employee responses, botii before and after 
implementation of the scheme with regard to the impact of the scheme on the overall 
performance management system are given in Table 4.28. The responses indicated no 
significant differences regarding the opinion of respondents towards performance 
management systems pre and post implementation of the scheme (Z= -1.572, p>0.01). 
Table 4.28. - Satisfaction with Performance Management System 
Pre & Post implementation of VPLP (overall) 
Particulars 
Post- Implementation 
Pre-lmplementation 
Mean 
3.31 
3.32 
SD 
0.477 
0.47 
'Z' value 
-1.572 
4.3.2. Satisfaction with PMS post implementation of VPLP, As per Country of 
Origin) 
The results from the one-way ANOVA test are presented in Table 4.30. The results from 
the analysis indicated that there were significant differences among the responses of 
employees from companies having their parental base in 4 different countries post 
implementation of the scheme (F=18.398, df=299, p<0.01). The mean, standard deviation 
and 'Z' value of the responses of employees from companies having their parental base in 
4 different countries namely, USA, UK, Japan and Korea are given in Table 4.29. The 
results from the table suggested that employees of the companies having their parental 
base in USA felt that their performance management systems improved post 
implementation of the VPLP scheme in their organizations ('Z' = 1.799, P<0.05). The 
post implementation of the scheme mean response value of employees from companies 
having their parental base in USA (M = 3.56) was significantly higher than the mean 
responses value before implementation of the scheme (M=3.38), which suggested that on 
an average employees from USA based companies felt that their performance 
management systems improved significantly due to these schemes. 
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Table 4.29. - Country wise satisfaction with PMS pre and post VPLP 
Country origin 
USA 
UK 
Japan 
Korea 
Mean (Pre VPLP) 
3.38 
3.17 
3.5 
3.25 
Mean (Post VPLP) 
3.56 
3.29 
3.06 
3.33 
SD 
0.3901 
0.44149 
0.47 
0.458 
'Z' value 
1.799* 
1.1177 
-3.579** 
0.719 
**P<0.0I,*P<0.05 
Table 4.30. - ANOVA (Between and Within Groups, Post VPLP Implementation) 
Source 
Between Countries 
Within Countries 
Total 
Sum of Squares 
10.698 
57.372 
68.07 
df 
3 
296 
299 
Mean Square 
3.566 
0.194 
F 
18.398** 
*P<0.05, **P<0.01 
The responses of employees from companies having their parental base in Japan indicated 
that post implementation of the scheme the performance management systems in their 
organizations declined significantly ('Z' = - 3.579, P<0.01). The responses of employees 
indicated that post implementation of the scheme, management in these organizations had 
not been able to properly utilize these systems to a good effect as the decline in 
performance management systems led to a significant decline in overall performance too 
in the organizations as is evident from Table 4.29. The mean response value post 
implementation of the scheme for Japan-based organizations employees (M= 3.06) was 
significantly lower than the mean response value prior to the implementation of the 
scheme (M=3.5) which suggested that on an average employees from Japan-based 
companies felt that there had been a significant decline in there performance due to these 
schemes. 
The responses of employees from companies having their parental base in UK indicated 
that there had not been any significant differences in the performance management 
systems in their organizations post implementation of the scheme ('Z' =1.177, P>O.OI). 
The mean response value of employees post implementation of the scheme (M= 3.29) 
was statistically similar to the mean response value prior to the implementation of the 
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scheme (M=3.i7) which suggested that on an average employees from these firms 
believed that these schemes had no impact on the performance management systems in 
these organizations. 
The responses of employees from companies having their parental base in Korea 
indicated that there were no significant differences in there performance management 
systems post implementation of the schemes ('Z' =0,77179, P>0.01). The mean response 
value post implementation of the scheme (M = 3.33) was statistically almost same as the 
mean response prior to the implementation of the scheme (M=3.25) which suggested that 
on an average, employees from companies having their parental base in Korea felt that 
these schemes had no impact on the performance management systems of these 
organizations. 
The post implementation mean response value of USA based organizations employees 
was highest among all parental groups which suggested that on an average, employees 
from USA based companies felt that their performance management systems improved to 
the largest extent due to these schemes. 
4.3.3. Employees Satisfaction with PMS (Pre and Post Implementation of 
VPLP, As per Nature of Service) 
The results from the one-way ANOVA test are presented in Table 4.32. The results from 
analysis indicated that there were significant differences between the responses of both 
blue and white collared employees with regard to the impact of the scheme on their 
performance management system ('F'=8.387, df=299, P>0.01). The mean response value 
of white collared employees (M= 3.39, Table 4.31.) was significantly higher than the 
mean response value of blue collared employees, which suggested that white collared 
employees had higher performance management system scores than blue collared 
employees. 
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The mean, standard deviation and 'Z' value of blue and white collared employees 
comparing their pre and post implementation responses on the impact of the scheme on 
their performance management system is given in Table 4.31. 
Table 4.31. - Satisfaction with PMS as per "Nature of job" pre and post VPLP 
Particulars 
Blue Collared Employees 
White Collared Employees 
Post-Implementation 
Pre-implementation 
Post-Implementation 
Pre-impiementation 
Mean 
3.233 
3.3 
3.391 
3.44 
SD 
0.439 
0.5 
0.518 
0.407 
'Z' value 
-0.969 
-.0.651 
Table 4.32. ANOVA (Between and Within Groups, Post VPLP Implementation) 
Source 
Between Nature Of Job 
Within Nature Of Job 
Total 
Sum of Squares 
1.864 
66.22 
68.084 
df 
1 
298 
299 
Mean Square 
1.864 
0.222 
F 
8.387** 
**P<0.01 
The results from the Table 4.31 suggested that white collared employees felt that there 
had not been much impact on the performance management systems in their 
organizations ('Z' = -0.651, P>0.01). The post implementation mean response value (M 
=3.39) was almost same as the mean response value prior to the implementation of the 
scheme (M = 3.44), which suggested that on an average white collared employees felt 
that these schemes had no impact on the performance management systems in these 
organizations. 
The responses of blue collared employees indicated that they felt that these schemes had 
no impact on the performance management systems of there organizations ('Z' = -0.969). 
The post implementation mean response value (M =3.23) was almost same as the mean 
response value prior to the implementation of the scheme (M = 3.3), which suggested 
that on an average blue collared employees felt that these schemes had no impact on the 
performance management systems in these organizations. 
144 
4.3.4. Employees Satisfaction with PMS, As per Length of Service) 
The results from the one-way ANOVA test are presented in Table 4.34. The results from 
our analysis indicated that there were no significant differences between the responses of 
employees belonging to different groups with regard to the impact of the scheme on their 
overall performance management systems ('F'=0.531, df=299, P>0.01). The post-
implementation mean response value of employees with a work experience of less than 3 
years (M=3.33) was highest among the 3 groups, which suggested that employees with 
work experience of less than 3 years under the scheme had highest performance 
management system scores. 
Table 4.33. -Satisfaction with PMS as per "Length of Service" 
Particulars 
Less than 3 Years 
3-5 Years 
More than 5 years 
Mean (Pre VPLP) 
3.39 
3.28 
3.29 
Mean (Post VPLP) 
3.38 
3.27 
3.28 
SD 
0.472 
0.499 
0.478 
'Z' value 
-0.379 
-0.702 
-0.71 
Table 4.34. ANOVA (Between and Within Groups, Post VPLP Implementation) 
Source 
Between Groups 
Within Groups 
Total 
Sum of Squares 
0.242 
67.842 
68.084 
df 
2 
297 
299 
Mean Square 
0.121 
0.228 
F 
0.531 
The mean, standard deviation and 'Z' value of employees from different groups 
comparing their pre and post implementation responses on the impact of the scheme on 
their performance management systems is given in Table 4.33. The responses of 
employees with a work experience less than 3 years under the VPLP Scheme suggested 
that they felt that there had not been any improvement in their performance management 
systems due to the scheme ('Z' =-0.379, P>0.01). The post implementation mean 
response value of employees from group less than 3 years (M=3.38) was almost same as 
the mean response value before implementation of the scheme (M=3.39), which 
suggested that on an average the overall performance management systems for employees 
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with a work experience of less than 3 years under the VPLP Scheme had remained same 
even after implementation of the scheme. The responses of employees with a work 
experience 3-5 years under the VPLP Scheme suggested that they felt that there had not 
been any improvement in their performance management systems due to the scheme ('Z' 
= - 0.702, P>0.01). The post implementation mean response value of employees from 
group 3-5 years (M=3.27) was almost same as the mean response value before 
implementation of the scheme (M=3.28), which suggested that on an average the overall 
performance management systems for employees with a work experience of 3-5 years 
under the VPLP Scheme remained same even after implementation of the scheme. 
The responses of employees with a work experience more than 5 years under the VPLP 
Scheme suggested that they felt that there had not been any improvement in their 
performance management systems due to the scheme ('Z' = - 0.71, P>0.01). The post 
implementation mean response value of employees from group more than 5 years 
(M=3.28) was almost same as the mean response value before implementation of the 
scheme (M=3.29), which suggested that on an average the overall performance 
management systems for employees with a work experience of more than 5 years under 
the VPLP Scheme remained same even after implementation of the scheme. 
4.3.5. KEY FINDINGS FROM THIS SECTION 
• There was no significant difference in perception of respondents towards 
performance management system before and after implementation of variable pay 
(Table 4.28 to 4.34) 
• Employees in Japanese companies complained that efficacy of PMS declined post 
launch ofVPLP (Table 4.29) 
• Employees in US companies were more supportive of their PMS post 
implementation of VPLP (Table 4.29) 
In the next section we present summarized findings with respect to hypotheses framed for 
this study. 
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4.4. 
No. 
Hni 
Ho2 
Ho3 
Ho4 
Hos 
Ho6 
Ho7 
Ho8 
Ho9 
Hoio 
Hon 
H012 
Review of Hypotheses 
Hypotheses 
Variable pay has no relationship with individual perceived 
performance 
Variable pay has no relationship with employee satisfaction 
Variable pay does not lead to employee retention in an 
organization 
Variable pay has no association with market strength of the 
organization 
Significant differences do not exist in perception of employees 
with varied length of service, towards variable pay programs 
Significant differences do not exist in perception of "Blue and 
White Collared" employees, towards variable pay programs 
Significant differences do not exist in perception of employees 
"before and after" implementation of variable pay programs 
Significant differences do not exist in perception of employees 
with varied cultural backgrounds, towards variable pay 
programs 
Variable pay does not lead towards improved employee 
earnings 
Variable pay has no relationship with camaraderie and 
teamwork among employees 
Variable pay has no relationship with performance evaluation 
of individuals 
Significant differences do not exist in satisfaction of employees 
with performance management systems "pre and post" 
implementation of variable pay programs 
Results 
Not Accepted 
Not Accepted 
Accepted 
Not Accepted 
Not Accepted 
Not Accepted 
Not Accepted 
Not Accepted 
Accepted 
Not Accepted 
Not Accepted 
Accepted 
In the next chapter, we shall present conclusions of our key findings and will recommend 
measures to make best use of variable pay programs. 
147 
CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSIONS & RECOMMENDATIONS 
5.1. Highlights 
5.2. Variable Pay and Employee Satisfaction 
5.3. Variable Pay and Employee Performance 
5.4. Variable Pay and Culture 
5.5. Variable Pay and Nature of Job 
5.6. Downside of Variable Pay 
5.7. Making a successful Variable Pay Program 
5.8. Scope for Future Research 
148 
CHAPTER 5 - CONCLUSIONS «& RECOMMENDATIONS 
5.1. Highlights 
In this section, we present summarized findings of the study stating the key conclusions. 
Overall findings have been grouped into five broad categories namely; 
• Variable Pay and Employee Satisfaction 
• Variable Pay and Employee Performance 
• Variable Pay and Culture 
• Variable Pay and Nature of Job 
• Downside of Variable Pay 
5.1.1. Variable Pay and Employee Satisfaction 
• Variable pay has 'no' to 'insignificant' impact on employee satisfaction. 
• Employees with limited work experience are more dissatisfied with their variable 
pay experience in comparison to senior employees. 
5.1.2. Variable Pay and Employee Performance 
Variable pay has a positive impact on an individual performance. 
Variable pay inspires an employee's desire to learn in order to perform better. 
Variable Pay helps employees have greater "Goal Clarity". 
Variable pay enables individuals have better "level of control" on their work. 
Frequency of performance evaluation leads to "improved performance". 
Variable pay enhances the employee's "ability to meet deadlines/ timelines" 
149 
5.1.3. Variable Pay and Culture 
• UK's parental culture may be considered as best suited for success of variable pay 
programs and satisfaction of employees with it. 
• Japanese parental culture is least amenable to success and satisfaction with 
variable pay experience. 
• Employees in companies with Japanese origin complained that their PMS 
declined post launch of VPLP. 
• Employees in US companies were more supportive of their PMS post 
implementation of VPLP. 
5.1.4. Variable Pay and Nature of Job 
• Variable pay programs have been rated favorably by White collared employees in 
comparison to blue collared employees. This is contrary to popular notion that 
VPLP programmes are apt for blue collared workers. 
5.1.5. Downside of Variable Pay 
• Variable pay schemes are yet to win confidence and trust of employees who still 
prefer not to recommend it to their best friends. 
• Variable Pay scheme do not ensure retention of employees. It has a negative 
impact on employee retention and motivation 
• Variable pay leads to loss of "Work Life Balance". This is experienced even by 
the ardent supporters of variable pay. 
• Variable pay negatively impacts the "cooperation and camaraderie" among 
employees. 
• Trust between "management and employees" is compromised post launch of 
variable pay. 
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• In a long run variable pay leads to "decline in motivation" especially with respect 
to team spirit. 
• Variable pay has no significant impact on employee's earnings and monetary 
benefits. 
• No significant difference was noted with respect to employees' perception 
towards performance management system before and after implementation of 
variable pay. 
5.2. Variable Pay and Employee Satisfaction 
Findings of the research indicate that variable pay does not ensure employee satisfaction. 
Out of six major constructs of employee satisfaction, it has negative relationship with 
three of them namely motivation, retention and recommendation (Table 4.5). Moreover 
employees with limited years of experience are less satisfied with their variable pay 
experience in comparison to those who have spent more years in the corporate world 
(Table 4.9). Employees who are working in organizations with UK's origin are 
comparatively more satisfied with variable pay followed by US, Korea and Japan (Table 
4.7). The blue collared employees seem to be more dissatisfied with variable in 
comparison to white collared (Table 4.8). 
On the basis of the above findings, it may be concluded that design of variable pay is the 
key to overall success of variable pay plan. While designing, the management may 
address the requirements of different category of employees. Unique strategy of 
implementation may be required for different group of employees. It has been reported 
that blue collared employees witnessed a decline in understanding of performance 
management system after launch of variable pay (Table 4.15). It is evident that they had 
poor understanding of the entire plan (Table 4.15). It means that less educated employees 
could not understand the nitty gritty of the overall VPLP plan, that led to lack of 
satisfaction and overall skepticism for such programs. Therefore we may say that to make 
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a successful variable pay programs, an effective communication plan needs to be 
designed (Britton, 1997). The communication plan is a link between business issues 
critical to success and specific incentives (Anfuso, 1995). Also the variable pay program 
may not employ a standard approach for employees of different experience bands. There 
should be different approach for young and less experienced employees. With little 
exposure of the real corporate world, they need more time to appreciate and understand 
the importance of linking pay to performance. In a nutshell, the employers need to spend 
more time in the designing process rather than enforcing. All level of employees need 
clarity on their career objective, it is evident from this research that there is strong 
correlation between employees knowledge about their career objectives and their level of 
interest at work (Table 4.24). Their confidence and faith in VPLP is also strongly 
correlated with their knowledge of career objectives (Table 4.24). Variable Pay plan 
should be transparent. How does it work, how much have they achieved against their set 
objectives, should be made clear to the employees. Most criticisms of variable pay can be 
traced to concerns about the nature, implementation, and execution of such programs 
rather than the theories upon which they are based. Researchers such as Hill (1993) and 
Hudson (2005) have also have highlighted the importance of designing an appropriate 
variable pay plan for different level of employees in order to be successful in the long 
run. The management should combine these incentive schemes with giving employees an 
opportunity to have input into their jobs, respecting employees and allowing them to do a 
good job. (Filipczak, 1996). As far as difference in opinion of employees working with 
varied country of origin, it is primarily to do with the management policies. This research 
indicates that the "individual" approach is more suitable than "group approach" for better 
employee satisfaction towards VPLP. UK based companies follow the former pattern of 
management and Japanese based companies follow the latter. Therefore the result is also 
not very surprising. This has been elaborated in section on performance and culture as 
well. 
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5.3. Variable Pay and Employee Performance 
Variable pay has a positive impact on an individual performance. Variable pay inspires 
employee's desire to learn in order to perform better. It enhances the employees' ability 
to meet deadlines/ timelines, thus benefiting the organization as well, it helps individuals 
have better "Goal Clarity" and better level of control on their own work. With increased 
frequency of performance evaluation the management may achieve improved employee 
performance (Table 4.10). 
On the basis of the above findings, it may be stated that variable pay as a concept is good 
for individuals as well as the organization, if effectively designed and implemented. As 
discussed in the previous section that design of variable pay is the key, we reiterate the 
same here. Companies need to design their variable pay plan in such a manner where 
greater emphasis is given on Individual performance. The variable pay plan should be 
such that it makes the person more independent than inter-dependent. Our 
recommendation is supported by Kristine and Mark (2003) who in their research reported 
that the variable pay programs that truly reward individual performance are more 
beneficial to the organization. The researcher further recommends that the variable pay 
plan should be used more like a "goal setting" exercise, where the organization strategy is 
linked towards the compensation strategy. On the same lines Kathryn (1993) also states 
that a performance oriented compensation strategy can be highly effective if it is aligned 
with the organization's structure, work culture, and goals. The purpose of a good variable 
pay program should be "to make the company stronger, more competitive. Using the 
benefit of this research, the researcher recommends that with "fair feedback on 
performance" (Table 4.10) and increasing the frequency of performance evaluation, an 
enhanced employee performance can be achieved by the management. This study has 
further explored that variable pay enhances employees' desire to learn to perform (Table 
4.10). The management should plan more training programs for their employees along 
with launch of variable pay plan, especially when an employee is supposed to deliver 
beyond his normal duties. It may be assumed that variable pay charges an employee. It is 
in the hands of the management to optimize the high level of engagement for the benefit 
of the organization. 
5.4. Variable Pay and Culture 
Variable pay has a positive impact on an individual performance, particularly in 
companies with UK and US origins (Table 4.4, Table 4.10, Table 4.11 and Table 4.12). In 
contrast, employees having companies with Japanese origin saw decline in their 
performance. Therefore it would be meaningful to note that the culture, management 
practices and approach towards variable pay has a significant impact on its overall 
success in an organization. Former companies are focused on "individual performance" 
and latter are more oriented towards "team performance". Therefore, the researcher 
recommends that employers who wish to have successful variable pay plan need to 
reward "individual contributions" and where performance is "Independent" and not 
"inter-dependent". The researcher's understanding from this finding is that "every 
individual" likes to be treated as an "individual" first before associating with a particular 
team or group. There is a need to value the importance of one's individuality. Companies 
that understand this viewpoint design their variable pay plan in such manner that "High 
Individual Performance" of team members is also given special status. The UK's Culture 
has very strong feelings towards individualism and masculinity. The UK's culture places 
significant emphasis on individual decision making and performance-based rewards 
systems. Approach tends to be task driven rather than people driven. Results are 
considered more important than relationships. Both power distance and uncertainty 
avoidance are relatively low in the U.K. This objective is reflected in the emphasis given 
by Rankin (1988) for the introduction of individual Variable Performance Linked Pay: 
"Dynamic markets need dynamic organizations. Individual contributions in leaner, more 
goal orientated enterprises can be seen to have real importance". The significance of this 
particular objective is illustrated in circumstances where individual Variable Performance 
Linked Pay has been used as part of concerted attempt to change organizational culture 
(Kristine and Mark, 2003). 
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5.5. Variable Pay and Nature of Job 
The white collared employees were more satisfied with variable pay in comparison to 
blue collared employees (Table 4.8, Table 4.15 and Table 4.16). In contrast to the popular 
myth that "VPLP is more suitable to blue collared", the research findings pointed out that 
employees with intangible measures, such as white collared employees favour linking 
pay to performance. Therefore employers need to use variable pay as a performance 
measure for intangible functions. It will make more sense for people with management 
responsibilities. Shirom et al. (1999) in their study on blue-collar workers reported that 
the blue collared workers became risk averse and went through emotional distress when 
they found that their performance parameters were unclear. Therefore the researcher's 
observation is that the erstwhile intangible functions such as HR, Finance or so-called 
support systems are now given clear tangible/measurable tasks, which the today's white 
collared worker is really appreciating. To make variable pay widely successful across 
nature of jobs of employees, the employer must make a commitment to define business 
expectations in measurable terms. The employer should ensure that the program is 
integrated with the business strategy. This means making all possible goals achievable, 
quantifiable, tangible, profitable, and practical for both the company and its employees. 
Pay systems, regardless of whether they contain Variable Performance Linked Pay or 
merit pay only, will have difficulty affecting employee performance if there is little or no 
acceptance from employees with different nature of work (Lawler, 1990). Hence, clear 
and specific goals should be setup for all types of employees and the performance 
appraisal should be separate for blue and white collared employees so that the chances of 
performance discrimination are eliminated. 
5.6. Downside of Variable Pay 
The research indicates that the variable pay schemes have yet not been able to win 
confidence and trust of employees who still prefer not to recommend it to their best 
friends. Further, variable pay schemes do not ensure retention of employees. It has a 
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negative impact on employee retention and motivation. Trust between "management and 
employees" is compromised post launch of variable pay. In a long run variable pay leads 
to "decline in motivation" of team spirit. Variable pay negatively impacts the 
"cooperation and camaraderie" among employees. 
The very first section of the research findings confirmed that variable pay has no 
relationship with employee retention (Table 4.4). In fact employees who experienced 
variable pay for more than a year reported lack of motivation and negative influence of 
VPLP on their desire to stay with the company (Table 4.4.). These research findings 
suggest that the management should not rely solely on variable pay as a medium to retain 
people. Employers need to focus on other relevant measures for employee retention". The 
researcher's recommendation to the organizations, which are using variable pay as a 
retention tool, is to "reconsider their decision ". Many a times, the management feels that 
we have linked a high reward to a challenging target, so we need not to work on other 
areas of employee motivation and retention. Variable performance linked pay is of 
secondary importance as a managerial tool for improving employee retention 
(Kohn, 1993). Criteria such as "goal clarity", "fair feedback on performance", "increased 
frequency cf performance evaluation", belter understanding of performance management 
system" may bring back employees trust and confidence in variable pay schemes. 
Initiatives on "team building" are required on the part of the management at the time of 
launching the variable pay as variable pay and teamwork normally do not go together. 
Most of the employers generally ignore the importance of a balanced work life, which in 
turn negatively impact the employee's performance. The targets to the employees should 
be realistic and achievable, so that the employee may achieve it without compromising 
his time for his family, which is equally important for his mental and physical well being. 
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5.7. Making a successful Variable Pay Program 
Research findings indicate a few pre-requisites for successful variable pay scheme. 
Unless the company has a robust performance management system, any kind of variable 
pay plan may not be effective. Performance management process is the core of the entire 
system. Therefore it is vital to streamline and assess existing performance management 
system before announcing any variable pay. For improving the performance management 
system (before introducing VPLP), there is a need to do the following -
• Employees should have control over their performance. If employees are overly 
dependent on the actions and output of other employees or processes, they may have 
little control over their own performance. Variable pay programs that are not based on 
principles of employee empowerment are almost certainly doomed to fail. 
• Business goals must be clearly defined and adequately disseminated to employees, 
and they should be crystallized with their participation. 
• Performance must be measured regularly and credibly. An elaborate system of 
performance appraisal and feedback must be put in place, with regularly scheduled 
meetings as one component. 
The research has revealed that the performance appraisal systems of participating 
organizations have remained same post implementation of the scheme due to which 
employees agreed that discrimination has increased as management is favoring certain 
individuals. The objectives set for an individual's performance appraisal should act as a 
basis for ongoing dialogue throughout the year amongst the manager and the employee. 
Detailed feedback on the appraisal undertaken at the end of the year should be provided. 
Transparency in the whole process is the key factor in ensuring its success, which 
ultimately relies more on an effective measurement of performance than on the 
distribution of payment. (Armstrong and Stephens, 2005). 
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5.7.1. Designing a successful VPLP Scheme 
• The design of variable performance linked pay is a trade-off amongst various options, 
which have to take into account the background culture of each organization/country. 
There is no "best" solution. When designing new schemes, management should 
consider what would prove acceptable to large number of employees in the 
organizations. The Variable Performance Linked Pay scheme implemented for the 
purpose of ensuring high quality research and development work might not be 
successful; as blue collared employees who work on standardized processes will not 
be able to contribute effectively to the targets and hence may lose out. 
• Implementation problems need to be anticipated and ironed out. There ought to be 
minimum surprises during implementation. 
• Evaluations need to be conducted regularly and a variable performance linked pay 
system needs to be revised from time to time. For an incentive program to meet the 
objective of contributing to an organization's success, it is critical that it measures and 
rewards the right things. Britton (1997) suggests that incentive programs have a 
negative impact on motivation when they measure the wrong things. Consequently, it 
can result in negative consequences on long-term motivation. It may hamper 
employee relationships. It can create an aversion to taking risks. Hence, the key to the 
success of variable compensation is to have something that can be measured and 
understood—something that is linked to creating economic value for the company 
(Anfuso, 1995). 
Variable performance linked pay should be applied in an environment that maintains 
and supports a trust-based work relationship. In such an environment, there is a 
balance between formal and informal processes, with ongoing dialogue, information 
sharing, negotiation, mutual respect, and transparency being prioritized as shown in 
Variable performance linked pay schemes of companies based in USA and UK. It is 
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also suggested that Variable Performance Linked pay scheme requires a mature and 
well-established service culture and a stable political and policy environment. A 
human resource management strategy that uses pay to reinforce larger business 
strategies. Thus, organizations who wish to establish a variable pay plan need to 
custom design it as per the requirement of its own culture and its own employees. 
5.8. Scope for Future Research 
• The current study was done within National Capital Region (New Delhi) 
involving 8 companies and 300 employees. However there is a scope for a wide 
national-level study where one may cover different geographic segments and 
varied business conditions. 
• The current study involved companies with origin in four countries namely USA, 
UK, Korea and Japan. However it would of interest to assess a few more countries 
in the list such as China, UAE, Australia, Germany etc. 
A continent wise study could be very insightful such as difference in opinion of 
employees working in Asia Pacific vis a vis, employees working in Latin 
America, Middle East or Europe. 
Implementation of variable pay is the key to success. There could be a study 
comparing successful VPLP design of different companies. 
Another scope could be to understand one particular domain or industry such as 
financial services, BPO/KPO or. Manufacturing etc. to see if there is any similarly 
in the overall response. 
It would be interesting to examine whether gender difference in pay carries over 
into the realms of Variable Performance Linked Pay programs. 
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• 
As global competition intensifies, future research should also consider the need 
for fundamental changes in incentive programs. It is crucial that incentive 
programs remain competitive with those offered internationally as the labour 
market will also become more competitive as organizations seek incumbents with 
proven track records. 
To have more depth of the subject, one may attempt exploring the downside 
factors of VPLP in greater detail, which have been highlighted in this study. 
More studies can be carried out on the issue of whether reward systems do 
motivate. It is also essential to pay attention to aspects which are equally, perhaps 
even more-important than the Variable Performance Linked Pay itself, such as: 
o Reorganization of work processes; 
o Training; 
o Employee involvement and participative decision-making; 
o Opportunities to contribute ideas and knowledge; 
o Non-monetary recognition; 
o Career development; 
o Goal setting. 
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ANNEXUREI 
THE QUESTIONNAIRE 
SECTION 'A' 
Dear Respondent 
We are conducting a research on the impact of Variable Performance Linked Pay on employee 
performance. Our purpose is to have your candid feedback regarding variable pay. Your 
feedback will help us understand the benefits and optimization of variable performance linked 
pay plans. We express our sincere thanks to you for your co-operation. All the information 
given by you will be totally confidential and aggregated with responses from other 
organizations and their employees for reaching a common understanding. 
PLEASE DO NOT WRITE YOUR NAME ANYWHERE IN THE 
QUESTIONNAIRE 
SECTION 'B' 
ORGANIZATIONAL INFORMATION 
Name of the Organization 
Parental Base 
(Kindly Tick) 
USA 
D 
UK 
D 
Japan 
D 
Korea 
D 
Address of the Organization 
Date of Establishment in 
India 
Core Business Activities 
No. Of Employees Blue 
Collared 
White 
Collared 
Date of Implementation of 
Variable Performance 
Linked Scheme 
Brief Details about the 
scheme (Applicability, 
Salient Features etc) 
SECTION 'C^ 
INDIVIDUAL EMPLOYEE INFORMATION 
Name of the Organization 
Age 
Parental Base 
Gender 
Department * 
Designation 
Total Work Experience (Incl. 
Present Organization) 
Tenure in Variable Performance 
Linked Pay Programme in the 
current organization 
Nature of Job 
USA 
D 
UK 
D 
Male 
D 
Senior 
Management 
D 
Operations 
D 
Japan 
D 
Korea 
D 
Female 
D 
Internal 
Services 
D 
Others 
D 
< 3 Years 
D 
3-5 years 
D 
White Collared (Management/ 
Services/ Other than manual/ 
labour work) 
D 
More than 5 years 
D 
Blue Collared 
(Manual/Production/ Operations) 
D 
*Departments 
• Senior Management: Function/ Department Heads 
• Operations: People under Production/ Logistics / Field 
• Internal Services: People under Marketing/ HR/ Finance/ MIS and other 
departments 
• Others: People who don't come under above 
SECTION ^ D' 
SATISFACTION WITH VARIABLE PAY 
This section consists of a few questions to ascertain your general overall opinion about 
'Variable Performance Linked Pay' scheme that exist in your organization. Five Point scale 
has been used here where 5 denotes the Highest level of agreement/ satisfaction and I denotes 
the Lowest level of agreement/ satisfaction with the statement. Please rate it to the extent of 
your satisfaction / agreement with the statements given below. Kindly note that there are no 
right or wrong answers and we are just taking your opinion. 
1. Taking overall aspects into account (usage, benefits), how satisfied are you with your 
overall variable pay experience in your company? 
Extremely 
Satisfied 
5 4 3 2 
Extremely 
Dissatisfied 
1 
2. If the Variable Performance Linked Pay program were made optional, would you 
recommend it to your best friend in the organization? 
Definitely 
Recommend 
5 4 3 2 
Definitely Not 
Recommend 
1 
3. Considering all aspects of Variable Performance Linked Pay program; how do you rate 
your performance at work place post implementation of variable pay? 
Major 
Improvement 
5 4 3 2 
Major Decline 
1 
4. Considering all aspects of Variable Performance Linked Pay program; how do you rate 
its impact on market strength of the organization post implementation of the same? 
Major 
Improvement 
5 4 3 2 
Major Decline 
I 
5. Has the introduction of the Variable Performance Linked Pay program helped the 
organization retain its workforce? (E.g., has variable pay program influenced your 
willingness to stay more with the organization) 
Definitely Yes 
5 4 3 2 
Definitely Not 
1 
6. To what extent the Variable Performance Linked Pay program has influenced your 
motivation in the organization? 
Extremely 
Motivated 
5 4 3 2 
Extremely De-
motivated 
1 
Now Move to "Section E" 
SECTION E^^  
SPECIFIC FEEDBACK 
(Before and After Implementation) 
This section is meant to rate various dimensions of Variable Performance Linked Pay program 
on employee performance. There are two sets of rating scales - one on the left and the other on 
the right of the statements. Both the scales are same and have been explained below. The left 
side scale is to capture your views for the period before the implementation of the Variable 
Performance Linked Pay program. The right side scale is to capture your view for the period 
after implementation of the variable pay scheme. Please use your experience and rate 
appropriately. Please note that there are no right or wrong answers. We are just trying to get a 
candid feedback from you. 
SCALE 
Major Improvement / Extremely Satisfied 
Significant Improvement / Very Satisfied 
Somewhat Improved / Somewhat Satisfied 
Somewhat Decline/ Somewhat Dissatisfied 
Significant Decline/ Very Dissatisfied 
Major Decline / Extremely Dissatisfied 
6 
5 
4 
3 
2 
1 
Kindly choose the most appropriate one among the statements given 
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ANNEXURE 2 
TRPM 
What is TRI*M™? 
TRI*M^^ - one of the most successful and professional customer retention systems in the 
world. Tracking developments across a period of time provides a business with 
information on the impact of corporate policies and shows if they need to be changed. 
,TM TRI*M consists of three modules: 
Measuring: You can only manage it, if you measure it. 
Managing: Measuring without subsequent managing ultimately has no effect. 
Management, that lacks a sound factual basis, is highly liable to error. 
Monitoring: Action and effect must be constantly monitored to ensure the long-
term success of a business. 
TRI*M ^^ - the way to improve Stakeholder Management 
Good, strong customer /employee retention achieved and developed through employee 
commitment and identification with their own company, relationships with suppliers, 
financial service providers, shareholders and other such stakeholders, is a decisive factor 
for market success. The best customers are those which you gain and retain, and not those 
which first need to be found. TRI*M ^^ can be used as a holistic system, measuring and 
managing all dimensions of Stakeholder Management in a comparable way ('Balanced 
Scorecard'), it can equally be focused on a single dimension. Such specific elements 
include: 
Customer Retention (Satisfaction and Loyalty) 
Employee Commitment (Satisfaction, Motivation, Engagement) 
Shareholder Confidence (Trust, Intensity of Involvement) 
Internal Service Quality (Satisfaction, Value) 
Management Evaluation (Satisfaction, Effectiveness) 
Supplier Advantage (Satisfaction, Value) 
Public (Awareness, Image, Trust) 
Mergers & Acquisitions (Trust, Effectiveness) 
TRI*M"' is the name of the customer retention system introduced to the market in the 
early 1990s by Infratest Burtce. Today it is being very successfully employed as a 
continuous monitoring instrument by more than 500 clients throughout the world. TNS 
Infratest has continued developing TRI*M '^^  to produce an integrated system, which 
provides businesses in every field with support in terms of the introduction, design and 
implementation of stakeholder management. 
The TRI*M Index shows by a single number the level of employee 
commitment. It is constructed out of five questions: 
Overview of questions representing theTRPM Index 
Wouldyourecommendyourbusinessunitasanemployerto 
your friends and acquaintances on the basis of your experiences? • B Recommendation 
How would you rate the motivation of direct colleagues 
you are working with day to day? 
Motivation of 
colleagues 
